Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P1Qu/A2

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 2
12 Contra istam positionem tripliciter potest argui. $a Nota, nullum supernaturale potest ratione naturali ostendi inesse viatori, nec necessario requiri ad perfectionem eius; nec etiam habens potest cognoscere illud sibi inesse. Igitur impossibile est hic contra Aristotelem uti ratione naturali: si arguatur ex creditis, non est ratio contra philosophum, quia praemissam creditam non concedet. Unde istae rationes hic factae contra ipsum alteram praemissam habent creditam vel probatam ex credito; ideo non sunt nisi persuasiones theologicae, ex creditis ad creditum. a$	12. Against this position one can argue in three ways. Note: it cannot be shown by natural reason that something supernatural exists in the wayfarer, nor that it is required necessarily for his perfection. Therefore it impossible to use natural reason here against Aristotle; if one argues from things believed, it is not a reason against the philosopher, because he will not concede the believed premise. Hence the reasons given against him here possess one or other premise as something believed, or as proved from something believed; therefore they are only persuasive theologically, from things believed to a thing believed.
13 Primo sic: omni agenti per cognitionem necessaria est distincta cognitio sui finis. Hanc probo, quia omne agens propter finem agit ex appetitu finis; omne per se agens agit propter finem; igitur omne per se agens suo modo appetit finem. Igitur sicut agenti naturali est necessarius appetitus finis propter quem debet agere, ita agenti per cognitionem - quod etiam est per se agens, ex II Physicorum - necessarius est appetitus sui finis propter quem debet agere. Patet ergo maior. ƿ Sed homo non potest scire ex naturalibus finem suum distincte igitur necessaria est sibi de hoc aliqua cognitio supernaturalis.	13. [First principal reason] – First thus: everything that acts through knowledge has need of distinct knowledge of its end. I prove this because everything that acts for an end acts from desire of the end; everything that per se acts, acts for an end; therefore everything that per se acts desires the end in its own particular way. Therefore, just as a natural agent needs desire of the end for which it must act, so a thing that acts by knowledge – which is also a per se agent, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22 – needs desire of the end for which it must act. The major then is plain. But man cannot from his natural powers distinctly know his end; therefore he needs some supernatural knowledge of it.
14 Minor patet: primo, quia Philosophus sequens naturalem rationem aut ponit felicitatem esse perfectam in cognitione acquisita substantiarum separatarum, sicut videtur velle I et X Ethicorum, aut si non determinate asserat illam esse supremam perfectionem nobis possibilem, aliam ratione naturali non concludit, ita quod soli naturali rationi innitendo vel errabit circa finem in particulari vel dubius remanebit; unde I Ethicorum dubitando ait: ((Si quod est deorum donum, rationabile est felicitatem esse)).	14. The minor is plain: first, because the Philosopher, following natural reason, lays down that happiness is perfected in the acquired knowledge of separate substances, as he seems to mean in the Ethics 1.6.1097b22-98a20, 10.7.1177a12-b1, 10.8.1178b7-32, 10.9.1179a22-32, or, if he does not determinately assert that it is the supreme perfection possible for us, he does not conclude anything else by natural reason, so that, by relying on natural reason alone, he will either be in error or remain in doubt about the end in its particular nature; hence in the Ethics 1.10.1099b11-13 he says hesitatingly “if any gift is from the gods, it is reasonable that happiness is.”
15 Secundo probatur eadem minor per rationem, quia nullius sibstantiae finis proprius cognoscitur a nobis nisi ex actibus eius nobis manifestis ex quibus ostenditur quod talis finis sit conveniens tali naturae; nullos actus experimur nec cognoscimus inesse ƿ nostrae naturae pro statu isto ex quibus cognoscamus visionem substantiarum separatarum esse convenientem nobis; igitur non possumus naturaliter cognoscere distincte quod ille finis sit conveniens naturae nostrae.	15. Second, the same minor is proved through reason, because the proper end of any substance is not known to us save from the acts of it that are manifest to us, from which acts is shown that such an end is fitting for such a nature; in this present life we do not experience or know that any acts are present in our nature from which we might know that the vision of separate substances is fitting for us; therefore we cannot naturally know distinctly that that end is fitting for our nature.
16 Hoc saltem certum est quod quaedam condiciones finis propter quas est appetibilior et ferventius inquirendus non possunt determinate cognosci ratione naturali. Etsi enim daretur quod ratio sufficeret ad probandum quod visio Dei nuda et fruitio est finis hominis, tamen non concludetur quod ista perpetuo convenient homini perfecto, in anima et corpore, sicut dicetur in IV distinctione 43. Et tamen perpetuitas huiusmodi boni est condicio reddens finem appetibiliorem quam si esset transitorium. Consequi enim hoc bonum in natura perfecta est appetibilius quam in anima separata, sicut patet per Augustinum XII Super Genesim. Istas igitur et similes condiciones finis necessarium est nosse ad efficaciter inquirendum finem, et tamen ad eas non sufficit ratio natu ralis, igitur requiritur doctrina supernaturaliter tradita.	16. From this it is at least certain that some conditions of the end, on whose account it is more desirable and more fervently to be sought, cannot be determinately known by natural reason. For even if it were granted that reason was sufficient to prove that the end of man is the pure vision and enjoyment of God, yet the conclusion will not follow that these fittingly belong in perpetuity to the man perfect in soul and body, the way it will be said in 4 d.43 q.2 n.32. And yet the perpetuity of a good of this sort is a condition that renders the end more desirable than it would if it were transitory. For to obtain this good in a perfect nature is more desirable than to obtain it in a separated soul, as is plain from Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis bk. 12. ch. 35 n.68. These and the like conditions of the end must be known, then, if the end is to be efficaciously sought, and yet natural reason is not sufficient for them; therefore a doctrine delivered supernaturally is required.
17 Secundo sic: omni cognoscenti ƿ agenti propter finem necessaria est cognitio quomodo et qualiter acquiratur talis finis; et etiam necessaria est cognitio omnium quae sunt ad illum finem necessaria; et tertio necessaria est cognitio quod omnia illa sufficiunt ad talem finem. Primum patet, quia si nesciat quomodo et qualiter finis acquiratur, nesciet qualiter ad consecutionem ipsius se disponet. Secundum probatur, quia si nesciat omnia necessaria ad ipsum, propter ignorantiam alicuius actus necessarii ad ipsum poterit a fine deficere. Si etiam, quantum ad tertium, nesciantur illa necessaria sufficere, ex dubitatione quod ignoret aliquid necessarium, non efficaciter prosequetur illud quod est necessarium.	17. [Second Principal Reason] – Second, thus: every knower that acts for an end needs knowledge of how and in what way such an end may be acquired; and also he needs knowledge of all the things that are necessary for the end; and, third, he needs knowledge that all those things are sufficient for such an end. The first condition is plain, because if he does not know how and in what way the end may be acquired, he will not know how to dispose himself so as to obtain it. The second condition is proved because if he does not know everything necessary for the end, he could, because of ignorance of some act necessary for it, fail of the end. Also, as to the third condition, if those necessary things are not known to be sufficient, he will, from doubt that he is ignorant of something necessary, not pursue what is necessary in an effective way.
18 Sed haec tria non potest viator naturali ratione cognoscere. Probatio de primo, quia beatitudo confertur tamquam praemium pro meritis quae Deus acceptat tamquam digna tali praemio, et per consequens non naturali necessitate sequitur ad actus nostros qualescumque sed contingenter datur a Deo, actus aliquos in ordine ad ipsum tamquam meritorios acceptante. Istud non est naturaliter ƿ scibile, ut videtur, quia hic etiam errabant philosophi, ponentes omnia quae sunt a Deo immediate esse ab eo necessario. Saltem alia duo membra sunt manifesta: non enim potest sciri naturali ratione acceptatio voluntatis divinae utpote tamquam contingenter acceptantis talia vel talia digna vita aeterna, et quod etiam illa sufficiant; dependet mere ex voluntate divina circa ea ad quae contingenter se habet; igitur etc.	18. But these three conditions cannot be known to the wayfarer by natural reason. The proof of the first is that beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits that God accepts as worthy of such a reward, and so as a result beatitude does not follow by natural necessity on any acts whatever of our own, but it is a contingent gift of God, who accepts some acts in their order to him as meritorious. This fact, as it seems, is not naturally knowable, because here too the philosophers erred, laying down that everything that is from God proceeds from him by necessity. The other two conditions, at any rate, are manifest: for the acceptance by the divine will, insofar as it contingently accepts such and such things as worthy of eternal life, cannot be known by natural reason, nor too that these things are sufficient; it all depends on the divine will in respect of those things the divine will is in a contingent way related to; therefore, etc.
19 Contra istas duas rationes instatur. Contra primam sic: omnis natura creata essentialiter dependet a qualibet per se causa eius, et propter talem dependentiam ex causato cognito potest sciri demonstratione quia et cognosci quaelibet eius per se causa; igitur cum natura hominis sit homini naturaliter cognoscibilis, quia non est potentiae eius cognitivae improportionalis, sequitur quod ex ista natura cognita possit naturaliter cognosci finis illius naturae. ƿ	19. [Instances against the two Principal Reasons] – Against these two reasons an instance is given. Against the first thus: every created nature depends essentially on any per se cause of it at all and, on account of such dependence, knowledge can be had from the thing caused by a ‘proof-that’, and any per se cause of it at all can be known; therefore, since the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, because it is not incommensurate with his cognitive power, the conclusion follows that the end of the nature can be naturally known from knowledge of the nature.
20 Confirmatur ratio: si enim ex natura inferiori cognita cognoscatur eius finis, non hoc minus est possibile in proposito, quia nec minor dependentia in proposito finiti ad suum finem est quam in aliis.	20. Confirmation of the reason: for if the end of a lower nature is known from knowledge of that nature, no less is this possible in the proposed case, because there is in the proposed case no lesser dependence of a determinate thing on its end than in other cases.
21 Ex hac etiam ratione videtur quod falsa sit illa propositio 'finis substantiae non cognoscitur nisi ex eius actibus', quae assumebatur in probatione minoris, quia ex cognitione naturae in se potest eius finis cognosci demonstratione quia.	21. From this reason too it seems that the proposition ‘the end of a substance is not known save from its acts’, which was assumed in the proof of the minor, is false, because the end of a nature can from the knowledge of that nature in itself be known by a ‘proof-that’.
22 Quod si dicatur quod ratio concludit hominem posse naturaliter cognoscere suum finem naturalem, non autem de fine supernaturali, contra, Augustinus libro De praedestinatione sanctorum: ((Posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum, quamvis habere fidem, sicut habere caritatem, gratiae sit fidelium)). Si ergo natura hominis est naturaliter cognoscibilis homini, naturaliter est etiam cognoscibilis illa potentia ut ƿ est talis naturae, et per consequens ordinabilitas talis naturae ad finem ad quem fides et caritas disponit.	22. But if it be said the reason concludes that man can naturally know his natural end but not his supernatural end, on the contrary Augustine says, On Predestination Sanctorum ch.5 n.10: “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, although having faith, like having charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” If, therefore, the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, then that ability as belonging to such a nature, and consequently such a nature’s directability to the end for which faith and charity dispose it, are also naturally knowable to him.
23 Item, homo naturaliter appetit finem illum quem dicis supernaturalem; igitur ad illum finem naturaliter ordinatur; igitur ex tali ordinatione potest concludi finis ille ut ex cognitione naturae ordinatae ad ipsum.	23. Again, man naturally desires the end which you say is supernatural; therefore he is naturally directed to that end; therefore that end can be concluded from such directedness as from knowledge of the nature directed to it.
24 Item, naturaliter est cognoscibile primum obiectum intellectus esse ens, secundum Avicennam, et naturaliter cognoscibile est in Deo perfectissime salvari rationem entis; finis autem cuiuscumque potentiae est optimum eorum quae continentur sub eius obiecto primo, quia in illo solo est perfecta quietatio et delectatio, ex X Ethicorum; ergo naturaliter cognoscibile est hominem ordinari secundum intellectum ad Deum tamquam ad finem.	24. Again, that the prime object of the intellect is being is naturally knowable, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 1.6 (72rb), and naturally knowable is that the nature of being is most perfectly realized in God; but the end of any power is the best of the things that are contained under its prime object, because in that alone is there perfect rest 14 and delight, from the Ethics 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore it is naturally knowable to man that he is in respect of his intellect directed to God as to his end.
25 Confirmatur ratio, quia cui naturaliter cognoscibilis est potentia aliqua, ei naturaliter cognoscibile est quid sit eius primum obiectum, et ulterius, potest cognoscere in quo salvatur ratio illius primi obiecti et quod perfectissimum tale est finis potentiae; mens ƿ autem nota est sibi, secundum August inum De Trinitate; igitur sibi est notum quid sit eius primum obiectum. Et novit Deum non excedi a ratione illius primi obiecti, quia tunc nullo modo esset ab ipsa mente intelligibilis; ergo novit Deum esse optimum in quo salvatur ratio sui obiecti, et ita ipsum novit esse finem potentiae.	25. The reason is confirmed, because what the prime object is of some power is naturally knowable to him to whom the power is naturally knowable, and, further, he can know what the nature of that prime object is realized in and that the most perfect such thing is the end of the power; but the mind is known to itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity bk.11 chs.11-12, nn.16, 18; therefore what is its prime object is known to it. Also known to it is that God is not transcended by the nature of that prime object, because then God would be in no way intelligible by the mind; therefore it knows that God is the best thing in which the nature of its object is realized, and so it knows that he is the end of the power.
26 Contra secundam rationem arguitur sic: si per unum extremum cognoscitur aliud extremum, ergo et media; sed necessaria ad consecutionem finis sunt media inter naturam et finem suum consequendum; igitur cum ex cognitione naturae possit finis cognosci, secundum prius probata, videtur quod similiter media ad finem necessaria possunt cognosci.	26. Against the second reason [nn.17-18] the argument runs as follows: if through one extreme the other extreme is known, therefore the means in between are known; but the means between the nature and the end of it that is to be obtained are necessary for obtaining the end; therefore, since, according to what was proved above (n.19), the end can be known from knowledge of the nature, it seems that the means necessary for the end can in like manner be known.
27 Confirmatur ratio: ita enim in proposito videtur esse necessaria conexio entium ad ipsum finem sicut est in aliis; sed propter talem conexionem in aliis ex fine cognoscuntur alia, sicut per rationem sanitatis concluditur talia et talia requiri ad sanitatem; igitur etc.	27. The reason is confirmed: for it thus seems that the connection of the things to the end is just as necessary in the proposed case as it is in other cases; but on account of this sort of connection in other cases other things are known from the end, as that from the nature of health is deduced that such and such things are required for health; therefore etc.
28 Ad primum istorum dico quod licet ƿ procedat de fine qui est causa finalis et non de fine attingendo per operationem - quorum finium distinctio dicetur infra - potest tamen dici ad illud, et ad sequens de Augustino, et ad tertium de potentia et primo obiecto, unica responsione, quod omnia accipiunt naturam nostram vel potentiam intellectivam esse nobis naturaliter cognoscibilem; quod falsum est, sub illa ratione propria et speciali sub qua ad talem finem ordinatur, et sub qua capax est gratiae consummatae, et sub qua habet Deum pro perfectissimo obiecto. Non enim cognoscitur anima nostra a nobis nec natura nostra pro statu isto nisi sub aliqua ratione generali, abstrahibili a sensibilibus, sicut patebit infra distinctione 3. Et secundum talem generalem rationem non convenit sibi ordinari ad illum finem, nec posse capere gratiam, nec habere Deum pro obiecto perfectissimo.	28. To the first of these instances (nn.19-21) I say that, although the process of reasoning is from the end which is the final cause and not from the end that must be attained by operation – the distinction between these ends will be stated below (1 d.1 p.1 q.1 n.5) – yet with a single response it can be said to the instance, and to the next one about Augustine, and to the third one about the power and the prime object, that all of these accept that our nature or intellective power is naturally knowable to us; but this is false in that proper and special respect under which our nature or intellective power is ordered to this sort of end and is capable of complete grace and has God for its most perfect object. For our soul and our nature are only known to us in this present life under some general reason that is capable of being abstracted from sensible things, as will appear below in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 n.24. And according to such a general reason it does not fittingly belong to our soul or nature to be ordered to that end, or to be capable of receiving grace, or to have God for most perfect object.
29 Tunc ad formam. Cum dicitur quod ex ente ad finem potest demonstrari finis demonstratione quia, dico quod non est verum nisi cognito ente ad finem sub illa ratione propria sub qua habet finem illum. Sic minor est falsa. - Et cum probatur per proportionem, dico quod licet mens sit eadem sibi, non tamen pro statu ƿ isto est sibi proportionalis tamquam obiectum nisi secundum rationes generales quae possunt abstrahi ab imaginabilibus.	29. Next to the form. When it is said [n.19] that from a thing that exists for an end the end can be demonstrated by a ‘proof-that’, I say that it is not true unless the thing that exists for an end is known under the proper reason under which it has that end. Thus the minor is false. – And when proof is given by commensuration (n.19), I say that the mind, although it is the same as itself, is yet not in this present life capable of being commensurate as an object with itself save in accord with the general reasons that are abstractable from sensible things.
30 Ad confirmationem dico quod nec aliarum substantiarum fines proprii cognoscuntur, qui scilicet sunt earum secundum rationes proprias, nisi sint aliqui actus manifesti ex quibus concludatur ordo earum ad talem finem.	30. To the confirmation [n.20] I say that the proper ends of other substances are not known either, namely the ends that belong to them according to their proper reasons, 16 unless some acts are manifest from which the order of those substances to such end may be deduced.
31 Et ex hoc patet ad illud quod additur contra probationem minoris, quod illa propositio non est falsa, 'non cognoscitur a nobis finis proprius substantiae nisi per actum eius manifestum'; non enim accipit propositio quod non posset aliter finis cognosci. Bene enim verum est quod si substantia cognosceretur sub propria ratione, ex ipsa sic cognita posset eius per se causa cognosci. Sed non sic cognoscitur a nobis nunc aliqua substantia, et ideo nunc nullum finem possumus concludere proprium substantiae nisi per actum evidentem de illa substantia ut nota in universali et confuse. In proposito deficit utraque via; sed probatio minoris tangit unam, de ignorantia actus, supponendo aliam, de ignorantia scilicet naturae in se.	31. And from this the response to what is added (n.21) against the proof of the minor is clear, because the proposition ‘the proper end of a substance is not known to us save by a manifest act of it’ (n.15) is not false; for the proposition does not suppose that the end could not be known in some other way. For the truth very much is that if a substance were known under its proper nature, from this knowledge of it the per se cause of it might be known. But no substance is now thus known to us, and therefore we can conclude to no end proper to a substance save through an evident act of the substance as that substance is known universally and confusedly. Both these ways are lacking in the proposed case; but the proof of the minor (n.15) touches on one of them, that about ignorance of the act, and it supposes the other, namely that about the ignorance of the nature in itself.
32 Ad secundum de Augustino dico quod illa potentia habendi caritatem ut insa est dispositio respectu Dei in se sub propria raƿtione amandi, convenit naturae hominis secundum rationem specialem, non communem sibi et sensibilibus; ideo non est illa potentialitas naturaliter cognoscibilis pro statu isto de homine, sicut nec homo cognoscitur sub illa ratione sub qua eius est haec potentia. Ita respondeo ad istud in quantum adduci potest ad conclusionem principalem, scilicet oppositam minori rationis primae. Sed in quantum adducitur contra illam responsionem de fine supernaturali et naturali, respondeo: concedo Deum esse finem naturalem hominis, sed non naturaliter adipiscendum sed supernaturaliter. Et hoc probat ratio sequens de desiderio naturali, quam concedo.	32. To the second instance about Augustine (n.22) I say that the power to have charity, as it is a disposition under the proper idea of love with respect to God in himself, is fitting to man’s nature in accord with a special reason, not with a reason common to himself and to sensible things; therefore the potentiality is not naturally knowable about man in this present life, just as man too is not known under the reason in which this power belongs to him. Such is my reply to the instance insofar as it can be adduced for the principal conclusion (n.19-20]), namely the one opposite to the minor of the first reason (n.14-15]). But insofar as it is adduced against the response about the supernatural and natural end (n.22) my reply is: I concede that God is the natural end of man, but as obtainable supernaturally and not naturally. And this is proved by the subsequent reason about natural desire (n.23), which I concede.
33 Ad aliud negandum est illud quod assumitur, quod scilicet naturaliter cognoscitur ens esse primum obiectum intellectus nostri, et hoc secundum totam indifferentiam entis ad sensibilia et insensibilia, et quod hoc dicit Avicenna quod sit naturaliter notum. Miscuit enim sectam suam - quae fuit secta Machoƿmeti - philosophicis, et quaedam dixit ut philosophica et ratione probata, alia ut consona sectae suae: unde expresse ponit libro IX Metaphysicae cap. 7 animam separatam cognoscere substantiam immaterialem in se, et ideo sub obiecto primo intellectus habuit ponere substantiam immaterialem contineri. Non sic Aristoteles; sed secundum ipsum, primum obiectum intellectus nostri est vel videtur esse quiditas sensibilis, et hoc vel in se sensibilis vel in suo inferiori; et haec est quiditas abstrahibilis a sensibilibus.	33. To the other argument (n.24), one must deny what it assumes, namely that it is naturally known that being is the prime object of our intellect, and that it is so in respect of the total indeterminacy of being to sensible and non-sensible things; and this is what Avicenna says is naturally known. For he has mixed his sect – which was the sect of Mohammed – together with philosophical matters, and some things he has said that are philosophical and proved by reason, others that are in conformity with his sect; he expressly lays down in his Metaphysics 9.7 (107ra) that the separated soul knows immaterial substance in itself, and therefore he had to lay down that immaterial substance was included under the prime object of the intellect. Not thus Aristotle [On the Soul 3.6.430b27-29], but according to him the prime object of our intellect is or seems to be sensible quiddity, and this either sensible in itself or in its inferior; and this is the quiddity that is abstractable from sensible things.
34 Quod autem dicitur in confirmatione illius rationis de Augustino, respondeo: dico quod dictum Augustini debet intelligi de actu primo, sufficiente omnino ex se respectu actus secundi, sed tamen nunc impedito; propter quod impedimentum ƿ actus secundus non elicitur nunc ex primo actu. De hoc amplius infra.	34. But as to what is said in confirmation of the reason from Augustine (n.25) my reply is: I say that the statement of Augustine must be understood of first act, which is altogether sufficient of itself as to second act but is now however impeded; and because of this impediment the second act is not now elicited from the first act. But of this more below 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.24-25].
35 Si obiciatur contra istud quod homo in statu naturae institutae potuit cognoscere naturam suam, ergo et finem naturae, ex deductione primae rationis; ergo illa cognitio non est supernaturalis.	35. If it is objected to this that man in the state of nature, when that state was established, could, by the deduction of the first reason (n.19), know his nature and therefore the end of his nature; therefore that knowledge is not supernatural.
36 Item, contra responsionem ad ultimam rationem: si ideo non cognoscitur quid sit obiectum primum intellectus, quia non cognoscitur intellectus sub omni ratione propria sub qua respicit tale obiectum, igitur non potest cognosci de quocumque quod ipsum sit intelligibile, quia non cognoscitur potentia sub omni ratione propria sub qua respicit quodcumque ut obiectum intelligibile.	36. Again, if it is objected to the response to the final reason (n.33): if what the prime object is of the intellect is for this reason not known that the intellect is not known in every proper respect in which it has regard to the object, then it cannot be known about anything at all that it is intelligible, because the power is not known in every proper respect in which it has regard to anything at all as to an intelligible object.
37 Respondeo: ad primum requireret dici, qualis fuit cognitio hominis instituti, quod usque alias differatur. Saltem tamen respectu viatoris pro statu isto est dicta cognitio supernaturalis, quia facultatem eius naturalem excedens; naturalem, dico, secundum statum naturae lapsae.	37. I reply: to the first objection (n.35) one would need to say of what sort the knowledge of man was when he was established, which may be put off to another occasion [4 d.1 p.2 q.2 n.7]. However at least in respect of the wayfarer in this present life the said knowledge is supernatural, because it exceeds his natural faculty; natural, I say, in the sense of in accord with the state of fallen nature.
38 Ad secundum concedo quod non habetur modo cognitio de anima vel aliqua eius potentia ita distincta quod ex ipsa possit cognosci quod aliquod obiectum intelligibile sibi correspondeat; sed ex ipso actu quem experimur concludimus potentiam et natuƿram cuius est ille actus illud respicere pro obiecto quod percipimus attingi per actum, ita quod obiectum potentiae non concludimus ex cognitione potentiae in se sed actus quem experimur. Sed de obiecto supernaturali neutram cognitionem possumus habere; et ideo ibi deficit utraque via cognoscendi finem proprium illius naturae.	38. To the second (n.26) I concede that knowledge of the soul now, or of any of its powers, is not had so distinctly that from it could be known that some intelligible object corresponds to it; but we deduce from the act itself which we experience that the power and nature of which it is the act have respect to the object as to the object which we perceive to be attained by the act, such that we do not deduce the object of the power from knowledge of the power in itself but from knowledge of the act which we experience. But we can have neither of these knowledges about a supernatural object; and for this reason both ways of knowing the proper end of that nature are there lacking.
39 Ad argumentum contra secundam rationem patet, quia supponit quoddam iam negatum. - Ad confirmationem illius rationis dico quod quando finis sequitur naturaliter ea quae sunt ad finem et naturaliter praeexigit illa, tunc ex fine possunt concludi ea quae sunt ad finem; hic autem non est consecutio naturalis, sed tantum acceptatio voluntatis divinae, compensantis ista merita tamquam digna fine tali.	39. To the argument (n.26) against the second reason, it is plain that it supposes something (n.19) already denied ([nn.28-29]). – To the confirmation (n.27) for the reason I say that when the end naturally follows the things that are for the end, and naturally requires them in advance, then the things that are for the end can be deduced from the end; here, however, the attainment is not natural but is only an acceptance by the divine will that rewards the merits as worthy of such end.
40 Item a tertio arguitur contra opinionem philosophorum principaliter. VI Metaphysicae: cognitio substantiarum separatarum est nobilissima, quia circa nobilissimum genus; igitur cognitio eorum quae sunt propria eis est maxime nobilis et necessaria, nam illa propria eis sunt perfectiora cognoscibilia quam illa in quibus conveniunt cum sensibilibus. Sed illa propria non possumus cognoscere ex puris naturalibus tantum. Primo, quia si in aliqua scientia modo possibili inveniri traderentur ƿ talia propria, hoc esset in metaphysica; sed ipsa non est possibilis a nobis naturaliter haberi de propriis passionibus istarum substantiarum separatarum, ut patet. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus I Metaphysicae, quod oportet sapientem omnia cognoscere aliqualiter, et non in particulari; et subdit: ((Qui enim novit universalia, novit aliqualiter omnia subiecta)). 'Sapientem' vocat ibi metaphysicum, sicut metaphysicam vocat ibi 'sapientiam'.	40. [Third Principal Reason] – Again, there is a third principal argument against the opinion of the philosophers. Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23: the knowledge of separate substances is the most noble because it is about the noblest kind of being; therefore knowledge of their characteristic properties is most noble and necessary, for those properties are more perfect knowables than are the ones they share with sensibles. But we cannot know those properties from pure natural powers alone. First, because if some science taught that it finds those properties in a way that is possible way, it would be the science of metaphysics; but a metaphysics about the characteristic features of those separate substances cannot be naturally had by us, as is plain. And this is what the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 1.2.982a8-10, that the wise man must know all things somehow and not in particular; and he subjoins: “For he who knows the universals somehow knows all the things under them.” He there calls the metaphysician ‘the wise man’, just as he there calls metaphysics ‘wisdom’.
41 Secundo probo idem, quia non cognoscuntur ista propria cognitione propter quid nisi cognita sint propria subiecta, quae sola includunt talia propter quid; sed propria subiecta eorum non sunt a nobis naturaliter cognoscibilia; ergo etc. Nec cognoscimus ista eorum propria demonstratione quia et ex effectibus. Quod probatur: nam effectus vel relinquunt intelƿlectum dubium quoad ista propria, vel abducunt illum in errorem. Quod apparet de proprietatibus primae substantiae immaterialis in se; proprietas enim eius est quod sit communicabilis tribus; sed effectus non ostendunt istam proprietatem, quia non sunt ab ipso in quantum trino. Et si ab effectibus arguatur ad causam, magis deducunt in oppositum et in errorem, quia in nullo effectu invenitur una natura nisi in uno supposito. Proprietas etiam istius naturae ad extra est contingenter causare; et ad oppositum huius magis effectus ducunt, in errorem, sicut patet per opinionem philosophorum, ponentium primum necessario causare quidquid causat. De proprietatibus etiam aliarum substantiarum patet idem, quia ƿ effectus magis ducunt in sempiternitatem et necessitatem earum quam in contingentiam et novitatem, secundum eos. Similiter videntur etiam philosophi ex motibus concludere quod numerus illarum substantiarum separatarum sit secundum numerum motuum caelestium. Similiter quod istae substantiae sunt naturaliter beatae et impeccabiles. Quae omnia sunt absurda.	41. Second, I prove the same because those properties are not known by a ‘knowledge-why’ unless the proper subjects are known, which alone include the proper ‘why’; but their proper subjects are not naturally knowable to us; therefore etc. Nor do we know their properties by a ‘demonstration-that’ and from the effects. Here is the proof; for the effects either leave the intellect in doubt as to those properties, or lead them away into error. And this is clear from the properties of the first immaterial substance in itself; for a property of it is that it is communicable to three; but the effects do not show this property, because these do not come from it insofar as it is three. And if an argument is made from the effects to the cause, the effects lead rather to the opposite and to error, because in no effect is there found one nature save in one supposit. It is also a property of that nature to be a contingent cause of things outside it; and the effects lead rather to the opposite of this, to error, as is plain from the opinion of the philosophers who posit that the first thing causes necessarily whatever it causes. About the properties of other substances too the same is plain, because the effects, according to the philosophers, lead rather to the eternity and necessity of those properties than to their contingency and newness. Likewise, the philosophers also seem to conclude from the celestial motions that the number of those separate substances accords with the number of the motions. Likewise, that those substances are naturally blessed and incapable of sin. All which things are absurd.
42 Contra istam rationem arguo quod quaecumque necessaria de substantiis separatis cognoscantur a nobis nunc per fidem sive per communem revelationem, possint cognosci cognitione naturali. Et hoc sic: quorum necessariorum cognoscimus terminos naturaliter, et illa possumus naturaliter comprehendere; sed omnium necessariorum revelatorum terminos naturaliter cognoscimus; ergo etc.	42. [Instance against the Third Principal Reason] – Against this reason I argue that any necessary property at all of separate substances that is now known to us by faith or common revelation could be known by natural knowledge. And this as follows: those necessary properties of which we naturally know the terms we can also naturally comprehend; but we naturally know the terms of all the necessary things that have been revealed; therefore etc.
43 Probatio maioris: illa necessaria aut sunt mediata, aut immediata; si immediata, ergo cognoscuntur cognitis terminis, I Posteƿriorum; si mediata, ergo cum possumus cognoscere extrema, possumus concipere medium inter illa. Et coniungendo illud medium cum utroque extremo, aut habentur praemissae mediatae, aut immediatae; si immediatae, idem quod prius; si mediatae, procedetur cognoscendo medium inter extrema et coniungendo cum extremis, quousque veniamus ad immediata. Ergo tandem deveniemus ad necessaria immediata, quae intelligimus ex terminis, ex quibus sequuntur omnia necessaria mediata; ergo illa mediata per immediata scire poterimus naturaliter.	43. Proof of the major: those necessary things are either mediate or immediate; if they are immediate, then they are known when the terms are known, Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b23-25; if they are mediate, then when we are able to know the extremes we are able to conceive the mean between them. And by conjoining the mean with either extreme, we get either mediate or immediate premises; if the premises are immediate, the same as before; if mediate, the process continues by knowing the mean between the extremes and by conjoining it with the extremes, until we come to things immediate. Therefore ultimately we will come down to immediate necessities that we understand from the terms, from which all the mediate necessities follow; therefore we will be able naturally to know those mediates through the immediates.
44 Probatio minoris principalis, quia habens fidem et non habens contradicentes sibi invicem, non contradicunt de nominibus tantum sed de conceptibus, sicut patet cum philosophus et theologus contradicunt sibi invicem de ista 'Deus est trinus', ubi non tantum idem nomen sed eundem conceptum unus negat et alius affirmat; igitur omnem conceptum simplicem quem habet ille habet iste.	44. Proof of the principal minor, because to have and not to have faith, being contradictories to each other, are not contradictory in words only but in concepts, as is plain when a philosopher and a theologian contradict each other over ‘God is triune,’ where one of them denies and the other affirms not only the same name but the same concept; therefore every simple concept that the one has the other has.
45 Ad istud respondeo. De substantiis separatis sunt aliquae veritates immediatae. Accipio tunc aliquam veritatem talem primam et immediatam, et sit a. In illa incluƿduntur multae veritates mediatae, puta omnes quae enuntiant particulariter communia ad praedicatum de communibus ad subiectum; dicantur b, c. Ista vera mediata non habent evidentiam nisi ex aliquo immediato. Igitur non sunt natae sciri nisi ex isto immediato intellecto. Si igitur aliquis intellectus possit intelligere terminos b et componere eos ad invicem, non autem possit intelligere terminos a nec per consequens ipsum a, b erit intellectui suo propositio neutra, quia nec nota ex se nec ex immediata, quia illa, per positum, non est nota. Ita est de nobis, quia conceptus quosdam communes habemus de substantiis materialibus et immaterialibus, et illos possumus ad invicem componere; sed istae complexiones non habent evidentiam nisi ex veris immediatis quae sunt de illis quiditatibus sub ratione earum propria et speciali, sub qua ratione non concipimus illas quiditates, et ideo nec scimus illas veritates generales de conceptibus generalibus.	45. [Response to the Instance] – To this instance I reply: There exist some immediate truths about separate substances. I take then some such first and immediate truth, and let it be a. In it are included many mediate truths, as for instance all those that in particular assert things common to the predicate of things common to the subject; let them be called b, c. Those true mediate assertions do not have their truth save from something immediate. Therefore they are not naturally known save from the understanding of that something immediate. If therefore some intellect could understand the terms in b and combine them with each other, but could not understand the terms in a nor consequently a itself, b will be indeterminate for his intellect, because it will not be known either from itself or from an immediate proposition, because this latter is, by supposition, not known. Such is how it is with us, because we have certain common concepts about material and immaterial substances, and we can combine them with each other; but the complexes we thus form are not evident save from the true immediate propositions that are about those essences in their proper and special idea; but we do not conceive those essences under this idea, and so we do not know those general truths about the general concepts.
46 Exemplum: si impossibile esset alicui concipere triangulum sub propria ratione, posset tamen abstrahere a quadrangulo rationem figurae et eam concipere, impossibile esset etiam sibi conƿcipere primitatem ut est propria passio trianguli, quia sic non concipitur nisi ut abstrahitur a triangulo; posset tamen primitatem abstrahere ab aliis primitatibus, puta in numeris. Iste intellectus licet posset formare compositionem hanc 'aliqua figura est prima', quia terminos eius potest apprehendere, tamen illa compositio formata erit sibi neutra, quia ista est mediata, inclusa in ista immediata 'triangulus est sic primus'; et quia hanc immediatam non potest intelligere, quia nec terminos eius, ideo non potest mediatam scire, quae ex hac immediata tantum habet evidentiam.	46. An example: if it were impossible for someone to conceive a triangle in its proper idea, although he could abstract and conceive the idea of the figure from a quadrilateral, it would also be impossible for him to conceive a triangle’s primacy as this primacy is a proper quality of a triangle, because it is not in this way conceived except when it is abstracted from triangle; yet he could abstract primacy from other primacies, as for instance primacy in numbers. Although this intellect could form this composite ‘some figure is primary’, because it can apprehend its terms, yet the composite when formed will be indeterminate for it, because it is a mediate one included in the immediate proposition ‘the triangle is primary in this way’; and because he cannot understand this immediate proposition, because he cannot understand its terms either, therefore he cannot know the mediate proposition, which only has its evidence from the immediate one.
47 Per hoc ad argumentum: nego maiorem; ad probationem dico quod illa necessaria sunt mediata. - Et cum dicis 'igitur possumus concipere medium inter extrema', nego consequentiam, quia medium inter extrema quandoque est essentialiter ordinatum, puta quod quid est alterius extremi vel passio prior respectu passionis posterioris; et tale est medium ad universaliter concludendum extremum de extremo. Concedo igitur quod quicumque potest intelligere extrema, potest intelligere tale medium inter extrema, quia intellectus eius includitur in altero extremo vel est idem alteri. Si autem medium sit particulare, contentum sub altero exƿtremo et non essentialiter inter extrema, tunc non oportet quod potens concipere extrema generalia, possit concipere medium particulare ad illa extrema. Ita est hic. Nam quiditas sub ratione propria et particulari habens passionem aliquam immediate sibi inhaerentem, est medium inferius ad conceptum communem de quo dicitur illa passio in communi concepta; et ideo non est medium universaliter inferens passionem de communi, sed tantum particulariter. Hoc patet in exemplo illo, quia non oportet quod potens concipere figuram in communi et primitatem in communi, possit concipere triangulum in particulari, quia triangulus est medium, contentum sub figura; medium, inquam, ad concludendum primitatem de figura particulariter.	47. Hereby to the argument (n.42): I deny the major; to the proof (n.43) I say that those necessary things are mediate. – And when you say ‘therefore we can conceive the mean between the extremes’, I deny the consequence, because the mean between the extremes is sometimes ordered essentially between them, for example the definition of one or other extreme, or a property that is prior in respect of a later property; and such is a mean for universally proving the extreme of the extreme. I therefore concede that whoever can understand the extremes can understand such a mean between the extremes, because the understanding of it is included in one or other extreme, or is the same as one or other extreme. But if the mean is a particular, contained under one or other extreme and not essentially between the extremes, then it is not necessary that he who can understand the general extremes can conceive the mean that is particular to the extremes. Thus it is here. For a whatness that has in its proper and particular idea some property immediately inhering in it, is a mean inferior to the common concept about which the property in the common concept is asserted; and so it is not a mean for proving the property of the common term universally, but only particularly. This is plain in the example (n.46), because it is not necessary that he who is able to conceive figure in general and primacy in general could conceive triangle in particular, because triangle is a mean contained under ‘figure’; a mean, I say, for proving primacy of a figure in particular.
48 $a Haec tertia ratio potissime concludit de prima substantia immateriali, quia eius tamquam obiecti beatifici potissime est cognitio necessaria. Et tunc responsio ad obiectionem contra ipsam: supponit videlicet quod naturaliter nunc non concipimus Deum nisi in conceptu sibi communi et sensibilibus, quod inferius in 1 quaestione distinctionis 3 exponetur. Si etiam negetur istud suppositum, adhuc oportet dicere conceptum qui potest fieri de Deo virtute creaturae esse imperfectum; qui autem fieret virtute ƿ ipsius essentiae in se, esset perfectus. Sicut igitur dictum est de conceptu generali et speciali, ita dicatur secundum aliam viam de perfecto conceptu et imperfecto. a$	48. This third reason (n.40) is especially conclusive about the first immaterial substance, because knowledge of it as the beatific object is especially necessary. And then the response to the objection (n.42) against it: namely the supposition is that we do not now naturally conceive God save in a concept common to him and to sensibles, which point will be expounded below, in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.5-10. Even if that supposition is denied, one must still say that the concept which can be made about God by virtue of a creature is imperfect; but the concept that might be made by virtue of the very essence in itself would be perfect. So, just as we spoke about general and special concept (n.47), let us thus in another way speak about perfect and imperfect concept.
49 Quarto sic arguitur: ordinatum ad aliquem finem ad quem est indispositum, necesse est paulative promoveri ad dispositionem illius finis; homo ordinatur ad finem supernaturalem, ad quem ex se est indispositus; igitur indiget paulative disponi ad habendum illum finem. Hoc fit per cognitionem aliquam supernaturalem imperfectam, qualis ponitur necessaria; igitur etc.	49. [Fourth Principal Reason]. Fourth it is argued thus: a thing that is ordered to some end for which it is not disposed must be little by little moved to the disposition for that end; man is ordered to a supernatural end for which he is not of himself disposed; therefore he needs to be disposed little by little for possessing that end. This is done through some supernatural imperfect knowledge of the sort set down as necessary.
50 Si autem instetur quod agens perfectum potest statim removere imperfectionem et statim agere, respondeo: quod si posset de potentia absoluta, tamen perfectius est communicare creaturae activitatem respectu suae perfectionis consequendae quam non communicare; potest autem homo habere aliquam activitatem respectu suae perfectionis finalis; igitur perfectius est quod hoc sibi communicetur. Quod non potest sine aliqua cognitione imperfecta praecedente illam cognitionem perfectam ad quam finaliter ordinatur. ƿ	50. But if it be instanced that a perfect agent can remove an imperfection and act at once, I reply: although this might be possible by absolute power, yet it is more perfect to communicate activity to the creature with respect to obtaining its own perfection than not to communicate it; but man can have some activity with respect to his own final perfection; therefore it is more perfect that this be communicated to him. But this would not be possible without some imperfect knowledge preceding the perfect knowledge toward which it is finally directed.
51 Quinto arguitur sic: omne agens utens instrumento in agendo, non potest per illud instrumentum in actionem aliquam quae excedit naturam illius instrumenti; lumen autem intellectus agentis est instrumentum quo anima utitur nunc in intelligendo naturaliter; igitur non potest per illud lumen in aliquam actionem quae excedat illud lumen. Sed illud de se est limitatum ad cognitionem habitam per viam sensitivam et viam sensuum; igitur anima non potest in cognitionem aliquam quae non potest haberi per viam sensus. Sed multorum aliorum cognitio est necessaria pro statu isto; ergo etc.	51. [Fifth Principal Reason]. Fifth, it is argued thus: every agent using an instrument in its acting has through that instrument no power for any action that exceeds the nature of the instrument; but the light of the agent intellect is the instrument which the soul now uses in its natural understanding; therefore it has through that light no power for any action that exceeds that light. But that light is of itself limited to acquiring knowledge in a sensitive way through means of the senses; therefore the soul has no power for any knowledge that cannot be had by means of sense. But knowledge of many other things is necessary for this present life; therefore etc.
52 Haec ratio videtur concludere contra eum qui fecit eam. Secundum enim deductionem istam lux increata non poterit uti intellectu agente ut instrumento ad cognitionem alicuius sincerae veritatis, quia talis secundum eum non potest haberi via sensuum, sine speciali illustratione. Et ita sequitur quod in cognitione sincerae veritatis lumen intellectus agentis nullo modo habeat aliquam actionem; quod videtur inconveniens, quia ista actio est perfectior omni intellectione: et per consequens illud quod est perfectius in anima in quantum intellectiva, debet concurrere aliquo modo ad illam actionem. ƿ	52. This reason seems to produce a conclusion contrary to him who has made it. For, according to this deduction, the uncreated light will not be able to use the agent intellect as an instrument for knowledge of any pure truth, because, according to him, such cannot be had by means of the senses without special illumination. And thus it follows that in the knowledge of pure truth the light of the agent intellect does not in any way perform any action; but this seems problematic, because this action is more perfect than any understanding; and consequently that which is more perfect in the soul insofar as the soul is intellective ought to contribute in some way to the action.
53 Istae duae ultimae rationes non videntur quam plurimum efficaces. Prima enim esset efficax si esset probatum quod homo ordinatur finaliter ad cognitionem supernaturalem (cuius probatio est pertinens ad quaestiones de beatitudine), et si cum hoc ostenderetur cognitionem naturalem non sufficienter disponere pro statu isto ad cognitionem supernaturalem consequendam. Secunda ratio duo petit, scilicet aliquorum cognitionem esse necessariam quae non possunt cognosci per viam sensuum, et quod lumen intellectus agentis est ad talia cognoscibilia limitatum.	53. [To the Fourth and Fifth Reason]. These two final reasons (49) [nn. (49), (51)] do not seem as effective as they could be. For the first would be effective if it had been proved that man is ordered finally to supernatural knowledge (the proof of which pertains to the question about beatitude, 4 Suppl. d.49 q.7 nn.2-7), and if along with this it were shown that natural knowledge does not in this present life sufficiently dispose for attaining supernatural knowledge. The second reason begs two questions, namely that there is need for knowledge of certain things that cannot be known by means of the senses, and that the light of the agent intellect is limited to knowables of that sort.
54 Tres primae rationes probabiliores apparent. Quod autem nulla talis cognitio sit necessaria ad salutem, probo: ƿ $a Pone, aliquis est non baptizatus: cum sit adultus, non habeat aliquem docentem, habet bonos motus quales potest habere, conformes rationi rectae naturali, et cavet illa quae ratio naturalis ostendit sibi esse mala. Licet Deus de lege communi talem visitaret, docendo per hominem vel per angelum - sicut Cornelium visitavit - tamen pone quod non docetur ab aliquo, ille salvabitur. Similiter licet postea doceatur, tamen prius est iustus, et ita dignus vita aeterna, quia per bona velle praecedentia doctrinam meretur gratiam qua est iustus; et tamen non habet theologiam, etiam quantum ad prima credibilia, sed tantum cognitionem naturalem. Ergo nihil theologiae est simpliciter necessarium ad salutem.	54. The first three reasons [nn. 13, 17, 40] appear more probable. However, that no such knowledge is necessary for salvation I prove: Suppose there is someone who is not baptized; although he is an adult, has no one to teach him, he has the sort of good motions in conformity with right reason that he is capable of having, and he avoids the things that natural reason shows him to be bad. Although God by common law would visit such a person and teach him through a man or an angel – in the way he visited Cornelius, Acts 10.1-48 – nevertheless suppose him not taught by anyone, he will be saved. Likewise, although he were taught later, yet he was just before and so worthy of eternal life, because by willing the good things that precede teaching he merits the grace whereby he is just; and yet he does not have theological knowledge, even as to the first objects of faith, but only natural knowledge. Therefore nothing of theology is simply necessary for salvation.
55 Posset dici quod ille per bona velle ex genere meretur de congruo iustificari ab originali, et Deus non subtrahit liberalitatis suae munus: ergo dat primam gratiam sine sacramento, quia non est alligatus sacramentis; gratia non datur sine habitu fidei; itaque habet habitum theologiae, licet non possit in actum, sicut nec baptizatus nisi instruatur. Et licet non sit contradictio gratiam dari ƿ sine fide, cum sint habitus distincti, et in aliis potentiis, tamen sicut in baptismo ponitur simultas in infusione, ita propter idem potest poni simultas in casu isto. Non enim minus gratiosus est Deus illi quem propter meritum de congruo iustificat sine sacramento quam illi quem sine omni merito proprio iustificat in susceptione sacramenti. Itaque possibile est Deo de potentia absoluta quemlibet salvare, et etiam facere quod mereatur gloriam sine fide infusa si sine illa det gratiam qua habens bene utatur quantum ad velle quod potest habere secundum naturalem rationem et fidem acquisitam, vel sine omni acquisita si doctor desit, licet de potentia ordinata non detur sine fidei habitu praecedente, quia sine illa non ponitur gratia infundi; non propter indigentiam, quasi gratia sine illa non sufficeret, sed propter liberalitatem divinam quae totum reformat; minus etiam perfecte esset homo dispositus quantum ad assensum verorum quorumdam sine fide infusa.	55. One could say that by meriting things good in their kind he merits by congruity to be justified from original sin, and God does not deny the gift of his liberality; therefore he gives the first grace without a sacrament, because he is not bound by the sacraments; grace is not given without the habit of faith; therefore that person has the habit of theology, although he is not able to activate it, just as neither is he baptized unless he is instructed. And although there is no contradiction in grace being given without faith, since the habits are distinct and exist in different powers, nevertheless just as in baptism the supposition is that these are infused simultaneously, so for the same reason simultaneity can be supposed in this case. For God is not less gracious to him whom without a sacrament he justifies because of his merit by congruity, than to him whom he justifies in the reception of the sacrament without any merit of his own. Therefore it is possible for God by his absolute power to save anyone he likes, and also to bring it about that the latter deserves glory without infused faith, if, in the absence of it, he gives the grace which the possessor uses well as far as to willing what he is able to acquire in accord with natural reason and acquired faith, or without any acquired faith if a teacher is lacking; although by his ordained power God does not give grace without the preceding habit of faith, because grace is supposed not to be infused without it; not because of any need, as if grace without it would not be sufficient, but because of divine liberality, which reforms the whole man; also a man would, without infused faith, be less perfectly disposed as to assenting to certain truths.
56 Et sicut hic, ita dico proportionaliter de habitu theologiae, qui perfectus exsistens includit fidem infusam et acquisitam articulorum et aliorum revelatorum a Deo in Scriptura, ita quod non est tantum haec infusa fides nec tantum illa acquisita sed simul ambae. Est ergo necessaria theologia, verum est loquendo de potentia ordinata et loquendo de principaliori habitu sive priori pertinente ad theologiam, qui scilicet est fides infusa, et hoc generaliter, quantum ad omnes; non sic quantum ad secundum haƿbitum quem includit, qui est fides acquisita, sed forte de necessitate ordinata est necessaria in adulto potente habere doctorem et eum intelligere, et hoc quantum ad aliquorum generalium fidem acquisitam. a$	56. And as in this case, so analogously about the habit of theology I say that the perfectly existing habit includes infused and acquired faith of the articles and other things revealed by God in Scripture, such that it is not infused faith alone nor acquired faith alone but both together. Theology is therefore necessary, but it is so when speaking of ordained power and when speaking of the more principal or prior habit that pertains to theology, namely the one which is infused faith, and this in general as far as concerns everyone; it is not so as far as concerns the second habit that it includes, which is acquired faith, although perhaps it is by ordained power necessary in an adult who is able to have a teacher and can understand him, and can do so as far as concerns acquired faith of certain general things.