Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P1Qu/A3

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 3
57 Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo, primo distinguendo quomodo aliquid dicatur supernaturale. Potentia enim receptiva comparatur ad actum quem recipit, vel ad agentem a quo recipit. Primo modo ipsa est potentia naturalis, vel violenta, vel neutra. Naturalis dicitur si naturaliter inclinetur, violenta si sit contra naturalem inclinationem passi, neutra si neque inclinetur naturaliter ad illam formam quam recipit neque ad oppositam. In hac autem comparatione nulla est supernaturalitas. Sed comparando receptivum ad agens a quo recipit formam, tunc est naturalitas quando receptivum comparatur ad tale agens quod natum est naturaliter imprimere talem formam in tali passo, supernaturalitas autem quando comparatur ad agens quod non est naturaliter impressivum illius formae in illud passum.	57. To the question, then, I reply by first distinguishing how something may be said to be supernatural. For a receptive power is compared with the act that it receives or with the agent from which it receives it. In the first way it is a natural power, or a violent one, or neither. It is called natural if it is naturally inclined to receive what it receives, violent if it does so against nature, neither if it is naturally inclined neither to the form which it receives nor to the opposite form. But when the comparison is taken in this way there is nothing supernatural in it. But if the receiver is compared with the agent from which it receives the form, then the case is natural when the receiver is compared with such an agent as has the nature of naturally impressing such a form on such a receiver, but supernatural when the receiver is compared with an agent that does not naturally impress the form on that receiver.
58 $aAntequam haec distinctio ad propositum applicetur, contra istud arguitur multipliciter: tam quod distinctio 'naturalis' et ƿ 'violenti' sumatur ex comparatione passi ad agens et non tantum ex comparatione eius ad formam, quam quod distinctio 'naturalis' et 'supernaturalis' sumatur ex comparatione passi ad formam et non tantum ex respectu eius ad agens. Quae argumenta non ponuntur hic.	58. Before this distinction is applied to the proposed case, there is a multiple argument against it; both that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ is taken from the comparison of the receiver to the agent and not only from the comparison of it to the form, and that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ is taken from the comparison of the receiver to the form and not only from its respect to the agent. But these arguments are not set down here [they are set down in 4 d.43 q.4 nn.4-5].
59 Sed solutio rationabilis apparet, quia illud est per se causa alicuius, quo posito, circumscripto vel variato quocumque alio, sequitur effectus. Nunc autem licet forma contra quam inclinatur receptivum non inducatur nisi per agens violentans passum, nec agens supernaturale agat supernaturaliter nisi inducendo formam, tamen per se ratio 'violenti' est ex habitudine passi ad formam, et per se ratio 'supernaturalis' est ex habitudine passi ad agens. Probatur, quia passo et forma manentibus in sua ratione (puta quod forma sit receptibilis, contra tamen inclinationem passi), quomodocumque varietur agens, passum violenter recipit; similiter, passo et agente sic se habentibus quod solum agens non naturaliter activum transmutet passum (solum, inquam, ita quod agens naturale non disponat), quamcumque formam inducet erit supernaturalis respectu passi. ƿ Hoc sic probatur secundo quia non tantum in 'induci' sed in 'permanere': aliqua forma violenter permanet in passo sine actione extrinseca licet non diu, aliqua naturaliter et diu, aliqua manet naturalis, aliqua supernaturalis, propter agens tantum, ita quod circumscribendo agens a quo fit non posset dici supernaturalis; posset autem dici naturalis, quia perficit naturaliter, comparando formam ad receptivum tantum. a$	59. However, a reasonable solution is apparent, because that thing is the per se cause of something on which, when it is posited, and when any other thing has been excluded or varied, the effect follows. But in the present case, although the form against which the receiver is inclined is not introduced except by an agent acting violently on the receiver, and although a supernatural agent does not act supernaturally except by introducing a form, yet the per se idea of ‘violent’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the form, and the per se idea of ‘supernatural’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the agent. The proof is that when the receiver and the form remain in their own nature (for example, that the form can be received but against the inclination of the receiver), then, however the agent is varied, the receiver receives it violently; likewise, when the receiver and the agent are so disposed that only an agent not acting naturally changes the receiver (‘only’ I say in the sense that a natural agent does not dispose it), then whatever form the agent introduces will be supernatural with respect to the receiver. This is proved secondly in this way, that the form is supernatural not only in ‘being introduced’ but also in ‘persisting’; in one way a form persists without extrinsic action in a receiver violently, although not for a long time, in another it persists naturally and for a long time; in one way it remains natural, in another supernatural, on account of the agent only, such that, by excluding the agent by which the thing is done, it could not be said to be supernatural; but it could be said to be natural, because the perfection, when the comparison is of the form to the receiver only, is natural.
60 Ad propositum igitur applicando, dico quod comparando intellectum possibilem ad notitiam actualem in se nulla est sibi cognitio supernaturalis, quia intellectus possibilis quacumque cognitione naturaliter perficitur et ad quamcumque cognitionem naturaliter inclinatur. Sed secundo modo loquendo, sic est supernaturalis quae generatur ab aliquo agente quod non est natum movere intellectum possibilem ad talem cognitionem naturaliter.	60. Applying this then to the proposed case, I say that when comparing the possible intellect with the actual knowledge in itself there is no supernatural knowledge, because the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever and it naturally inclines to any knowledge whatever. But speaking in the second way [n.57], it 30 is supernatural in this sense, that it is generated by an agent that does not have the nature to move the possible intellect naturally to such knowledge.
61 Pro statu autem isto, secundum Philosophum, intellectus possibilis natus est moveri ad cognitionem ab intellectu agente et phantasmate, igitur sola illa cognitio est ei naturalis quae ab istis agentibus imprimitur. Virtute autem istorum potest haberi omnis cognitio incomplexi quae secundum legem communem habetur a viatore, sicut patet in instantia contra rationem tertiam principalem. Et ideo licet Deus possit per revelationem specialem cognitionem alicuius inƿcomplexi causare, sicut in raptu, non tamen talis cognitio supernaturalis est necessaria de lege communi.	61. Now for this present life, according to the Philosopher [On the Soul 3.4.429a13-18, 5.430a14-17, 7.431a14-17, 8.432a8-10], the possible intellect has the nature to be moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and by a sensible phantasm, therefore only that knowledge is natural to it which is impressed on it by those agents. Now by virtue of those agents all knowledge that is had of a concept by a wayfarer in accord with ordinary law can be had, as is plain in the instance [n.42] against the third principal reason. And therefore, although God could, by a special revelation, cause knowledge of some concept, as in the case of rapture, yet such supernatural knowledge is not of ordinary law necessary.
62 De complexis autem veritatibus secus est, quia, sicut ostensum est per tres primas rationes contra primam opinionem adductas, posita tota actione intellectus agentis et phantasmatum, multae complexiones remanebunt nobis ignotae et nobis neutrae quarum cognitio est nobis necessaria. Istarum igitur notitiam necesse est nobis supernaturaliter tradi, quia nullus earum notitiam potuit naturaliter invenire et eam aliis docendo tradere, quia sicut uni ita et cuilibet ex naturalibus erant neutrae. Utrum autem post primam doctrinae de talibus traditionem possit alius ex naturalibus assentire doctrinae traditae, de hoc in III libro distinctione 23. Haec autem prima traditio talis doctrinae dicitur revelatio, quae ideo est supernaturalis, quia est ab agente quod non est naturaliter motivum intellectus pro statu isto.	62. But as to propositional truths it is otherwise because, as was shown by the three first reasons adduced against the first opinion [nn.13-18, 40-41], after the whole action of the agent intellect and of sensible phantasms has been put in place, many propositions will remain unknown to us and neutral to us of which the knowledge is necessary for us. Therefore knowledge of these things must be delivered to us supernaturally, because no one can naturally discover the knowledge of them and deliver it to others by teaching, because since they were by natural powers neutral for one person so were they neutral for anyone else. But whether, after the first handing down of teaching about such things, someone else could, by natural powers, assent to the doctrine handed down, see 3. Suppl. d.23 q.un. nn.4-5. Now this first handing down of such doctrine is called revelation, which is for this reason supernatural, that it is from an agent which is, for this present life, not naturally a mover of the intellect.
63 Aliter etiam posset dici actio vel notitia supernaturalis quia est ab agente supplente vicem obiecti supernaturalis. Nam obiectum natum causare notitiam huius 'Deus est trinus', et similium, est essentia divina sub propria ratione cognita; ipsa sub tali ratione cognoscibilis est obiectum supernaturale. Quodcumque ergo ƿ agens causat notitiam aliquam veritatum quae per tale obiectum sic cognitum natae essent esse evidentes, illud agens in hoc supplet vicem illius obiecti. Quod si ipsum agens causaret perfectam notitiam illarum veritatum qualem obiectum in se cognitum causaret, tunc perfecte suppleret vicem obiecti; pro quanto imperfecta notitia quam facit, virtualiter continetur in illa perfecta cuius obiectum in se cognitum esset causa.	63. In another way too an action or knowledge could be said to be supernatural because it is from an agent supplying the place of the supernatural object. For an object having the nature to cause knowledge of this truth ‘God is triune’, and of similar ones, is the divine essence known under its proper idea; it is, as knowable under this idea, a supernatural object. Any agent, then, which causes some knowledge of the truths that have the nature to be evident through such an object thus known, that agent is in this respect supplying the place of the object. But if the agent were to cause of those truths a perfect knowledge of the sort that the object in itself would cause, then the agent would perfectly supply the place of the object; to the extent the knowledge it causes is imperfect this knowledge is virtually contained in the perfect knowledge of which the object would be in itself the cause.
64 Ita est in proposito. Nam revelans hanc 'Deus est trinus' causat in mente aliquam notitiam huius veritatis, licet obscuram, quia de obiecto sub ratione propria non cognito, quod obiectum si esset sic cognitum, natum esset causare perfectam et claram notitiam illius veritatis. Pro quanto ergo est haec notitia obscura et in illa clara includitur eminenter, sicut imperfectum in perfecto, pro tanto revelans hanc obscuram, vel causans, supplet vicem obiecti, illius clarae notitiae causativi, praecipue cum non possit notitiam alicuius veritatis causare nisi ut supplens vicem alicuius obiecti; nec veritatum talium de isto obiecto notitiam causare possit ut supplet vicem obiecti alicuius inferioris naturaliter motivi intellectus nostri, ƿ quia nullum tale virtualiter includit aliquam notitiam veritatum illarum, nec claram etiam nec ohscuram; igitur oportet quod in causando etiam illam obscuram suppleat aliqualiter vicem obiecti supernaturalis .	64. So it is in the proposed case. For he who reveals ‘God is triune’ causes in the mind some knowledge, though an obscure knowledge, of this truth, because it is about an object not known under its proper idea, which object, if it were thus known, would naturally cause a perfect and clear knowledge of that truth. To the extent, then, that this knowledge is obscure and is included eminently in the clear knowledge, as the imperfect in the perfect, to that same extent the revealer or causer of this obscure truth supplies the place of the object which is the cause of the clear knowledge, especially since it cannot cause knowledge of any truth except by supplying the place of some object; nor could it cause about this object knowledge of such truths in the way it supplies the place of some lesser object which is naturally mover of our intellect, because no such object virtually includes any knowledge of those truths, neither clear even nor obscure; therefore it must, 32 in causing even that obscure knowledge, supply in some way the place of the supernatural object.
65 Differentia istorum duorum modorum ponendi supernaturalitatem notitiae revelatae patet, separando unum ab alio. Puta, si agens supernaturale causaret notitiam obiecti naturalis, ut si infunderet geometriam alicui, ista esset supernaturalis primo modo, non secundo (hoc est a utroque modo, quia secundus infert primum licet non e converso). Ubi autem est primus tantum, ibi non est necesse quod sit supernaturalis quin naturaliter possit haberi; ubi est secundus modus, necessitas est ut supernaturaliter habeatur, quia naturaliter haberi non potest. ƿ	65. The difference between these two ways of positing the supernaturality of revealed knowledge is plain by separating one from the other. For example, if a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, as suppose it were to infuse geometry into someone, it would be supernatural in the first way [n.60], not in the second [n.63] (I mean, in both ways, because the second involves the first, though not conversely). But where only the first is, there it is not necessary that it be supernatural such that it not be capable of being possessed naturally; where the second way is, the necessity is that it be possessed supernaturally, because it cannot be possessed naturally.