Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect1

Lecture 1

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 1 Postquam philosophus removit a principali consideratione huius scientiae ens per accidens, et ens secundum quod significat verum, hic incipit determinare de ente per se, quod est extra animam, de quo est principalis consideratio huius scientiae. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas partes. Haec enim scientia et determinat de ente inquantum est ens, et de primis principiis entium, ut in sexto libro est habitum. In prima ergo parte determinatur de ente. In secunda de primis principiis entis, in duodecimo libro, ibi, de substantia quidem et cetera. Quia vero ens et unum se consequuntur, et sub eadem consideratione cadunt, ut in principio quarti est habitum, ideo prima pars dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de ente. In secunda de uno et de his quae consequuntur ad unum, in decimo libro, ibi, unum quia multis dicitur. Ens autem per se, quod est extra animam, dupliciter dividitur, ut in quinto libro est habitum. Uno modo per decem praedicamenta, alio modo per potentiam et actum. Dividitur ergo prima pars in duas. In prima determinat de ente secundum quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta. In secunda determinat de ente secundum quod dividitur per potentiam et actum, in nono libro, ibi, ergo de primo ente et cetera.	1245. Having dismissed both accidental being and being which signifies the true from the principal study of this science, here the Philosopher begins to establish the truth about essential being (ens per se), which exists outside the mind and constitutes the principal object of study in this science. This is divided into two parts; for this science discusses both being as being and the first principles of being, as has been stated in Book VI (532:C 1145). Thus in the first part (560:C 1245) he establishes the truth about being; and in the second (1023:C2416), about the first principles of being. He does this in Book XII (“The study”). But since being and unity accompany each other and come within the scope of the same study, as has been stated at the beginning of Book IV (301:C 548), the first part is therefore divided into two sections. In the first he establishes the truth about being as being; and in the second (814:C 1920), about unity and those attributes which naturally accompany it. He does this in Book X (“It was pointed out”). Now essential being, which exists outside the mind, is divided in two ways, as has been stated in Book V (437:C 889); for it is divided, first, into the ten categories, and second, into the potential and the actual. Accordingly, the first part is divided into two sections. In the first he establishes the truth about being as divided into the ten categories; and in the second (742:C 1768), about being as divided into the potential and the actual. He does this in Book IX (“We have dealt”).
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 2 Prima autem pars dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit quod ad determinandum de ente, prout in decem praedicamenta dividitur, oportet determinare de sola substantia. In secunda incipit de substantia determinare, ibi, dicitur autem substantia et si non multiplicius et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod de substantia est determinandum. Secundo ostendit quid de ea sit tractandum, ibi, videtur autem substantia. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod intendens tractare de ente, de sola substantia debet tractare per rationem. Secundo per consuetudinem aliorum, ibi, et quod olim, et nunc et cetera. Intendit ergo in prima parte talem rationem ponere. Illud quod est primum inter entia quasi ens simpliciter et non secundum quid, sufficienter demonstrat naturam entis: sed substantia est huiusmodi; ergo sufficit ad cognoscendum naturam entis determinare de substantia. Circa hoc autem duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod substantia sit primum ens. Secundo ostendit quomodo dicatur primum, ibi, multipliciter quidem igitur dicitur primum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.	1246. The first part is divided again into two sections. In the first he shows that in order to establish the truth about being as divided into the ten categories, it is necessary to establish the truth about substance; and in the second (568)C 1270), he begins to do this (“The term substance”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (560:C 1247), he shows that it is necessary to settle the issue about substance. Second (565:C 1263), he indicates the things that have to be discussed about substance (“Now it seems”). In regard to the first he does two things. He shows that one who intends to treat being should investigate substances separately; and he does this, first, by giving an argument; and second (564:C 1260), by considering what others have been accustomed to do (“And the question”). Hence in the first part his aim is to give the following argument. That which is the first among the kinds of being, since it is being in an unqualified sense and not being with some qualification, clearly indicates the nature of being. But substance is being of this kind. Therefore to know the nature of being it suffices to establish the truth about substance. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that substance is the first kind of being; and second (563:C 1257), he shows in what way it is said to be first (“Now there are several”). In regard to the first he does two things. Metaphysics is about substance
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 3 Primo proponit intentum quod ens dicitur multipliciter, ut dictum est in quinto libro, in quo diviserat quoties dicuntur huiusmodi nomina, quia quoddam ens significat quid est et hoc aliquid, idest substantiam; ut per quid, intelligatur essentia substantiae, per hoc aliquid suppositum, ad quae duo omnes modi substantiae reducuntur, ut in quinto est habitum. Illud vero significat qualitatem vel quantitatem, aut aliquid aliorum praedicamentorum. Et cum ens tot modis dicatur, palam est quod inter omnia entia, primum est quod quid est, idest ens quod significat substantiam.	1247. First, he explains his thesis. He says that the term being is used in many senses (as has been stated in Book V (885) where he distinguished the different senses in which terms of this kind are used); for (1) in one sense being signifies (a) the whatness of a thing and (b) this particular thing, i.e., substance, inasmuch as by “the whatness of a thing” is meant the essence of a substance, and by “this particular thing,” an individual substance; and the different senses of substance are reduced to these two, as has been stated in Book V (440:C 898). And in another sense (2) it signifies quality or quantity or any one of the other categories. And since being is used in many senses, it is evident that being in the primary sense is the whatness of a thing, i.e., the being which signifies substance.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 4 Secundo ibi, nam quando probat propositum; et utitur tali ratione. Quod est per se et simpliciter in unoquoque genere, est prius eo quod est per aliud et secundum quid. Sed substantia est ens simpliciter et per seipsam: omnia autem alia genera a substantia sunt entia secundum quid et per substantiam: ergo substantia est prima inter alia entia.	1248. For when we state (561). Second, he proves his thesis by using the following argument: in every class of things that which exists of itself and is a being in an unqualified sense is prior to that which exists by reason of something else and is a being in a qualified sense. But substance is a being in an unqualified sense and exists of itself, whereas all classes of beings other than substance are beings in a qualified sense and exist by reason of substance. Therefore substance is the primary kind of being.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 5 Minorem autem dupliciter manifestat. Primo ex ipso modo loquendi sive praedicandi; dicens, quod ex hoc palam est quod substantia sit primum entium, quia quando dicimus de aliquo quale quid sit, dicimus ipsum esse aut bonum aut malum. Haec enim significant qualitatem, quae aliud est a substantia et quantitate. Tricubitum autem significat quantitatem, et homo significat substantiam. Et ideo quando dicimus quale est aliquid, non dicimus ipsum esse tricubitum neque hominem. Sed quando dicimus quid est de aliquo, non dicimus ipsum esse album, nec calidum, quae significant qualitatem; nec tricubitum, quod significat quantitatem; sed hominem aut Deum, quae significant substantiam.	1249. He makes the minor premise clear in two ways. He does this, first, by considering the way in which we speak or make predications. He says that it is evident from this that substance is the primary kind of being, because when we state of what sort a thing is we say that it is either good or evil; for this signifies quality, which differs from substance and quantity. Now three cubits long signifies quantity and man signifies substance. Therefore when we state of what sort a thing is, we do not say that it is three cubits long or a man. And when we state what a thing is, we do not say that it is white or hot, which signify quality, or three cubits long, which signifies quantity, but we say that it is a man or a god, which signifies substance.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 6 Ex quo patet quod illa quae significant substantiam, dicunt quid est aliquid absolute. Quae autem praedicant qualitatem, non dicunt quid est illud de quo praedicatur absolute, sed quale quid. Et simile est in quantitate, et aliis generibus.	1250. From this it is clear that terms signifying substance express what a thing is in an unqualified sense, whereas those signifying quality do not express what a thing is in an unqualified sense, but what sort of thing it is. The same is true of quantity and the other genera.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 7 Et ex hoc patet quod ipsa substantia dicitur ens ratione suiipsius, quia absolute significantia substantiam significant quid est hoc. Alia vero dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant secundum se aliquam quidditatem, quasi secundum se entia, cum non ita dicant absolute quid: sed eo quod sunt talis entis, idest eo quod habent aliquam habitudinem ad substantiam quae est per se ens; quia non significant quidditatem; inquantum scilicet quaedam sunt qualitates talis entis, scilicet substantiae, et quaedam quantitates, et aliae passiones, vel aliquid aliud tale, quod significatur per alia genera.	1251. From this it is clear that substance itself is said to be a being of itself, because terms which simply signify substance designate what this thing is. But other classes of things are said to be beings, not because they have a quiddity of themselves (as though they were beings of themselves, since they do not express what a thing is in an unqualified sense), but because “they belong to such a being,” i.e., because they have some connection with substance, which is a being of itself. For they do not signify quiddity, since some of them are clearly qualities of such a being, i.e., of substance, other quantities, other affections, or something of the sort signified by the other genera.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 8 Secundo ibi, unde et probat idem per quoddam signum. Quia enim alia entia non sunt entia nisi secundum quod referuntur ad substantiam, ideo potest esse dubitatio de aliis entibus in abstracto significatis, quando non significant cum aliqua habitudine ad substantiam: utrum sint entia vel non entia, scilicet utrum vadere, sanare et sedere et unumquodque istorum in abstracto significatorum sit ens aut non ens. Et similiter est in aliis talibus, quae in abstracto significantur; sive significentur per modum actionis, ut praedicta, sive non, ut albedo sive nigredo.	1252. Hence one may (562). Second he proves the same point by means of an example. The other kinds of beings are beings only inasmuch as they are related to substance. Therefore, since other beings when signified in the abstract do not designate any connection with substance, the question can arise whether they are beings or non-beings, for example, whether to walk, to be healthy, and to sit, and any one of these things which are signified in the abstract, is a being or a non-being. And it is similar in the case of other things such as these, which are signified in the abstract, whether they designate some activity, as the foregoing do, or whether they do not, as is the case with whiteness and blackness.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 9 Pro tanto autem videntur accidentia in abstracto significata esse non entia, quia nihil ipsorum est aptum natum secundum se esse; immo cuiuslibet eorum esse est alteri inesse, et non est possibile aliquid eorum separari a substantia; et ideo quando significantur in abstracto quasi sint secundum se entia et a substantia separata, videtur quod sint non entia. Licet modus significandi vocum non consequatur immediate modum essendi rerum, sed mediante modo intelligendi; quia intellectus sunt similitudines rerum, voces autem intellectuum, ut dicitur in primo perihermenias.	1253. Now accidents signified in the abstract seem to be non-beings, because no one of them is fitted by nature to exist of itself. In fact the being of each of them consists in their existing in something else, and no one of them is capable of existing apart from substance. Therefore when they are signified in the abstract as though they were beings of themselves and separate from substance, they seem to be non-beings. The reason is that words do not signify things directly according to the mode of being which they have in reality, but indirectly according to the mode in which we understand them; for concepts are the likenesses of things, and words the likenesses of concepts, as is stated in Book I of the Peri hermenias.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 10 Licet autem modus essendi accidentium non sit ut per se sint, sed solum ut insint, intellectus tamen potest ea per se intelligere, cum sit natus dividere ea quae secundum naturam coniuncta sunt. Et ideo nomina abstracta accidentium significant entia quae quidem inhaerent, licet non significent ea per modum inhaerentium. Essent autem significata per huiusmodi nomina non entia, si non inessent in re.	1254. Moreover, even though the mode of being which accidents have is not one whereby they may exist of themselves but only in something else, still the intellect can understand them as though they existed of themselves; for it is capable by nature of separating things which are united in reality. Hence abstract names of accidents signify beings which inhere in something else, although they do not signify them as inhering. And non-beings would be signified by names of this kind, granted that they would not inhere in something else.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 11 Et quia ista in abstracto significata videntur non entia, magis videntur entia nomina accidentium concreta. Magis autem videtur aliquid entium esse vadens et sedens et sanans quia determinatur eis aliquod subiectum per ipsam nominis significationem, inquantum significantur in concretione ad subiectum. Hoc autem subiectum est substantia. Et ideo unumquodque talium nominum, quae significant accidens in concreto, apparet in tali categoria, idest videtur importare praedicamentum substantiae; non ita quod praedicamentum substantiae sit pars significationis talium nominum (album enim, ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat); sed inquantum huiusmodi nomina significant accidentia ut inhaerentia substantiae. Bonum autem aut sedens non dicitur sine hoc, idest sine substantia. Significat enim accidens concretum substantiae.	1255. Further, since these accidents signified in the abstract appear to be non-beings, it seems rather to be the concrete names of accidents that signify beings. And “if anything is a being,” it seems rather to be “the thing that walks and sits and is healthy,” because some subject is determined by them by reason of the very meaning of the term, inasmuch as they designate something connected with a subject. Now this subject is substance. Therefore every term of this kind which signifies an accident in the concrete “appears in a definite category,” i.e., it seems to involve the category of substance, not in such a way that the category of substance is a part of the meaning of such terms (for white in the categorical sense indicates quality alone), but so that terms of this sort signify accidents as inhering in a substance. And we do not use the terms “good or sitting without this,” i.e., without substance; for an accident signifies something connected with substance.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 12 Et quia accidentia non videntur entia prout secundum se significantur, sed solum prout significantur in concretione ad substantiam, palam est quod singula aliorum entium sunt entia propter substantiam. Et ex hoc ulterius apparet, quod substantia est primum ens, et ens simpliciter, et non ens secundum aliquid, idest secundum quid, sicut est in accidentibus. Esse enim album non est simpliciter esse, sed secundum quid. Quod ex hoc patet, quia cum incipit esse albus, non dicimus quod incipiat esse simpliciter, sed quia incipiat esse albus. Cum enim Socrates incipit esse homo, dicitur simpliciter quod incipit esse. Unde patet quod esse hominem significat esse simpliciter. Esse autem album significat esse secundum quid.	1256. Again, since accidents do not seem to be beings insofar as they are signified in themselves, but only insofar as they are signified in connection with substance, evidently it is by reason of this that each of the other beings is a being. And from this it also appears that substance is “the first kind of being and being in an unqualified sense and not being of a special sort,” i.e., with some qualification, as is the case with accidents; for to be white is not to be in an unqualified sense but with some qualification. This is clear from the fact that when a thing begins to be white we do not say that it begins to be in an unqualified sense, but that it begins to be white. For when Socrates begins to be a man, he is said to begin to be in an unqualified sense. Hence it is obvious that being a man signifies being in an unqualified sense, but that being white signifies being with some qualification.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit multipliciter quidem. Ostendit quomodo substantia dicatur primum; et dicit quod cum hoc quod dico primum dicatur multis modis, ut in quinto est habitum, tribus modis substantia est prima inter omnia entia: scilicet secundum cognitionem, et secundum definitionem et secundum tempus. Et quod sit prima tempore aliis, ex hoc probatur, quod nullum aliorum praedicamentorum est separabile a substantia, sola autem substantia est separabilis ab aliis: nullum enim accidens invenitur sine substantia, sed aliqua substantia invenitur sine accidente. Et sic patet, quod non quandocumque est substantia, est accidens, sed e contrario: et propter hoc substantia est prior tempore.	1257. Now there are several (563). Here he shows in what respect substance is said to be first. He says that, since the term first is used in several senses, as has been explained in Book V (936), then substance is the first of all beings in three respects: in the order of (1) knowing, in (2) definition, and in (3) time. (3) He proves that it is first in time by this argument: none of the other categories is capable of existing apart from substance, but substance alone is capable of existing apart from the others; for no accident is found without a substance, but some substance is found without an accident. Thus it is clear that an accident does not exist whenever a substance does, but the reverse is true; and for this reason substance is prior in time.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 14 Et quod etiam sit prima secundum definitionem, patet, quia in definitione cuiuslibet accidentium oportet ponere definitionem substantiae. Sicut enim in definitione simi ponitur nasus, ita in definitione cuiuslibet accidentis ponitur proprium eius subiectum; et ideo sicut animal est prius definitione quam homo, quia definitio animalis ponitur in definitione hominis, eadem ratione substantia est prior definitione accidentibus.	1258. (2) It is also evident that it is first in definition, because in the definition of any accident it is necessary to include the definition of substance; for just as nose is given in the definition of snub, so too the proper subject of any accident is given in the definition of that accident. Hence just as animal is prior to man in definition, because the definition of animal is given in that of man, in a similar fashion substance is prior to accidents in definition.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 15 Quod etiam sit prior ordine cognitionis, patet. Illud enim est primum secundum cognitionem, quod est magis notum et magis manifestat rem. Res autem unaquaeque magis noscitur, quando scitur eius substantia, quam quando scitur eius quantitas aut qualitas. Tunc enim putamus nos maxime scire singula, quando noscitur quid est homo aut ignis, magis quam quando cognoscimus quale est aut quantum, aut ubi, aut secundum aliquod aliud praedicamentum. Quare etiam de ipsis, quae sunt in praedicamentis accidentium, tunc scimus singula, quando de unoquoque scimus quid est. Sicut quando scimus quid est ipsum quale, scimus qualitatem, et quando scimus quid est ipsum quantum, scimus quantitatem. Sicut enim alia praedicamenta non habent esse nisi per hoc quod insunt substantiae, ita non habent cognosci nisi inquantum participant aliquid de modo cognitionis substantiae, quae est cognoscere quid est.	1259. (1) It is evident too that substance is first in the order of knowing, for that is first in the order of knowing which is better known and explains a thing better. Now each thing is better known when its substance is known rather than when its quality or quantity is known; for we think we know each thing best when we know what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know of what sort it is or how much it is or where it is or when we know it according to any of the other categories. For this reason too we think that we know each of the things contained in the categories of accidents when we know what each is; for example, when we know what being this sort of thing is, we know quality; and when we know what being how much is, we know quantity. For just as the other categories have being only insofar as they inhere in a substance, in a similar way they can be known only insofar as they share to some extent in the mode according to which substance is known, and this is to know the whatness of a thing.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit et quod ostendit idem, scilicet quod de substantia sola est agendum, ex consuetudine aliorum philosophorum: dicens, quod cum sit quaesitum et semper dubitatum apud philosophos et olim quantum ad praeteritum, et nunc quantum ad praesens, quid est ens: hoc nihil aliud est quaerere et dubitare, quam quid est substantia rerum.	1260. And the question (564). Here he proves the same point, namely, that it is necessary to treat substance separately, by considering what other philosophers have been accustomed to do. He says that when one raises the question what being is (and this is a question which has always caused difficulty for philosophers both “formerly,” i.e., in the past, and “now,” i.e., in the present), this is nothing else than the question or problem what the substance of things is.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 17 Hoc enim ens, scilicet substantiam, quidam dixerunt esse unum vel immobile, sicut Parmenides et Melissus, vel mobile, sicut antiqui naturales ponentes unum tantum materiale principium rerum. Solam autem materiam putabant ens esse substantiam. Et sic patet, quod cum ponerent unum ens propter unum materiale principium, per unum ens intelligebant unam substantiam. Quidam vero posuerunt plura entia quam unum, qui scilicet posuerunt plura principia materialia, et per consequens plures rerum substantias. Quorum quidam posuerunt ea finita, ut Empedocles quatuor elementa; quidam vero infinita, ut Anaxagoras infinitas partes consimiles, et Democritus infinita indivisibilia corpora.	1261. For some men, such as Parmenides (65:C 138) and Melissus (65:C 140), said that “this being,” i.e., substance, is one and immobile, whereas others, such as the ancient philosophers of nature, who maintained (67:C 145) that there is only one material principle of things, said that it is mobile. And they thought that matter alone is being and substance. Hence when they claimed that there is one being because there is one material principle, they obviously understood by one being, one substance. Other men maintained that there are more beings than one, namely, those who posited (67:C 145) many material principles, and consequently, many substances of things. And some of this group held that these principles are limited in number, for example, Empedocles, who posited (68:C 148) four elements; and others held that they are unlimited in number, for example, Anaxagoras, who posited (44:C go) an unlimited number of like parts, and Democritus, who posited (55:C 113) an unlimited number of indivisible bodies.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 18 Et ideo si alii philosophi tractantes de entibus attendebant ad solas substantias, et nobis etiam speculandum est de sic ente, idest de substantia quid ipsa sit. Et hoc inquam maxime, quia de hac principaliter intendimus. Et primo, quia per eam alia cognoscuntur et solum, ut est dicere quia de substantia sola determinando, de omnibus aliis notitiam facit. Et ita quodam modo solum de substantia determinat, et quodam modo non solum. Hoc autem significat cum dicit ut est dicere vel ut ita dicatur, quod consuevimus dicere de his quae non usquequaque sunt vera.	1262. If, then, the other philosophers in treating of beings paid attention to substances alone, we too should investigate “what this kind of being is,” i.e., what substance itself is. And this we must do, I say, chiefly, because this is our principal aim; and primarily, because by means of it the other kinds of being are known; and solely, as we might say, because by establishing what is true about substance by itself, one acquires a knowledge of all the other kinds of being. Thus in one sense he deals with substance separately, and in another sense not. He indicates this when he says “as we might say” or inasmuch as we might speak in this way, as we are accustomed to say of things which are not true in every respect.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit videtur autem ostendit quid determinandum sit de substantia: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit opiniones aliorum de substantia. Secundo dicit, quid de earum veritate est inquirendum, ibi, de his ergo et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quid sit manifestum circa substantias; dicens, quod esse substantiam manifestissime inest corporibus. Unde animalia et plantas et partes eorum dicimus esse substantias, et etiam alia naturalia corpora, ut ignem, terram, et aquam et talium singula, idest talia elementaria corpora, sicut aerem et vaporem secundum opinionem Heracliti, et alia media secundum opinionem aliorum. Et etiam omnes partes elementorum, et etiam corpora, quae sunt composita ex elementis, vel ex aliquibus partibus elementorum, sicut particularia corpora mixta aut ex omnibus elementis, idest totis, sicut tota ipsa sphaera activorum et passivorum et sicut etiam caelum quod et quoddam corpus naturale praeter elementa dicimus esse substantiam, et partes eius, ut astra et luna, et sol.	1263. Now it seems (565). Here he indicates the things that have to be discussed about substance; and in regard to this he does two things. First (565:C 1263), he gives the opinions that other men have held about substance. Second (567:C 1268), he states that it is necessary to determine which of their opinions are true (“Regarding these matters”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (565), he indicates the things that are evident about substance. He says that substantial being is found most obviously in bodies. Thus we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural bodies such as fire, earth, water, “and particular things of this kind,” i.e., such elemental bodies as earth and fire, according to the opinion of Heraclitus (42:C 87), and other intermediate entities, according to the opinions of others. We also say that all parts of the elements are substances, as well as the bodies composed of the elements, whether of some of the elements, as particular compounds, or “of all the elements,” i.e., the whole of the various elements, as this whole sphere of active and passive beings; and as we also say that “a heaven,” which is a natural body distinct from the elements, is a substance, and also its parts, such as the stars, the moon and the sun.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 20 Sed utrum hae sensibiles substantiae sint solum substantiae secundum quod ponebant antiqui naturales, vel etiam sint aliquae aliae substantiae ab istis, sicut ponebant Platonici, vel etiam istae non sint substantiae, sed solum sint aliae substantiae ab istis, perscrutandum est.	1264. But whether these sensible substances are the only substances, as the ancient philosophers of nature claimed, or whether there are also some substances which differ from these, as the Platonists claimed, or whether these too are not substances but only certain things which differ from these, must be investigated.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 21 Secundo ibi, videntur quibusdam recitat opiniones philosophorum de substantiis non manifestis, dicens, quod quibusdam videtur, quod termini corporis sint rerum substantiae, ut scilicet superficies, et linea et punctus et unitas sint magis substantiae quam corpus et solidum. Et haec opinio dividitur: quia quidam nihil talium terminorum opinabantur esse separata a sensibilibus, scilicet Pythagorici. Alii vero ponebant quaedam entia sempiterna a sensibilibus separata, quae sunt plura et magis entia quam sensibilia: magis inquam entia, quia ista sunt incorruptibilia et immobilia, haec autem corruptibilia et mobilia; plura vero, quia sensibilia sunt unius ordinis tantum, separata vero duorum: sicut Plato posuit duas substantias separatas, idest duos ordines substantiarum separatarum, scilicet species vel ideas, et mathematica. Et tertium ordinem posuit substantias corporum sensibilium.	1265. Again, it seems (566). Second, he describes the philosophers’ opinions about those substances which are not evident. He says that it seems to some philosophers that the limits of bodies are the substances of things, i.e., that surface, line, point and unit are substances to a greater degree than a body or solid. And those who held this opinion differed in their views; because some, the Pythagoreans, thought that no limits of this kind are separate from sensible bodies, while others thought that there are certain eternal beings which are separate from and more numerous than sensible things and have being to a greater degree. I say “have being to a greater degree,” because they are incorruptible and immobile, whereas sensible bodies are corruptible and mobile; and “more numerous,” because while sensible bodies belong only to one order, these separate beings belong to two, inasmuch as “Plato claimed that there are two kinds of separate substances,” or two orders of separate substances, namely, the separate Forms or Ideas and the objects of mathematics; and he also posited a third order—the substances of sensible bodies.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 22 Sed Leucippus, qui successor fuit Platonis, et ex sorore nepos, posuit plures ordines substantiarum, et in unoquoque etiam inchoavit ab uno, quod ponebat esse principium in quolibet ordine substantiarum. Sed aliud quidem unum ponebat esse principium numerorum, quos ponebat esse primas substantias post species; aliud autem magnitudinum, quas ponebat esse secundas substantias; et demum ponebat substantiam animae; et hoc modo protendebat ordinem substantiarum usque ad corruptibilia corpora.	1266. But Speusippus, who was Plato’s nephew and his successor, posited many orders of substances, and in each order he also began with the unit, which he posited as the principle in each order of substance. But he posited one kind of unit as the principle of numbers, which he claimed to be the first substances after the Forms, and another as the principle of continuous quantities, which he claimed to be second substances; and finally he posited the substance of the soul. Hence by proceeding in this way he extended the order of substances right down to corruptible bodies.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 23 Sed quidam differebant a Platone et Leucippo, quia non distinguebant inter species, et primum ordinem mathematicorum, qui est numerorum. Dicebant enim species et numeros habere eamdem naturam, et omnia alia esse habita, idest consequenter se habentia ad numeros, scilicet lineas et superficies usque ad primam caeli substantiam, et alia sensibilia, quae sunt in ultimo ordine.	1267. But some thinkers differed from Plato and Speusippus, because they did not distinguish between the Forms and the first order of mathematical objects, which is that of numbers. For they said that the Forms and numbers have the same nature, and that “all other things depend on these,” i.e., are related successively to numbers, namely, lines and surfaces, right down to the first substance of the heavens and the other sensible bodies which belong to this last order.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 24 Deinde cum dicit de his igitur. Ostendit quid circa praedicta dicendum sit; dicens, quod dicendum est quid de praedictis dicitur bene aut non bene, et quae sunt substantiae, et utrum praedicta mathematica et species sint aliquid praeter res sensibiles, aut non. Et illae substantiae si sint praeter sensibiles, quem modum essendi habeant. Et si ista non sunt praeter sensibiles substantias, utrum sit aliqua alia substantia separabilis, et quare et quomodo; aut nulla est substantia praeter sensibiles.	1268. Regarding these matters (567). Here he explains what should be said about the foregoing opinions. He says that it is necessary to determine which of the above opinions are true and which are not; and what things are substances; and whether the objects of mathematics and the separate Forms are substances in addition to sensible ones, or not; and if they are substances, what mode of being they have; and if they are not substances in addition to sensible ones, whether there is any other separate substance, and [if so], why and how; or whether there is no substance in addition to sensible substances.
lib. 7 l. 1 n. 25 Hoc enim determinabit in duodecimo huius et infra. Sed tamen antequam haec determinentur, oportet primo ponere et describere quid sit substantia in istis sensibilibus, in quibus substantia manifesta invenitur. Quod quidem facit in hoc septimo et in octavo sequenti.	1269. For he will settle this issue below and in Book XII (1055:C 2488) of this work. Yet before this is done it is first necessary to posit and explain what it is that constitutes the substance of these sensible bodies in which substance is clearly found. He does this in the present book (568:C 1270) and in Book VIII (696:C 1687), which follows.