Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect11

Lecture 11

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 1 In ista parte determinat quamdam dubitationem, quae poterat oriri ex solutione praemissae quaestionis. Distinxerat enim, solvendo praemissam quaestionem, inter partes speciei, et partes individui, quod est compositum ex specie et ex materia. Et ideo hic quaerit, quae sint partes speciei, et quae non. Dividitur ergo ista pars in partes tres. In prima determinat hanc dubitationem. In secunda ostendit quid restat dicendum, ibi, utrum autem praeter materiam. Tertio recapitulat ea quae dicta sunt, ibi, quid quidem igitur est quod quid erat. Circa primum tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo solvit, ibi, quaecumque quidem igitur et cetera. Tertio solutionem manifestando colligit, ibi, palam autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum dictum sit quod partes speciei ponuntur in definitionibus, non autem partes compositi ex specie et materia, merito dubitatur quae sunt partes speciei, et quae non sunt partes speciei sed simul sumpti, idest individui, in quo simul sumitur natura speciei cum materia ipsa individuante.	1501. In this part he solves a problem which could arise from the answer to the foregoing question; for in answering that question he had distinguished the parts of the species from those of the individual thing, which is composed of species and matter. Hence he now inquires as to what parts are parts of the species and what are not. This part is therefore divided into three sections. In the first (629)C 1501) he solves the problem. In the second (638:C 1525) he shows what remains to be discussed (“But whether”). In the third (639:C 1529) he summarizes the points discussed (“We have stated”). He accordingly says, first (629), that since it has been stated that the parts of the species are given in definitions, but not the parts of the thing composed of matter and species, there is a real problem as to what parts are parts of the species, and what are not parts of the species “but of the concrete whole,” i.e., the individual thing, in which the nature of the species is taken along with individuating matter.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 2 Si enim hoc non sit manifestum, non poterimus aliquid recte definire, quia definitio nunquam est rei singularis, sed solum universalis, ut supra dictum est. Et inter universalia proprie est species, quae constituitur ex genere et differentia, ex quibus omnis definitio constat. Genus enim non definitur, nisi etiam sit species. Unde patet, quod nisi sciatur quae pars sit sicut materia, et quae non est sicut materia sed sicut ad speciem ipsam pertinens, non erit manifestum qualis debeat esse definitio rei assignanda, cum non assignetur nisi speciei, et oporteat in definitione speciei partes speciei ponere, et non partes quae sunt posteriores specie.	1502. For if this is not evident, we will be unable to define anything correctly, because definition never pertains to the singular but only to the universal, as was stated above (627)C 149397). And among universals the species is properly included, and this is constituted of genus and difference, of which every definition is composed; for a genus is defined only if there is also a species. Hence it is clear that unless we know what part has the nature of matter, and what part does not but pertains to the species itself, it will not be evident as to what definition should be assigned to a thing, since it is assigned only to the species. And in the definition of the species it is necessary to give the parts of the species and not those which are subsequent to it.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit quaecumque quidem solvit propositam dubitationem. Et circa haec tria facit. Primo ponit solutionem secundum opinionem Platonicorum. Secundo improbat eam, ibi, accidit itaque unam. Tertio solvit secundum suam sententiam, ibi, quare omnia reducere. Circa primum duo facit. Primo solvit propositam dubitationem quantum ad sensibilia. Secundo quantum ad mathematica, ibi, quoniam autem. Primo ergo dicit, quod in quibusdam manifestum est, quod materia non sit pars speciei, sicut in omnibus illis quae manifeste apparent fieri in materiis diversis secundum speciem, sicut circulus invenitur fieri in aere et in lapide et in ligno. Unde manifestum est quod neque aes neque lapis neque lignum, est aliquid de substantia circuli, quasi pars existat huius speciei, quae est circulus. Est autem hoc manifestum propter hoc quod circulus a quolibet istorum separatur: nihil autem potest separari ab eo quod est pars speciei.	1503. Therefore in the case (630). He solves the proposed problem; and in regard to this he does three things. First (630:C 1503), he gives the solution according to the opinion of the Platonists. Second (632:C 1512), he rejects it (“It follows”). Third (635:C 196), he solves it by giving his own opinion (“Hence to reduce”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he solves the proposed difficulty in reference to sensible things; and second (631:C 1507), in reference to the objects of mathematics (“Now since this seems”). He says, first (630), then, that In the case of some things it is evident that matter is not part of the species, for example, all those which appear to be produced in specifically different matters, as a circle is found to be produced in bronze, in stone and in wood. Hence it is evident that neither bronze nor stone nor wood is part of the substance of circle, as though it were a part of the form, circle. And this is evident by reason of the fact that circle may be separated from each of these matters, and nothing can be separated from something which is a part of its form.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 4 Sed quaedam sunt, quorum species non inveniuntur fieri in diversis materiis secundum speciem, sed semper in eisdem. Sicut species hominis, quantum ad hoc quod visibiliter apparet, non invenitur nisi in carnibus et ossibus. Nihil tamen prohibet, ut etiam ista, quae non videntur a propria materia separata, similiter se habeant ad suas materias sicut illa quae esse possunt in diversis materiis, et ab unaquaque earum separari.	1504. But there are some things whose species do not occur as produced in specifically different matters, but always in the same matters; for example, the species of man insofar as it is apparent to the sense of sight is found only in flesh and bones. However, nothing prevents those things which do not seem to be separate from their proper matter from also being related in the same way to their own matters as those things which can exist in different matters and be separated from each of them.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 5 Si enim poneremus quod non viderentur sensibiliter aliqui circuli nisi ex aere, nihilominus tamen sic esset pars speciei circuli aes. Et licet tunc non separaretur circulus actu ab aere, separaretur tamen mente, quia species circuli posset intelligi sine aere, ex quo aes non esset pars speciei circuli, licet difficile sit mente auferre et separare abinvicem quae actu non separantur. Non enim est hoc nisi illorum qui per intellectum supra sensibilia elevari possunt.	1505. For if we were to maintain that some circles would not be apparent to the senses unless they were composed of bronze, none the less bronze would not be in this way a part of the form of circle. And even though circle would not then be actually separate from bronze, it would still be separable in thought, since the species of circle can be understood without bronze, since bronze is not part of the form of circle, although it is difficult to mentally separate and isolate from each other those things which are not actually separate; for this belongs only to those things which can be raised above the sensible order by the intellect.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 6 Et similiter si hominis species semper apparet in carnibus et ossibus et talibus partibus, oportet quaerere, utrum istae partes sint speciei humanae et rationis, idest definitionis hominis; aut non sunt partes speciei, sed solum materia speciei, sicut aes circuli. Sed quia talis species non fit in aliis partibus materialibus quam in istis, ideo de facili non possumus separare hominem per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus. Videtur enim eadem ratio esse hic et in circulo, si omnes circuli essent aerei.	1506. And similarly, if the species of man always appears in flesh and bones and such parts, it is necessary to ask whether these are parts of man’s species “and of the intelligible expression,” or definition, of man; or whether they are not the species’ parts, but only the matter of the species, as bronze is the matter of a circle. But because such a species does not arise in other material parts than these, therefore we cannot by means of our intellect easily separate man from flesh and bones; for the reasoning seems to be the same in this case as in that of a circle, if all circles were of bronze.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem procedit ulterius prosequendo opinionem praetactam quantum ad mathematica; dicens, quod quia videtur hoc contingere in aliquibus, scilicet quod materia non sit pars speciei, quamvis species non inveniatur nisi in illa materia, sed non est manifestum quando et in quibus hoc contingat vel non contingat, ideo aliqui circa hoc dubitant non solum in naturalibus, sed etiam in mathematicis, ut in circulo et triangulo.	1507. Now since this (631). Then he continues his discussion by examining the opinion just touched on insofar as it relates to the objects of mathematics, He says that in some cases it seems possible for matter not to be a part of the species, although the species occurs only in matter, but it is not evident when and in what instances this is possible or not possible. Therefore some thinkers are puzzled about this, not only in reference to natural things but also in reference to the objects of mathematics, such as circles and triangles.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 8 Videtur enim eis, quod sicut materia sensibilis non est pars speciei in naturalibus, ita etiam quod materia intelligibilis non sit pars speciei in mathematicis. Materia autem figurarum mathematicarum intelligibilis, est continuum, ut linea vel superficies. Et ideo vult, quod linea non sit pars speciei circuli vel trianguli; quasi non sit competens quod triangulus et circulus definiantur per lineas et continuum, cum non sint partes speciei; sed omnia ista similiter dicantur ad circulum et triangulum, sicut carnes et ossa ad hominem, et aes et lapides ad circulum.	1508. For it seems to them that, just as sensible matter is not a part of the species of natural beings, in a similar fashion intelligible matter is not a part of the species of mathematical entities. Now the intelligible matter of mathematical figures is continuous quantity, such as lines and surfaces. Hence it was thought that a line is not part of the species of a circle or triangle (as if it were not right that a triangle and a circle should be defined by lines and by continuous quantity, since they are not parts of the species), but that all those things are related to a circle and a triangle in the same way that flesh and bones are related to man, and bronze and stones to circles.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 9 Removendo autem a triangulo et circulo continuum, quod est linea, nihil remanet nisi unitas et numerus, quia triangulus est tres lineas habens, et circulus unam. Et ideo, quia lineas non dicunt esse partes speciei, referunt omnes species ad numeros, dicentes quod numeri sunt species mathematicorum omnium. Dicunt enim quod ratio duorum est ratio lineae rectae, propter hoc quod linea recta duobus punctis terminatur.	1509. But when the continuous quantity, line, is removed from triangles and circles, the only thing that remains is the unit and number, because a triangle is a figure having three lines, and a circle is a figure having one. Therefore, not holding that lines are parts of the species, they refer all species to numbers, saying that numbers are the species of all mathematical entities; for they say that the intelligible structure of the number two is that of a straight line, because a straight line is terminated by two points.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 10 Sed circa hoc inter Platonicos ponentes ideas, est differentia quaedam. Quidam enim non ponentes mathematica media inter species et sensibilia, dicentes species esse numeros, dicunt ipsam lineam esse dualitatem, quia non ponunt lineam mediam differentem a specie lineae.	1510. But among the Platonists, who posit Ideas, there is a difference of opinion on this matter; for some of them, i.e,, those who did not make the objects of mathematics an intermediate class between the Forms and sensible things but claimed that the Forms are numbers, said that the line is the number two, because they did not hold that there is an intermediate line differing from the Form of a line.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 11 Quidam vero dicunt quod dualitas est species lineae, et non linea. Linea enim est quoddam mathematicum medium inter species et sensibilia; et dualitas est ipsa species. Et secundum eos, in quibusdam non differunt species et cuius est species, sicut in numeris, quia ipsas species dicebant esse numeros. Unde idem dicebant esse dualitatem et speciem dualitatis. Sed lineae hoc non accidit, secundum eos, quia linea iam dicit aliquid participans speciem, cum multae lineae inveniantur esse in una specie; quod non esset si ipsamet linea esset ipsa species.	1511. But others said that the number two is not a line but the Form of a line; for according to them the line is a mathematical intermediate between the Forms and sensible things; and they said that the number two is the Form itself of the number two. And according to them there are some things in which the Form and the thing of which it is the Form do not differ, for example, numbers. Hence they said that the number two and the Form of twoness are the same. But this is not the case with a line, in their opinion, because a line already expresses something participating in a Form, since there are found to be many lines in one species; and this would not be so if the line itself were a separate Form.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit accidit itaque improbat praedictam solutionem; et ponit tres rationes: quarum prima est. Si soli numeri sint species, omnia ista quae participant uno numero participant una specie. Multa autem sunt diversa specie quae participant uno numero. Unus enim et idem numerus est in triangulo propter tres lineas, et in syllogismo propter tres terminos, et in corpore propter tres dimensiones. Accidit igitur multorum specie diversorum esse unam speciem. Quod non solum Platonicis sed etiam Pythagoricis accidit, qui etiam ponebant naturam omnium rerum esse numeros.	1512. It follows, then (632). He now rejects the solution given above; and he gives three arguments, of which the first is this: if numbers alone are separate Forms, all things which participate in one number will participate in one Form. But there are many specifically different things which participate in one number; for one and the same number is present in a triangle because of its three lines, and in a syllogism because of its three terms, and in a solid because of its three dimensions. Hence it follows that there is one Form of many things which are specifically different. This was the conclusion which faced not only the Platonists but also the Pythagoreans, who also claimed that the nature of everything consists in numbers.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 13 Secundam ponit ibi, et contingit. Quae talis est. Si carnes et ossa non sunt partes speciei humanae, nec lineae speciei trianguli, pari ratione nulla materia est pars speciei. Sed secundum Platonicos, in numero dualitas attribuitur materiae, unitas autem speciei: ergo sola unitas est species. Dualitas autem, et per consequens omnes alii numeri, tamquam materiam implicantes, non erunt species. Et sic una tantum erit species omnium rerum.	1513. And it is possible (633). Then he gives the second argument, which is as follows: if flesh and bones are not parts of the Form of man, and lines not parts of the Form of triangle, then for a like reason no matter is part of a Form. But in the case of numbers, according to the Platonists, the number two is attributed to matter and unity to Form. Therefore only unity constitutes Form. But the number two, and therefore all other numbers, inasmuch as they imply matter, will not be Forms. Hence there will only be one Form of all things.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 14 Tertiam ponit ibi, quamvis sic. Quae talis est. Illa sunt unum quorum species una est. Si igitur omnium species est una, sequetur quod omnia sint unum secundum speciem, et non solum quae videntur esse diversa. Potest tamen dici quod hoc tertium non est alia ratio a secunda; sed est inconveniens, quod ex secunda conclusione sequitur secundae rationis.	1514. However, in this way (634). Here he gives the third argument, which is as follows: those things are one whose Form is one. Hence if there is only one Form of all things, it follows that all things are one formally, and not just those which seem to be different [but in reality are not]. Yet it can be said that this third argument does not differ from the second one, but that it is an absurdity which follows as a conclusion of the second argument.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 15 Posita ergo ratione cui praemissa solutio innitebatur, et positis rationibus contra praemissam solutionem, concludit: dictum esse quod illa quae sunt circa definitiones habent dubitationem et qua de causa. Et sic patet quod per omnia praemissa ostendere voluit difficultatem praemissae dubitationis.	1515. Therefore having given the arguments on which the foregoing solution is based, and having given two arguments against this solution, he concludes that the questions about definitions constitute a problem, and that the reason for this has been stated. Thus it is evident that he wishes to use everything which has been set down to expose the difficulty connected with the foregoing problem.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit quare omnia solvit praemissam quaestionem secundum propriam sententiam. Et primo quantum ad naturalia. Secundo quantum ad mathematica, ibi, circa mathematica. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo praedicta inconvenientia sequuntur removentibus a specie rei omnia quae sunt materialia, sive sint sensibilia, sive non, patet ex dictis quod superfluum est omnes species rerum reducere ad numeros vel unitatem, et auferre totaliter materiam sensibilem et intelligibilem, sicut Platonici faciebant.	1516. Hence to reduce (635). He now gives the real solution of the foregoing problem based on his own doctrine. He does this first with regard to natural things; and second (636:C 1520), with regard to the objects of mathematics (“And with regard”). He accordingly says, first (635), that since the absurdities mentioned above plague those removing from the species of a thing all material parts, whether they are sensible or not, it is evident from what has been said that it is futile to reduce all species of things to numbers or to the unit and to do away completely with sensible and intelligible matter as the Platonists did.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 17 Quia quaedam species rerum non sunt formae sine materia; sed sunt hoc in hoc forsan, idest formae in materia: ita quod id quod resultat ex forma in materia existente species est. Aut si non sunt sicut forma in materia, sunt se habentia sicut illa quae habent formam in materia. Proprie enim formam in materia habent naturalia, quibus quodam modo assimilantur mathematica, etiam inquantum proportio figurae circuli vel trianguli ad lineas, est sicut proportio formae hominis ad carnes et ossa. Et ideo, sicut species hominis non est forma aliqua sine carnibus et ossibus, ita forma circuli vel trianguli non est aliqua forma sine lineis. Et ideo parabola quam consuevit dicere de animali Socrates iunior, non se bene habet.	1517. For some forms of things are not forms without matter, but are “a this in this,” i.e., a form in matter, in such a way that what results from the form existing in matter is the species. Or if they are not like a form in matter, they are like things which have a form in matter; for properly speaking natural things have form in matter, and the objects of mathematics also resemble these in a way inasmuch as the figure of a circle or a triangle is related to lines as the form of man is related to flesh and bones. Therefore just as man’s species is not a form without flesh and bones, neither is the form of a triangle or of a circle a form without lines. Hence the analogy of animal, which the younger Socrates was accustomed to use, is not a good one.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 18 Videtur autem ipsum Platonem Socratem iuniorem nominare, quia in omnibus libris suis introducit Socratem loquentem, propter hoc quod fuerat magister eius. Opinionem autem Platonis, de materialitate naturalium specierum, vocat parabolam, quia fabulis assimilatur quae componuntur ad aliquam sententiam metaphorice insinuandam. Propter quod in tertio superius dixit, quod haec opinio assimilatur opinionibus fingentium deos esse, et quod formae eorum sunt sicut formae humanae. Ideo autem praedicta opinio non bene se habet, quia ducit extra veritatem, in eo quod facit opinari quod hoc modo contingat esse hominem sine partibus materialibus, scilicet sine carnibus et ossibus, sicut contingit circulum esse sine aere quod manifeste non pertinet ad species circuli.	1518. Now it seems that Plato himself is called the younger Socrates, because in all his works he introduces Socrates as the speaker, since Socrates was his master. And Plato’s opinion about the materiality of natural species he calls an analogy, because it is similar to fables, which are devised for the purpose of conveying some opinion by means of a metaphor; and this is why he said above in Book III (254:C 471; 257:C 474), that this opinion resembles the opinion of those who assume that there are gods and that their forms are like human ones. Hence the view expressed above is not a good one, because it leads us away from the truth insofar as it makes us think that it is possible for man to exist without flesh mid bones, just as it is possible for a circle to exist without bronze, which clearly does not belong to the species of a circle.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 19 Sed hoc non est simile. Non enim similiter se habet homo ad carnes et ossa, sicut circulus ad aes; quia circulus non est aliquod sensibile secundum suam rationem. Potest enim intelligi sine materia sensibili. Unde aes, quod est materia sensibilis, non est pars speciei circuli. Sed animal videtur esse quoddam sensibile. Non enim potest definiri sine motu. Animal enim discernitur a non animali sensu et motu, ut patet in primo libro de anima. Et ideo non potest definiri animal sine partibus corporalibus habentibus se aliquo modo debito ad motum. Non enim manus est pars hominis quocumque modo se habens, sed quando est sic disposita quod potest perficere opus manus; quod non potest facere sine anima, quae est principium motus. Quare oportet quod manus cuiuscumque sit pars hominis, secundum quod est animata. Secundum vero quod est inanimata, non est pars, sicut manus mortua vel depicta. Unde oportet quod partes tales quae sunt necessariae ad perficiendum operationem speciei propriam, sint partes speciei; tam quae sunt ex parte formae, quam quae sunt ex parte materiae.	1519. But this case is not similar; for a man is not related to flesh and bones in the same way that a circle is related to bronze, because a circle is not something sensible in its own intelligible expression; for it can be understood without sensible matter. Hence, bronze, which is sensible matter, is not part of the species of a circle. But an animal seems to be a sensible thing since it cannot be defined without motion; for an animal is distinguished from something that is not an animal by means of sensation and motion, as is clear in Book I of The Soul. Therefore an animal cannot be defined without including bodily parts, which are disposed in a proper way for motion; for the hand is not a part of man when it exists in every state, but when it is disposed in such a way that it can perform the proper work of a hand; and this it cannot do without the soul, which is the principle of motion. Hence it is necessary that the hand be a part of man insofar as it is animated, but it is not a part of man insofar as it is not animated, like the hand of a corpse or that in a painting. Therefore such parts as are required for the carrying out of the proper operation of the species must be parts of the species; both those which pertain to the form and those which pertain to matter.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 20 Deinde cum dicit circa mathematica solvit quaestionem quantum ad mathematica. Videtur enim post solutionem de naturalibus positam, adhuc relinqui sub dubio de mathematicis. Dixerat enim quod, cum animal sit sensibile, non potest definiri sine partibus sensibilibus, sicut circulus potest definiri sine aere, quod est sensibilis materia. Et ideo circa mathematica quaeritur quare rationes, idest definitiones partium, non sunt partes rationum totorum, sicut quare hemicycla, idest semicirculi, non ponuntur in definitione circuli. Non enim potest dici, quod haec, scilicet hemicycla, sint sensibilia, sicut aes est sensibilis materia.	1520. And with regard to (636). Next he answers the question with regard to the objects of mathematics; for though the solution has been given above with regard to natural things, it seems that the difficulty still remains with regard to the objects of mathematics; for he had said above that since an animal is sensible it cannot be defined without sensible parts, as a circle can be defined without bronze, which is sensible matter. Therefore “with regard to the objects of mathematics the question arises why the intelligible expressions of the parts,” i.e., the definitions of the parts, “are not parts of the intelligible expression of the whole,” e.g., why semicircles, or half-circles, are not given in the definition of a circle-, for it cannot be said that these, namely, semicircles, are sensible things, as bronze is sensible matter.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 21 Sed solvit quod hoc nihil differt quantum ad propositum, utrum scilicet partes materiae sint sensibilia vel non sensibilia; quia etiam non sensibilium est aliqua materia intelligibilis. Et talis materia, quae scilicet non est pars speciei, est omnis eius quod non est quod quid erat esse et species eadem secundum se, sed est hoc aliquid, idest particulare aliquod demonstratum: quasi dicat: in omni eo quod non est ipsa sua species, sed est aliquod individuum determinatum in specie, oportet esse aliquas partes materiae quae non sunt partes speciei. Socrates enim, quia non est ipsa sua humanitas, sed est habens humanitatem, ideo habet in se partes materiales quae non sunt partes speciei, sed quae sunt partes huius materiae individualis quae est individuationis principium, ut has carnes et haec ossa.	1521. But he answers that it makes no difference to his thesis whether the material parts are sensible or not, because there is intelligible matter even in things which are not sensible. And such matter—the kind which is not a part of the species—belongs to everything whose essence or species is not the same as itself “but is a particular thing,” i.e., a determinate particular, as if to say that in everything which is not its own species but is a definite individual determined in species there must be certain material parts which are not parts of the species. For since Socrates is not identical with his own humanity but has humanity, for this reason he has in himself certain material parts which are not parts of his species but of this individual matter, which is the principle of individuation, for example, this flesh and these bones.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 22 Et similiter in hoc circulo sunt hae lineae quae non sunt partes speciei. Unde patet quod huiusmodi non sunt partes circuli qui est universalis, sed sunt partes singularium circulorum, sicut dictum est prius. Et propter hoc semicirculi non ponuntur in definitione circuli universalis, quia sunt partes singularium circulorum, et non universalis. Et hoc est verum tam in materia sensibili, quam in materia intelligibili. Utroque enim modo invenitur materia, ut ex dictis patet. Si autem esset aliquod individuum quod esset ipsa sua species, sicut si Socrates esset ipsa sua humanitas, non essent in Socrate aliquae partes quae non essent partes humanitatis.	1522. And, similarly, in this particular circle there are these particular lines which are not parts of the species. Hence it is clear that parts of this kind are not parts of the universal circle but of singular circles, as was stated above (627)C 1492). And for this reason semicircles are not included in the definition of the universal circle, because they are parts of singular circles and not of the universal circle. This is true both of sensible and intelligible matter; for matter is found in both modes, as is evident from what has been said. But if there were some individual which was the same as its own species, for example, if Socrates were his own humanity, there would be no parts in Socrates which would not be parts of humanity.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 23 Deinde cum dicit palam autem recolligit praedictam solutionem, exemplificando eam in animali; dicens, palam esse quod anima est substantia prima, idest forma animalis, corpus autem materia, homo autem aut animal id quod est ex utrisque, scilicet in universali, sed Socrates et Coriscus quod est ex utrisque in particulari. Quia anima dicitur dupliciter, scilicet in universali et particulari, ut anima et haec anima. Ideo autem oportet quod significatur per modum totius, dici universaliter et singulariter, ea ratione quia anima dicitur dupliciter: quia hoc competit secundum utramque opinionem hominum de anima. Sicut enim supra dictum est, alii dicunt hominem et animal esse animam, alii vero dicunt hominem et animal non esse animam, sed totum, scilicet compositum ex anima et corpore.	1523. And it is also (637). He now sums up the solution given above by using animal as an example. He says that it is evident that the soul “is a primary substance,” i.e., the form of animal, and that the body is matter, and that “man is the composite of both,” i.e., insofar as they are taken universally; but that Socrates or Coriscus is the composite of both taken particularly, because “soul is taken in two senses,” i.e., universally and particularly, as soul and as this soul. Hence what is signified as a whole must be taken both universally and singularly, in the way in which soul is taken in two senses, because this is in keeping with both views which men take of the soul. For, as was said above (624:C 1467), some claim that a man or an animal is its soul, whereas others say that a man or an animal is not its soul “but the whole,” i.e., the composite of soul and body.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 24 Patet ergo quod secundum illam opinionem quae dicit hominem esse animam, anima dicitur universaliter et singulariter, ut anima et haec anima; et homo etiam dicitur universaliter et particulariter sive singulariter, scilicet homo et hic homo. Similiter etiam secundum hanc opinionem, quae dicit hominem esse compositum ex anima et corpore, sequitur quod si simplicia dicuntur universaliter et singulariter, quod etiam compositum dicatur universaliter et singulariter. Sicut si anima est hoc, et corpus est hoc, quae sunt simpliciter dicta tamquam partes compositi, quod etiam dicatur universale et particulare sive singulare, non solum partes, sed etiam compositum.	1524. It is evident, then, according to the opinion which affirms that man is his soul, that the term soul is taken both universally and singularly, as soul and this soul; and the term man is also taken both universally and particularly, i.e., singularly, as man and as this man. And similarly, too, according to the opinion which affirms that man is a composite of body and soul, it follows that, if simple things may be taken both universally and singularly, composites may also be taken both universally and singularly; for example, if the soul is this thing and the body is this thing, which are referred to in an unqualified sense as parts of the composite, it follows that the terms universal and particular, or singular, may be applied not only to the parts but also to the composite.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 25 Deinde cum dicit utrum autem ostendit quid de cetero remaneat determinandum circa substantias. Et ponit quod duo remaneant determinanda. Quorum primum est quod, cum determinatum sit, quod substantia et quod quid est rerum sensibilium et materialium sunt ipsae partes speciei, restat determinare utrum talium substantiarum, scilicet materialium et sensibilium, sit aliqua substantia praeter materiam, ita quod oporteat quaerere aliquam substantiam istorum sensibilium alteram ab ea quae determinata est, sicut quidam dicunt numeros praeter materiam existentes, aut aliquid tale, idest species vel ideas, esse substantias horum sensibilium. Et de hoc perscrutandum est posterius.	1525. But whether (638) He explains what still remains to be established about substances; and he gives the two issues which have to be dealt with. The first is this: when it has been established that the substance and whatness of sensible and material things are parts of the species, the next thing that has to be established is whether there is some substance besides the matter “of such substances,” i.e., of material and sensible substances, so that it is necessary to look for some other substance of these sensible things besides the one which has been dealt with; as some affirm that there are numbers existing apart from matter, “or something of the kind,” i.e., that separate Forms or Ideas are the substances of these sensible things. This must be investigated later on (Books XIII and XIV).
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 26 Haec enim perscrutatio est propria huic scientiae. In hac enim scientia tentamus determinare de substantiis sensibilibus huius gratia, idest propter substantias immateriales, quia speculatio circa substantias sensibiles et materiales quodammodo pertinet ad physicam, quae non est prima philosophia, sed secunda, sicut in quarto habitum est. Prima enim philosophia est de primis substantiis quae sunt substantiae immateriales, de quibus speculatur non solum inquantum sunt substantiae, sed inquantum substantiae tales, inquantum scilicet immateriales. De sensibilibus vero substantiis non speculatur inquantum sunt tales substantiae, sed inquantum sunt substantiae, aut etiam entia, vel inquantum per eas manuducimur in cognitionem substantiarum immaterialium. Physicus vero e converso determinat de substantiis materialibus, non inquantum sunt substantiae, sed inquantum materiales et habentes in se principium motus.	1526. For this investigation is the one proper to this science, because in this science we attempt to establish something about sensible substances “for the sake of these,” i.e., for the sake of immaterial substances, because the study of sensible and material substances belongs in a sense to the philosophy of nature, which is not first philosophy, but second philosophy, as was stated in Book IV (323:C 593). For first philosophy is concerned with the first substances, which are immaterial ones, which it studies not only inasmuch as they are substances but inasmuch as they are such substances, namely, inasmuch as they are immaterial. But it does not study sensible substances inasmuch as they are such substances but inasmuch as they are substances, or also beings, or inasmuch as we are led by such substances to a knowledge of immaterial substances. But the philosopher of nature, on the other hand, deals with material substances, not inasmuch as they are substances, but inasmuch as they are material and have a principle of motion within themselves.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 27 Et quia posset aliquis credere quod scientia naturalis non specularetur circa totas substantias materiales et sensibiles, sed solum circa materias eorum, ideo hoc removet dicens, quod physicum non solum oportet considerare de materia, sed etiam de ea parte quae est secundum rationem, scilicet de forma. Et magis etiam de forma quam de materia, quia forma est magis natura quam materia, ut probatum est in secundo physicorum.	1527. And because someone might think that the philosophy of nature should not treat of material and sensible substances in their entirety, but only of their matters, he therefore rejects this, saying that the philosophy of nature must consider not only matter but also the part “which is intelligible,” namely, the form. And it must also consider form more than matter, because form is nature to a greater degree than matter, as was proved in Book II of the Physics.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 28 Secundum vero quod restat determinandum, est quomodo partes quae sunt in ratione, idest in definitione se habent; utrum scilicet sint substantiae existentes in actu, et quare etiam definitio, cum componatur ex multis partibus, est una ratio. Palam enim est quod oportet definitionem esse unam tantum rationem, quia res est una. Definitio vero significat quid est res. Sed per quid aliqua res habens partes efficiatur una, speculandum est posterius.	1528. Second, it remains to be established how “the parts in the intelligible expression,” i.e., in the definition, are disposed: whether they are parts of the substance actually. And it also remains to be established why the definition, when it is composed of many parts, is one intelligible expression; for it is evident that the definition of a thing must be only one intelligible expression, because a thing is one, and a definition signifies what a thing is. But how a thing having parts is one must be investigated later (733:C 1755).
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 29 Deinde cum dicit quid quidem recapitulat ea quae sunt determinata; dicens, quod est dictum quid est quod quid erat esse, et quomodo id quod est quod quid erat esse, est quod praedicatur de omni, et quod praedicatur secundum se. Et iterum dictum est quare quorumdam ratio significans quod quid erat esse, continet in se partes definiti, sicut definitio syllabae continet literas, et quorumdam non, sicut definitio circuli non continet semicirculos. Dictum est etiam quod in ratione substantiae, idest formae, non ponuntur partes quae sunt partes substantiae sicut materia, quia tales non sunt partes substantiae illius, idest formae, sed partes totius compositi.	1529. We have stated (639). Next he sums up the points which have been established. He says that it has been stated what the essence of a thing is, and how it is predicated of all things, and that it is predicated essentially. And it has also been stated why the intelligible expression signifying the essence of some things contains in itself the parts of the thing defined, just as the definition of a syllable contains its letters, and “why that of others does not,” as the definition of a circle does not contain semicircles. And again it has also been stated that those parts which are material parts of substance are not given “in the intelligible expression of substance,” i.e., of form, because such parts are not “parts of that substance,” i.e., of the form, but are parts of the whole composite.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 30 Cuius quidem compositi aliquo modo est definitio, aliquo modo non est. Quia si accipiatur cum materia, scilicet individuali, non est eius definitio, quia singularia non definiuntur, ut supra est habitum. Cuius ratio est, quia talis materia individualis est quid infinitum et indeterminatum. Materia enim non finitur nisi per formam. Sed compositum acceptum secundum primam substantiam, idest secundum formam, habet definitionem. Definitur enim compositum acceptum in specie, non secundum individuum.	1530. Now in one sense there is a definition of this kind of composite, and in another sense there is not; for if it is taken “with matter,” namely, the individual, there is no definition of it, since singulars are not defined, as was stated above (627) C 1493). The reason is that such individual matter is something unlimited and indeterminate; for matter is limited only by form. But if composite is taken “with reference to the primary substance,” i.e., to form, it has a definition; for the composite is defined when taken specifically, but not when taken individually.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 31 Sicut autem individuum per materiam individuatur, ita unumquodque ponitur in sua specie per formam. Non enim homo est homo quia habet carnes et ossa, sed ex eo quod habet animam rationalem in carnibus et ossibus. Unde oportet quod definitio speciei accipiatur a forma, et quod illae partes materiae solum ponantur in definitione speciei, in quibus primo et principaliter est forma. Sicut ratio hominis est illa quae est animae. Ex hoc enim homo est homo, quod habet talem animam. Et propter hoc, si homo definitur, oportet quod definiatur per animam, et quod nihilominus in eius definitione ponantur partes corporis, in quibus primo est anima, sicut cor aut cerebrum, ut supra dixit.	1531. And just as the individual is individuated by matter, in a similar fashion each thing is placed in its proper species by its form; for man is man, not because he has flesh and bones, but because he has a rational soul in this flesh and these bones. It is necessary, then, that the definition of the species should be taken from the form, and that only those material parts should be given in the definition of the species, in which the form has the primary and chief role, as the intelligible expression of man is one which contains soul; for man is man because he has such a soul. And for this reason, if man is defined, he must be defined by his soul, yet in his definition one must include the parts of the body in which the soul is first present, such as the heart or the brain, as was said above (626)C 1489).
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 32 Ipsa namque substantia cuius pars non est materia est species, idest forma quae inest materiae, ex qua forma et materia dicitur tota substantia, idest determinatur et definitur. Sicut concavitas est quaedam forma. Ex ea enim et naso, dicitur nasus simus et simitas. Et similiter ex anima et corpore, dicitur homo et humanitas. Si enim nasus, qui est sicut materia, esset pars curvitatis, tunc cum dicitur nasus curvus, bis diceretur nasus. Semel enim diceretur proprio nomine, et semel prout includeretur in definitione curvi. (Si tamen poneretur in eius definitione sicut pars essentiae curvitatis, non quasi ex additione, ut supra dictum est). Quamvis autem materia non sit in essentia formae, est tamen in tota substantia composita. Sicut curvitas est in naso simo, et etiam materia individualis est in Callia.	1532. For the substance, of which matter is not a part, “is the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, which is present in matter; and from this form and matter “the whole substance” is derived, i.e., made determinate and defined; for example, concavity is a form of this kind, for from this and from nose snubnose and snubness are derived. And in the same way man and humanity are derived from soul and body. For if nose, which plays the part of matter, were part of curvature, then when curved nose is referred to, the term nose would be expressed twice; for it is expressed once by its own name, and it is included again in the definition of the curved. However, this would be the case if nose were placed in the definition of the curved as part of the essence of curvature, and not by addition, as was stated above (624)C 1472). And even though matter is not present in the essence of form, it is nevertheless present in the whole composite substance; for example, curvature is present in snub nose, and individual matter is also present in Callias.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 33 Dictum est etiam superius quod quod quid erat esse uniuscuiusque, est idem cum eo cuius est. Quod quidem est simpliciter verum in quibusdam, sicut in primis substantiis, idest in immaterialibus. Sicut ipsa curvitas est idem cum eo quod quid erat curvitatis, si tamen curvitas est de primis substantiis. Quod quidem dicit, quia etiam curvitas videtur esse forma in materia, licet non in materia sensibili, sed intelligibili, quae est ipsum continuum. Vel secundum aliam literam quae prima est. Est enim quaedam curvitas prima, sicut curvitas quae est in speciebus secundum Platonicos, in quibus speciebus communiter est verum quod quaelibet est idem cum suo quod quid est. Alia autem curvitas quae est in rebus sensibilibus vel in mathematicis, non est prima. Unde non est idem quod suum quod quid erat esse.	1533. It was also said above (591)C 1362) that the essence of each thing is the same as the thing of which it is the essence. This is true without qualification in some cases, “as in the case of primary substances,” i.e., in that of immaterial substances, just as curvature itself is the same as the essence of curvature, provided that curvature belongs to primary substances. He says this because curvature seems to be a form in matter, though not in sensible matter but in an intelligible matter—continuous quantity. Or, according to another text, “which is first”; for there is a primary curvature, like the curvature which exists among the separate Forms, according to the Platonists, and of these Forms it is universally true that each is the same as its own essence. But the other curvature which is present in sensible things or in the objects of mathematics is not a primary one. Hence it is not the same as its essence.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 34 Dicit autem exponendo, quod primam substantiam hic nominat non substantiam particularem, sicut in praedicamentis, sed quae non dicitur per hoc quod aliud sit in alio sicut in subiecto et materia, idest illae res quae sunt formae non in materia, sicut substantiae separatae. Quaecumque vero sunt sicut materia, vel etiam sunt concepta cum materia, sicut composita quae habent in sui ratione materiam, in istis non est idem quod quid erat esse, et id cuius est. Nec etiam est unum in his quae dicuntur secundum accidens, sicut Socrates et musicus sunt idem per accidens.	1534. And in explaining this he says that he does not use the term primary substance here to mean a particular substance, as he does in the Categories, but to mean something which does not exist in something else “as in a subject or matter,” i.e., those things which are not forms in matter, such as the separate substances. But all those which have the nature of matter or are conceived with matter, such as composites, which have matter in their intelligible expression, are not the same as their essence. Nor do those predications which are accidental form a unity, as Socrates and musician are the same accidentally.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 35 Attendendum est autem quod ab hac sententia quam posuerat, scilicet quod quod quid est idem est cum unoquoque cuius est, duo hic excipit, scilicet illa quae dicuntur per accidens, et substantias materiales, cum superius non exceperit nisi illa quae dicuntur per accidens. Oportet autem non solum ista excludi, sed etiam substantias materiales. Sicut enim supra dictum est, quod quid erat esse est id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem non assignatur individuis, sed speciebus; et ideo materia individualis, quae est individuationis principium est praeter id quod est quod quid erat esse. Impossibile est autem in rerum natura esse speciem nisi in hoc individuo. Unde oportet quod quaelibet res naturae, si habeat materiam quae est pars speciei, quae est pertinens ad quod quid est, quod etiam habeat materiam individualem, quae non pertinet ad quod quid est. Unde nulla res naturae si materiam habeat, est ipsum quod quid est, sed est habens illud. Sicut Socrates non est humanitas, sed est humanitatem habens. Si autem esset possibile esse hominem compositum ex corpore et anima, qui non esset hic homo ex hoc corpore et ex hac anima compositus, nihilominus esset suum quod quid erat esse, quamvis haberet materiam.	1535. Now it must be noted that from the opinion which he expressed here that each thing and its essence are the same, he now excludes two kinds of things: (1) things which are accidental, and (2) substances which are material, although above he excluded only those things which are said to be accidental. And it is necessary not only to exclude the former but also to exclude material substances; for, as was said above (622:C 1460), what the definition signifies is the essence, and definitions are not assigned to individuals but to species; and therefore individual matter, which is the principle of individuation, is distinct from the essence. But in reality it is impossible for a form to exist except in a particular substance. Hence if any natural thing has matter which is part of its species, and this pertains to its essence, it must also have individual matter, which does not pertain to its essence. Therefore, if any natural thing has matter, it is not its own essence but is something having an essence; for example, Socrates is not humanity but something having humanity. And if it were possible for a man to be composed of body and soul and not be this particular man composed of this body and this soul, he would still be his own essence, even though he contained matter.
lib. 7 l. 11 n. 36 Licet autem homo praeter singularia non sit in rerum natura, est tamen in ratione quae pertinet ad logicam considerationem. Et ideo superius ubi logice consideravit de quod quid erat esse, non exclusit substantias materiales, quin in illis etiam esset idem quod quid est, cum eo cuius est. Homo enim communis est idem cum suo quod quid est, logice loquendo. Nunc autem postquam iam descendit ad principia naturalia quae sunt materia et forma, et ostendit quomodo diversimode comparantur ad universale et particulare quod subsistit in natura, excipit hic ab eo quod supra dixerat idem esse quod quid est cum unoquoque, substantias materiales in rerum natura existentes. Relinquitur autem quod illae substantiae quae sunt formae tantum subsistentes, non habent aliquid per quod individuentur, quod sit extra rationem rei vel speciei significantem quod quid est. Et ideo in illis simpliciter verum est, quod quaelibet illarum est suum quod quid erat esse.	1536. Now even though man does not exist apart from singular men in reality, nevertheless man is separable in his intelligible expression, which pertains to the domain of logic. Therefore, above (578)C 1308), where he considered essence from the viewpoint of logic, he did not exclude material substances from being their own essence; for man as a universal is the same as his essence, logically speaking. And now having come to natural principles, which are matter and form, and having shown how they are related to the universal in different ways, and to the particular thing which subsists in nature, he now excludes material substances, which exist in reality, from the statement which he had made above to the effect that the essence of a thing is the same as the thing of which it is the essence. Moreover it follows that those substances which are subsistent forms alone do not have any principle individuating them which is extrinsic to the intelligible expression (of the thing or of the species) which signifies their whatness. Concerning these things, then, it is true that each is unqualifiedly the same as its own essence.