Authors/Buridan/Summulae de dialectica/Liber 4/Cap1

• 4.1.1
• 4.1.2
• 4.1.3
• 4.1.4

Latin	English
SDD 4: TRACTATUS DE SUPPOSITIONE
SDD 4.1: DE DIFFERENTIA SIGNIFICATIONIS ET SUPPOSITIONIS
SDD 4.1.1
Tractatus sequens erit de suppositionibus et quibusdam annexis eis. Et primo dicemus de differentia significationis et suppositionis. Et non intendo loqui de significatione vocis naturaliter, quia ex talibus vocibus non formamus propositiones, sed solum intendo loqui de significatione vocis ad placitum. Nec intendo, quantum ad hoc Summulae de dialectica, loqui de suppositione materiali, quia sic omnis vox litterata, quamvis non imposita ad aliquid significandum, potest supponere, sed solum intendo loqui pro nunc de suppositione prout vox secundum significationem sibi impositam potest vel non potest supponere.	The following treatise will be about supposition and certain related matters. And first, we will state the difference between supposition and signification. And I do not intend to speak here of the signification of utterance naturally, since we do not form propositions from such utterances, but I mean only to speak of the signification of utterance by convention. Nor do I intend here to speak of material supposition, for every written utterance can supposit in this way, even though it is not imposed to signify anything. Rather, I intend for now to speak only of supposition insofar as an utterance can or cannot supposit according to the signification imposed upon it.
Quia non est propositionis supponere, sed termini qui est subiectum vel praedicatum, ideo post tractatum de terminis praedicamentalibus debet sequi iste quartus tractatus, qui est de suppositionibus et quibusdam annexis eis. Et continebit iste tractatus sex capitula. Primum erit de differentia inter significationem, suppositionem, verificationem et appellationem; secundum erit de multis divisionibus vocum significativarum ad placitum, ut appareat quae possunt supponere et quae non; tertium erit de communibus modis et divisionibus suppositionum, quartum erit in speciali de suppositionibus terminorum relativorum, quintum erit de appellationibus, et sextum erit de ampliationibus et restrictionibus.	Because supposition does not belong to a proposition, but rather belongs to a term which is subject or predicate, this fourth treatise, which is about supposition and certain related matters, should follow after the treatise on categorical terms. And this treatise contains six chapters. The first is about the difference between signification, supposition, verification, and appellation. The second is about the many kinds of significative utterances, so as to clarify which can supposit and which cannot. The third is about the common modes and divisions of supposition. The fourth deals specifically with the supposition of 'relative terms'. The fifth is about appellation, and the sixth is about ampliation and restriction.
Primum capitulum continet quattuor partes. Prima proponit intentum, secunda declarat differentiam significationis et suppositionis, tertiam differentiam suppositionis et verificationis, et quarta differentiam suppositionis et appellationis; secunda incipit ibi "dicto ergo modo", tertia ibi "uerificatio autem", quarta ibi "appellatio autem".	This first chapter contains four sections: The first sets out the aim of the chapter, the second clarifies the difference between signification and supposition, the third, the difference between supposition and verification, and the fourth the difference between supposition and appellation.
Prima pars est satis manifesta. Proponit enim intentionem tractatus in summa, quod de suppositionibus et quibusdam annexis eis, ut quod de significationibus, verificationibus, appellationibus, ampliationibus et restrictionibus. Proponit etiam quod statim erit determinandum in isto capitulo de differentia significationis et suppositionis. Proponit etiam de qua significatione intendendum sit in hoc capitulo et de qua non, et similiter de qua suppositione et de qua non. Et haec plana sunt in textu.	The first part is clear enough, for it sets out in summary form the aim of this treatise, that is about "supposition and related matters," as being about signification, verification, appellation, and ampliation and restriction. It also sets out immediately what questions are to be determined in this chapter about the difference between signification and supposition. It also sets out which sort of signification is meant in this chapter, and similarly what sort of supposition is meant and what is not. And these matters are plain in the text.
Sed etiam addendum est quod hic non intendimus de supponere prout est reddere suppositum verbo apud grammaticum. Quia sic potest ita bene supponere iste terminus 'chimaera' sicut iste terminus 'homo'; aeque enim est congrua haec oratio 'chimaera currit' sicut haec 'homo legit', et non est ita prout apud logicum de suppositione intendimus. Etiam si dico 'homo est animal', ita bene 'animal' supponit sicut 'homo', quod non est sic de suppositione apud grammaticum.	But it should also be added that here we do not mean to deal with supposition insofar as rendering 'supposition' by the word used by the grammarians. For then the term 'chimaera' could supposit just as well as the terms 'man', for the expression 'a chimaera runs' is as well-formed as "a man is reading," and so is not supposition as the logician means it.  Also, if I say 'a man is an animal', thus 'animal' supposits as rightly as 'man', which is not the case for supposition as the grammarian understands it.
SDD 4.1.2
(l) Dicto ergo modo capiendo 'significationem' et 'suppositionem', differunt significatio et suppositio quia cuiuslibet dictionis quae non materialiter sumpta est pars propositionis interest significare et audienti eam conceptum aliquem constituere secundum institutionem sibi ad placitum datam. (2) Sed non omnis talis dictionis est supponere, quia solus talis terminus est innatus supponere qui aliquo demonstrato per istud pronomen 'hoc' aut aliquibus demonstratis per istud pronomen 'haec' potest vere affirmari de illo pronomine. Ideo iste terminus 'chimaera' non potest supponere, quia quocumque demonstrato falsum est dicere 'hoc est chimaera' et, similiter, quibuscumque demonstratis, falsum est dicere 'haec sunt chimaera'.	Therefore, taking 'signification' and 'supposition' as said above, signification and supposition differ because of any given word which, not taken materially is a part of a proposition, there is a difference between its signifying, and its establishing some concept in the hearer, according to the institution given to it by convention. But supposition does not belong to every such word, for only such a term supposits which can truly be affirmed of a pronoun, when something is pointed out by the pronoun 'this' or a number of things by the pronoun 'these' . Thus the term "chimaera" cannot supposit, for whatever is pointed out, it is false to say "This is a chimaera", and similarly, whatever things are pointed out, it is false to say "These are chimaeras."
Ista pars continet duas clausulas, unam de significatione, aliam de suppositione.	This part contains two clauses, one about signification, the other about supposition.
Quantum ad primam, notandum est quod data fuit nobis virtus vociferandi finaliter ut possemus aliis significare conceptus nostros, et datus fuit nobis auditus finaliter ut nobis significarentur conceptus vociferantium. Ita loquitur Aristoteles, in fine libri de Anima, dicens "auditum enim habet animal ut significetur aliquid sibi; linguam autem habet ut significet aliquid alteri"; et per 'linguam' intendit virtutem vociferativam, quaecumque illa fuerit.	As far as the first, it should be noted that the the power of speech was ultimately given to us that we could to signify our concepts to others, and hearing was ultimately given to us that concepts of speakers could be signified to us. Aristotle says this in De anima, saying "the animal has hearing so that something may be signified to it; and it has a tongue in order that it may signify something to another." And by 'tongue' he means the power of speech, whatever that may be.
Et sic patet quod vox significativa debet significare audienti conceptum proferentis et debet in audiente constituere conceptum similem conceptui proferentis, nisi frustra vel deceptorie proferatur, aut forte solum propter propriam delectationem quae est in audiendo se ipsum, sicut est de eo qui solitarie cantat, aut propter aliquam talem causam. Tamen manifestum est quod omnino disputantes et proferentes hoc intendunt, scilicet quod voces eorum praedicta duo operentur.	And so it is clear that a significant utterance ouight to signify the concept of the utterer to the hearer, and ought to establish a concept in the hearer similar to the concept of the utterer, unless prevented or uttered deceptively, or perhaps only because of the proper delight which is in the hearing itself [se ipso?], as in the case of the hearer who sings alone, or for some such cause. Nevertheless, it is manifest that those who dispute and utter wholly intend this, namely that their utterances function in the two ways above.
Sciendum est etiam quod voces significativae naturaliter non ponuntur in propositionibus, quia se ipsis, sine formatione alicuius propositionis, innatae sunt facere sensum perfectum in audiente ad hoc idoneo. Sed etiam nec illa vox quae vocatur 'non significativa' intrat propositionem, scilicet illa vox quae nec naturaliter nec secundum impositionem sibi ad placitum datam significat aliquid, nisi forte se ipsam vel conceptum sui ipsius, ut 'bu','ba'. Talis enim nec est nomen nec verbum nec syncategorema; ideo ad nihil deserviret in propositione, nisi sumeretur materialiter. Si enim dico 'bu currit', haec non est propositio, quia haec vox 'bu' non habet significationem, nec modum significandi secundum quem posset reddere suppositum verbi; si tamen sumeretur materialiter, bene esset propositio, valens istam 'haec vox 'bu' currit.	It should also be known that naturally significant utterances do not occur in propositions, since by themselves, without the formation of any proposition, they are sufficient to produce a complete sense in a suitable hearer. But also, an utterance which is called 'non significative' does not occur in a proposition, namely one which neither signifies naturally nor by some imposition conventionally given to it, unless perhaps by itself or by the concept of it, for example, 'bu ba'. For such an utterance is neither noun nor verb nor syncategoremata, and so has no place in a sentence unless it were taken materially. For if I say 'bu runs", this is not a proposition, for the utterance 'bu' has no signification, nor a mode of signifying which could provide a subject for the verb. Yet if it were taken materially, it would certainly be a proposition, validating "the utterance 'bu' is running".
Quantum vero ad secundam clausulam, quae est de suppositione, apparet mihi quod sit satis manifesta, nisi quod iunior posset dubitare, quia iste terminus 'deus' potest supponere, et tamen quocumque demonstrato per istud pronomen 'hoc' non verificaretur de illo pronomine, quia oporteret quod deus demonstraretur, quem demonstrare non possumus. Aliqui respondent quod licet deus non possit demonstrari ad sensum, tamen potest demonstrari ad intellectum. Vel possumus dicere quod ad hoc quod terminus possit supponere sufficit quod vere possit affirmari vel de tali pronomine, vel de relativo referente aliquem terminum priorem. Verbi gratia, vere dicimus 'prima causa est et ipsa est deus', vel etiam 'omnipotens non est malus et ipse est deus'; sic autem non est de 'chimaera', quia etiam si diceremus 'chimaera non est lapis et ipsa est chimaera', haec esset falsa 'ipsa est chimaera'. Ita tale pronomen relativum potest in propositio capi vice pronominis demonstrativi.	As far as the second point of, which is about supposition, it seems to me that it is clear enough, except that a student could doubt it because the term 'God' can supposit, and yet whatever is pointed out by the pronoun 'this', [the term 'God'] would not be verified of the pronoun, since God, whom we cannot point out, would have to be pointed out. Some reply that although God cannot be pointed out to sense still he nevertheless can be pointed out to the understanding. Or we can say that for a term to supposit it is sufficient that it can be truly affirmed of such a pronoun or of a relative term referring to some prior term. For example, we say truly "There is a first cause and that cause is God" or even "the omnipotent being is not evil and that being is God". But that is not the case for 'chimaera,' since even if we were to say "A chimaera is not a stone and that thing is a chimaera", the proposition  "that is a chimaera" would be false. Thus such a relative pronoun can take the place of a demonstrative pronoun in a proposition.
SDD 4.1.3
(1) Verificatio autem differt a suppositione, quia verificatio proprie est propositionis et non termini, sed suppositio est termini et non propositionis. (2) Item, possibile est esse suppositionem terminorum in propositione sine verificatione propositionis, tam in affirmativis quam in negativis, ut 'homo est asinus' vel 'homo non est animal'. (3) Item, potest esse in negativis verificatio sine suppositione, ut 'chimaera non est hircocervus'. (4) Sed necesse est in affirmativis veris verificationem propositionis esse pro aliquo vel aliquibus pro quo vel quibus termini supponunt; et si sit terminus distributus, oportet verificationem esse pro omnibus pro quibus supponit si propositio debeat esse vera, et si non sit terminus distributus, sufficit pro aliquo vel aliquibus.	Now verification is different from supposition, for verification is properly of a proposition and not of a term, but supposition belongs to a term and not to a sentence. Likewise, it is possible that there is supposition of the terms in a proposition without the verification of the proposition, in negative propositions as well as in affirmatives, such as "A man is an donkey" or "a man is not an animal." Likewise, in negatives there can be verification without supposition, as in "a chimaera is not a goat-stag." But in true affirmatives it is necessary that verification of the proposition is by some thing or things for which the terms supposit. And if the term is distributed, verification has to be by all those things for which it supposits if the proposition is to be true, and if the term is not distributed, it is sufficient for some thing or things.
In hac tertia parte sunt quattuor clausulae. Prima dicit quod verificatio est propositionis et non termini, quod est quia propositionis propria passio est esse veram vel falsam. Omnis enim propositio est vera vel falsa et omne verum vel falsum est propositio, prout logici utuntur istis nominibus 'uerum' et 'falsum'. Ita solet dici, et est verum si loquatur de propositionibus mentalibus et de vero et falso principaliter dictis, et non secundum attributionem ad aliud simpliciter verum vel falsum. Omnis enim propositio mentalis est vera vel falsa et omne simpliciter verum vel falsum est propositio mentalis, prout de vero et falso loquitur logicus. Si enim propositio vocalis est vera vel falsa, hoc non est nisi in quantum significat mentalem veram vel falsam proferentis vel constituit mentalem veram vel falsam in animo audientis; et hoc est attributive, sicut urina dicitur sana eo quod significat sanitatem animalis, vel cibus sanus quia est efficiens sanitatem animalis.	In this third part there are four clauses. The first says that verification is of a proposition and not of a term, which is because being true or false is the proper attribute of a proposition. For every proposition is true or false and anything true or false is a proposition, insofar as logicians use the terms 'true' and 'false.' So it is customarily said, and it is true if we are speaking of mental propositions, and of truth and falsity said principally and not by attribution to something else that is absolutely true or false. For every mental proposition is true or false, and anything absolutely true or false is a mental proposition, insofar as the logician speaks of true and false. For if a spoken proposition is true or false, it is so only insofar as it signifies a true mental proposition of the utterer, or establishes a true mental proposition in the soul of the hearer. And this is attributively, just as urine is called healthy in that it signifies the health of the animal, or food called healthy because it brings about health of an animal.
Sed tamen notandum est, ut videtur mihi, quod de propositionibus vocalibus, quae dicuntur verae vel falsae significative solum, ex eo quod repraesentant mentales veras vel falsas, omnis propositio vocalis est vera vel falsa. Quia non est propositio vocalis nisi repraesentet propositionem mentalem, et omnis propositio mentalis est vera vel falsa; ideo omnis vocalis repraesentat verum vel falsum; ideo omnis vocalis repraesentative, seu significative, est vera vel falsa.	But still it should be noted, as it seems to me, that concerning spoken propositions, which are called true or false significatively only because they represent true or false mental propositions, every spoken proposition is true or false. For it is not a spoken proposition unless it represents a mental proposition, and every mental proposition is true or false. Therefore every spoken proposition represents the true or false and therefore every spoken proposition is representatively, or significatively true or false.
Sed tamen credo quod non omnis vox quae est significative vera vel falsa sit propositio vocalis, quia instantia apparet de istis dictionibus impersonalibus 'legitur', 'amatur', 'tonat', 'pluit', 'ninguit', 'grandinat'; quaelibet enim earum repraesentat verum vel falsum, et tamen nulla earum est propositio. Quia omnis propositio debet habere subiectum et praedicatum principales partes sui, et sic non est hic; et etiam quia omnis propositio est oratio, cum propositio describatur quod est oratio verum vel falsum significans (loquendo de propositione vocali), et tamen nulla illarum dictionum est oratio, quia non convenit sibi definitio orationis, scilicet cuius partes sunt significativae separatae.	Nevertheless, I do not believe that every utterance which is significatively true or false is a spoken proposition, for there seem to be counterexamples such as the impersonal verbs 'it-is-reading,' 'it-is-loved,' 'it-is-raining', 'it-thunders', 'it-hails', for any of these represents the true or the false, and yet none of them is a proposition. For every proposition ought to have a subject and predicate as its principal parts, and it is not so here, and also because every proposition is an expression (since a proposition is described as an sentence signifying the true or the false - speaking of a spoken proposition), and yet none of those verbs is a sentence, since they do not satisfy the definition of an sentence, namely whose parts are significative separately.
Sic ergo tales dictiones vocales sunt verae vel falsae significative, quia repraesentant propositiones mentales veras vel falsas, sed tamen non sunt propositiones neque orationes, quia non componuntur ex pluribus vocibus seorsum significantibus, quod requiritur ad hoc quod vox dicatur propositio vel oratio ultra illud quod oportet ei correspondere propositionem mentalem. Immo ex pacto disputantium, ipsi possunt consentire quod nihil plus vel aliud intelligant per hanc vocem 'A' quam per hanc vocem 'homo currit' quantum ad significationem ad placitum, et tunc sequitur, si est verum dicere 'homo currit', quod est verum dicere 'A', et tamen haec vox 'A' non est oratio nec propositio, cum non habeat partes per se significativas.	Therefore those spoken words are true or the false significatively, because they represent true or false mental propositions, and yet they are neither propositions nor sentences, for they are not composed of several parts separately signifying, which is a further requirement to a mental proposition having to correspond to it, if an utterance is to be called a proposition or sentence. Indeed, by the agreement of the disputants, they can consent that they understand no more and no less by 'A' than by "A man is running," so far as signification by convention, and then if it is true to say "A man is running" then it is true to say 'A', and yet 'A' is neither an expression nor a proposition, since it does not have parts which signify of themselves.
Tunc ergo quando dicebatur, in prima clausula, quod propositionis est verificatio, et non termini, hoc erat intelligendum de mentalibus. Et si hoc volumus intelligere de vocalibus, tunc 'termini non est verificatio' id est 'nullus terminus est verus vel falsus', capiendo 'terminum' pro eo quod significative sumptum potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. Sed si caperemus 'terminum' pro dictione aequivalenti propositioni, tunc talis terminus posset dici verus vel falsus significative, sicut et propositio vocalis.	Therefore, then, when it was said in the first clause that verification belongs to a proposition and not to a term, this was to be understood about mental propositions. And if we want to understnd this of spoken propositions, then there is no verification of a term, i.e. no term is true of false, taking 'term' as that which taken significatively can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. But if we take 'term' as a word equivalent to a proposition, then such a term can be called true or false significatively, just as a spoken proposition also.
Deinde etiam, quando dicebatur, in eadem prima clausula, quod termini est supponere, et non propositionis, hoc est verum de propositione significative sumpta et de termino prout terminus dicitur subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis.	Hence when it was said in the same first clause that supposition belongs to a term and not to a proposition, this is true of 'proposition' taken significatively and of 'term' according as the subject or predicate of a proposition is called a term.
SDD 4.1.4
(1) Appellatio autem differt a suppositione, quia est dare terminum supponentem et non appellantem, sicut sunt termini recti de praedicamento substantiae, ut 'animal', 'planta', 'aurum', (2) et est dare terminum appellantem et non supponentem, ut 'chimaera', 'uacuum', vel hoc totum 'homo hinnibilis', (3) et est dare terminum appellantem et supponentem, ut 'album', 'pater', 'sedens', vel hoc totum 'homo albus', sed aliud appellat et pro alio supponit, ut 'album' supponit pro re quae est alba et appellat albedinem. (4) Omnis enim terminus pro aliquo supponens et aliud pro quo non supponit significans appellat omne illud quod significat aliud ab eo pro quo supponit, per modum adiacentis ei pro quo supponit.	Now appellation differs from supposition because we have to allow terms which supposit and do not appellate. For example, there are nominative terms in the category of substance such as 'animal,' 'plant,' 'gold'. And we have to allow terms which appellate but do not supposit, such as 'chimaera,' 'vacuum,' and the whole expression 'man able-to-neigh'. And we must allow terms which both supposit and appellate, such as 'white,' 'father,' 'sitting,' or the whole expression 'white man', which appellates one thing and supposits for another, as 'white' supposits for a thing which is white and appellates whiteness. For every term suppositing for something and signifying another thing for which it does not supposit appellates everything which it signifies other than what it supposits, by the mode of adjency to what it supposits for.
Apparet quod ista quarta pars continet quattuor clausulas. Prima est de terminis supponentibus et non appellantibus, qui sunt termini recti de praedicamento substantiae; et hoc est quia non connotant alienam dispositionem cum substantia quam significant et pro qua supponunt. Et ita etiam est de multis terminis abstractis de praedicamento qualitatis, ut 'albedo', 'caliditas', 'humiditas'.	This fourth passage contains four clauses. The first is about terms which supposit and do not appellate, which are nominative terms in the category of substance, and this is because they do not connote another disposition in the substance which they signify and for which they supposit. And it is also so for many abstract terms in the category of quality, for example 'whiteness,' 'hotness,' 'humanity.' [reading humanitas].
Sed dubitatur de terminis obliquis de praedicamento substantiae an supponant vel appellent. Et ego dico quod numquam, proprie loquendo, supponunt; quia nullus terminus, proprie loquendo, supponit nisi sit subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis, et obliquus non potest per se esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis, ut suppono. Unde patet quod quacumque re demonstrata non est verum dicere 'hoc est lapidis', vel 'lapidem', nisi ad istum sensum, vel consimilem, 'hoc est lapidis' id est 'hoc est pars lapidis'; sed tunc 'lapidis' non supponit, sed hoc totum 'pars lapidis'. Ergo obliquus non potest esse per se subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis, unde apparet quod non supponit.	But there is a doubt whether oblique terms in the category of substance supposit or appellate. And I say that, strictly speaking, they never supposit, for no term, strictly speaking, supposits unless it is the subject or predicate of a proposition, and an oblique term cannot be per se the  subject or predicate of a proposition. Hence it is clear that it is not true to say of anything pointed out "This is of-a-stone" or 'to-a-stone' except in this sense or a similar one, that this is of a stone, i.e. this is part of a stone. But then 'of-a-stone' does not supposit, but rather the whole expression 'part of a stone' supposits. Therefore an oblique term cannot per se be the subject or predicate of a proposition, hence it is obvious that it cannot supposit.
Tamen dico quod obliquus bene appellat: quia si dico 'asinus Socratis currit', hoc totum 'asinus Socratis' supponit pro asino, et non pro alio quam pro asino, et tamen iste terminus 'Socratis' significat aliud ab asino; ideo iste terminus 'Socratis' appellat Socratem tamquam adiacentem asino, id est tamquam possidentem, licet non tamquam inhaerentem.	Yet I say that an oblique term can rightly appellate, for if I say "The donkey of-Socrates is running" the whole expression 'donkey of-Socrates' supposits for the donkey and not for anything but the donkey, and nevertheless the term 'of-Socrates' appellates Socrates as adjacent to the donkey, i.e. as possessing it, not as inhering in it.
Sed etiam tu quaeres an dicendo 'animal rationale currit' sit ibi aliqua appellatio a parte subiecti. Et ego dico quod non, supposito quod 'animal' sit vere terminus de praedicamento substantiae et 'rationale' sit vere differentia specifica 'animalis', nullum accidens connotans; sed solum ibi est contractio suppositionis, sine appellatione dispositionis alienae. Et ita esset dicendo 'animal homo currit', vel dicendo 'animal quod est homo currit'; vel etiam dicendo 'animal quod non est homo currit': videtur enim quod sic negative dicere non est nisi excipere, sive removere, 'hominem' a suppositione huius termini 'animal'. Et si aliquis uult hoc vocare 'appellationem', placet mihi. Tamen terminus substantialis rectus per se sumptus bene supponit pro substantiis et nihil appellat.	But if you will also ask whether in saying "A rational animal is runs" there is some appellation on the part of the subject there. And I say that there is not, assuming that 'animal' is truly a term in the category of substance and that 'rational' is truly the specific differentia of animal, connoting no accident, but here there is only a contraction of the supposition without the appelation of an alien disposition. And so it would be in saying "An animal man runs" or "An animal which is a man is running", or even "An animal which is not a man is running." It seems that to speak negatively in this way is nothing but to except or remove man from the supposition of the term 'animal.' And if anyone wants to call this 'appellation' I am content. Yet the nominative substantial term taken per se for substances more correctly supposits and does not appellate anything.
Secunda clausula est de appellantibus et non supponentibus, ut 'chimaera', 'vacuum', 'homo hinnibilis'. Hoc apparet, quia quocumque demonstrato non est verum dicere 'hoc est chimaera', vel 'hoc est uacuum', vel 'hoc est homo hinnibilis'. Sed in ista propositione 'homo hinnibilis currit', ista dictio 'hinnibilis' appellat potentiam ad hinniendum, non circa illud pro quo totum subiectum supponit, sed circa illud pro quo altera pars, scilicet 'homo', supponeret si per se sumeretur; et quia hoc appellatum non potest adiacere homini, ideo per hanc dictionem 'hinnibilis' non solum contrahitur suppositio 'hominis', sed tota aufertur.	The second clause is about appellating terms and not suppositing terms, such as 'chimaera,' 'vacuum,' 'man able-to-neigh.' This is apparent, because whatever is pointed out it is not true to say "This is a chimaera", "This is a vacuum", "This is a man able-to-neigh." But in the proposition "A man able-to-neigh is running" the phrase 'able-to-neigh' appellates the power or capacity of neighing, not concerning that for which the whole subject supposits, but as in that for which the other part, namely 'man', would supposit if it were taken per se. Since what is appellated cannot be adjacent to man, therefore the term 'able-to-neigh' not only contracts the supposition of 'man,' but totally removes it.
Ita est de isto termino 'vacuum', quod apparet si loco istius termini acciperetur definitio dicens quid nominis, scilicet 'locus non repletus corpore'. Iste enim terminus 'locus', si per se sumeretur in propositione, bene supponeret, sed propter appellationes terminorum appositorum removetur suppositio. Et sic appareret de 'chimaera' si daretur definitio dicens quid nominis.	So it is for the term 'vacuum,' the answer is apparent if we take the nominal definition for the term taken per se in the proposition, namely 'a place not filled with body.' For the term 'place', if it were taken per se in the proposition, would correctly supposit, but its supposition is removed by the appellation of the terms added to it. And so it would seem about 'chimaera' if the nominal definition were given.
Tertia clausula est de termino supponente et appellante. Apparet enim quod 'album' supponit pro substantia et appellat albedinem tamquam illi substantiae inhaerentem.	The third clause is about terms which supposit and appellate. For it seems that 'white' supposits for substance and appellates whiteness as inhering in that substance.
Quarta clausula est una regula quae iam satis est manifesta ex dictis. Sed apponendum est quod ubi subiectum propositionis pro nullo supponeret, sicut est de illis dictis in secunda clausula, adhuc ibi bene esset appellatio eo modo quo dictum fuit in illa secunda clausula.	The fourth clause is a rule which is clear enough from what was said. But it should be added that where the subject of a proposition does not supposit for anything, as with the words given in the second clause, there can still be appellation in the way discussed.