Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D2/P2Q2

• I. To the First Question A. The Opinion of Others
• B. Against the Conclusion of the Opinion
• C. Scotus' own Solution 1. How Body is in a Place
• a. On the First Article
• b. On the Other Articles
• How an Angel is in Place
• D. To the Principal Arguments
• II. To the Second Question

Latin	English
	Question Two: Whether an Angel requires a Determinate Place
197 Iuxta hoc quaero - sine argumentis - utrum angelus requirat determinatum locum, ita quod nec in maiore nec in minore possit esse, sed praecise in tanto loco; et includit hoc, utrum possit esse in loco punctali, et utrum in quantumcumque parvo loco et in quantumcumque magno.	197. Next I ask - without arguments - whether an angel requires a determinate place such that he can be neither in a greater nor a lesser space but precisely in a space of so much; and this question includes whether he can be at a spatial point, and whether he can be in a place ever so small or ever so large.
	I. To the First Question A. The Opinion of Others
198 Ad primam quaestionem dicitur quod angelus est in loco praecise per operationem suam.	198. [First way of speaking] - As to the first question [n.189], one assertion [from Thomas Aquinas] is that an angel is in place precisely through his operation.
199 Ad quod probandum adducitur Damascenus cap. 13: ƿ'Incorporea' - inquit - 'natura ubi adest, et operatur; non corporaliter sed spiritualiter continetur'; et infra, in eodem cap.: ((Intelligibiliter dicitur circumscribi, ubi et operatur)); et cap. 16: 'Intellectualiter adesse et operari, ubi utique iussi fuerint'. Ita quod semper videtur cum 'esse angeli in loco' coniungere 'operari', quasi hoc sit angelum esse in loco, quod est 'ipsum operari in loco'.	199. For proof of this Damascene ch.13 is adduced, who says, "Incorporeal nature operates where it is; and it is not corporeally contained but spiritually;" and later in the same chapter, "it is said to be intelligibly circumscribed where it also operates;" and in ch.16, "they [sc. incorporeal things] are intellectually present and operate where at least they have been commanded to be." Thus it seems that 'an angel's being in place' is always conjoined with his 'operating' - as if being in place were for an angel the fact that 'he operates in place'.
200 Contra hoc est quod istud est damnatum sicut quidam articulus, damnatus ab episcopo Parisiensi et excommunicatus.	200. Against this [sc. an angel is in place by his operation] is that the opinion has been condemned as a certain condemned and excommunicated article by the bishop of Paris.
201 Quod si dicatur quod 'excommunicatio non transiit mare vel ƿdioecesim', - si tamen fuerit articulus damnatus ut articulus haereticus, videtur esse damnatus sicut haereticus non solum auctoritate dioecesani sed etiam auctoritate domini Papae, Extra 'De haereticis', cap. ((Ad abolendam)). Vel saltem sententia est suspecta, quia in aliqua universitate sollemniter est damnata.	201. But if it be said that 'an excommunication does not pass beyond the sea or beyond the diocese' - yet, if it was condemned as an heretical article, it seems to have been condemned as heretical not only by the authority of the diocese but also by the authority of the lord Pope [Gregory IX], in his Extra 'On Heretics' ch. 'In order to abolish'. Or at least the opinion is suspect, because it has been solemnly condemned in a university.
202 Alii, nolentes uti verbo suspecto ƿ(angelum scilicet esse in loco per operationem), dicunt ipsum esse in loco per applicationem eius ad locum.	202. [The second way of speaking] - Others [Henry of Ghent, Richard of Middleton], not wishing to use a suspect statement (namely that an angel is in place through operation) say that an angel is in place through an application of himself to place.
203 Sed isti videntur idem sub alio vocabulo occultare. Non enim videtur 'applicatio' posse intelligi aliquid esse, nisi sit actus primus vel actus secundus. Non actus primus, patet. Nec secundus, quia si intelligatur actus secundus, igitur est operatio: et non immanens (ut intellectio vel volitio), quia operatio immanens ita abstrahit a loco sicut essentia angeli; igitur 'applicatio' est operatio transiens in corpus, et ita erit in loco per operationem eius circa corpus in loco.	203. But these thinkers seem to hide the same opinion under different words. For 'application' does not seem it can be understood as anything other than first act [sc. act of essence] or second act [sc. act of power]. Not first act, as is plain. Nor second act, because if second act is understood, it is operation; and not an immanent operation (as understanding or volition), because the immanent operation of an angel abstracts from place just as does the essence of an angel; therefore 'application' is a transitive operation on a body, and so an angel will be in place through his operating on a body in place.
	B. Against the Conclusion of the Opinion
204 Contra conclusionem huius opinionis arguitur: Primo sic, quod sic ponens contradicat sibi ipsi, quia in quaeƿstione illa 'Utrum Deus sit ubique', probat quod sic per hoc quod secundum Philosophum VII Physicorum 'movens est simul cum moto', et Deus est primum efficiens et ideo potens movere omne mobile; et ex hoc concludit quod Deus est in omnibus et praesens omnibus. Quaero quid intendit per hoc concludere? Aut Deum esse praesentem, hoc est 'moventem', - et tunc est petitio principii, quia idem praemissa et conclusio; et nihil ad propositum, quia ibi intendit concludere immensitatem Dei secundum quam Deus est praesens omnibus. Aut intendit concludere illam praesentiam quae competit Deo in quantum est immensus, et tunc ex operatione alicubi - secundum ipsum - sequitur praesentia illa quae pertinet ad immensitatem divinam (quae est Dei in quantum Deus est), ita quod prius naturaliter erit Deus praesens in quantum immensus quam in quantum operans; et hoc concluditur ex hoc quod est praesens per operationem, sicut ex posteriore prius. Igitur a simili in proposito, prius naturaliter erit ƿangelus praesens alicui loco per essentiam, quam sit praesens sibi per suam operationem.	204. Argument against the conclusion of this opinion [n.198]: First thus: that he who posits this conclusion contradicts himself, because in the question 'whether God is everywhere' [Aquinas SG 3.68] he proves that God is everywhere through the fact that, according to the Philosopher Physics 7.2.243a3-4, 'the mover is together with the moved', and God is the first efficient cause and therefore able to move every movable; and from this he concludes that God is in everything and present to everything. I ask what he means hereby to conclude. Either that God is present, that is, is 'mover', and then there is a begging of the question because the premises and the conclusion are the same [sc. 'because God moves everything, therefore he is present by motion to everything']; and is nothing to the purpose, because he intends there to infer the immensity of God from the presence of God to everything. Or he means to infer the presence that belongs to God insofar as he is immense, and in that case from God's presence anywhere is inferred - according to him - the presence that pertains to the divine immensity (which belongs to God insofar as he is God), such that God will as he is immense naturally be present before he is as operating present; and this is inferred from the fact that he is present by operation, the way the prior is inferred from the posterior [sc. as cause is inferred from effect, or 'God is somewhere by operation, therefore he is first there by essence']. Therefore by likeness as to the issue at hand, an angel will naturally be present in some place by essence before he is present there by his operation [sc. contrary to the opinion in question here, which says an angel is only present in place by operation and not first by essence].
205 Confirmatur ratio, quia minus videtur de Deo quod oporteat ipsum esse praesentem per essentiam ubi operatur, quam angelum, quia illud quod est illimitatae potentiae videtur posse agere in quantumcumque distans, sed illud quod est determinatae et limitatae virtutis requirit determinatam approximationem passi ad hoc quod agat in ipsum; nullum enim est agens virtutis limitatae et determinatae cuius actio non possit impediri per nimiam distantiam ad passum, et ita magis videtur necesse ponere angelum esse praesentem, ad hoc quod agat.	205. A confirmation of this reason [n.204] is that it seems less true of God that he must by his essence be present in the place where he operates than of an angel, because what is of unlimited power seems able to act on a thing however distant it is, but what is of determinate and limited power requires a determinate nearness to what it acts on so that it may act on it; for there is no agent of limited and determinate power whose action cannot be impeded by too much distance from what is acted on, and so it seems more necessary to posit that an angel is present so as to act [sc. than that God is].
206 Confirmatur etiam, quia si aliqua actio est in corpore ab angelo, quomodo se habet actio ista ad virtutem illam a qua procedit? Aut mediate aut immediate? Si immediata est illi a qua procedit, igitur immediate est angelus in tali corpore vel iuxta tale corpus. Si mediata, ergo est ab illa virtute per aliquod medium, et de isto medio erit eadem quaestio. Et tunc oportebit stare ad hoc quod illud quod primo est a tali virtute, immediatum est tali virtuti (et per consequens, illi cuius est talis virtus), et ita illud erit praesens ibi. ƿ	206. Another confirmation is that if there is any action from an angel on a body, how is this action disposed to the power from which it proceeds? Mediately or immediately? If it is disposed immediately to the power from which it proceeds, then the angel is in such body or next to it immediately. If it is mediately disposed, then it is from the power through some medium, and there will be the same question about this medium. And then one will have to stop at the fact that what is first from such power is immediate to such power (and consequently to him whose power it is), and thus that it will be present in that place.
207 Praeterea, secundo, sequitur quod angelus aliquando (immo frequenter) nusquam sit: nihil enim operatur in caelo empyreo (quia illud non est mutabile, neque mobile), igitur nusquam est in caelo empyreo. Ibi autem est ut plurimum.	207. Further and second, there follows [sc. from this opinion, n.198] that an angel may sometimes (nay frequently) be nowhere; for an angel does nothing in the empyrean heaven (because it is neither changeable nor movable, [Aquinas Sentences 2 d.2 q.2 a.2]), so he is never in the empyrean heaven. But he is there most of all.
208 Item, si transeat de caelo ad terram, potest operari in locis extremis, nihil agendo in locis omnibus intermediis, - quia potest esse aliquis angelus, qui non est motor alicuius orbis intermedii; igitur iste tunc nec est in caelo, nec in terra, nec in medio.	208. Again, if an angel passes from heaven to earth, he can act on the extreme places while doing nothing in any of the intervening places - because there can be an angel who is not the mover of any intermediate sphere; so he is then [sc. in his passing] neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor in between.
209 Praeterea: non enim primo est, ubi primo operatur. Totum enim aliquod est primo proportionatum virtuti angeli, ita quod totum primo movet (et ita proportionatum, secundum Philosophum libro Caeli et mundi, quod si adderetur una stella, moveret cum poena et labore), et tamen non primo est in toto caelo; ergo etc. ƿ	209. Further: for an angel is not there first where he first operates. For the whole of something is first proportioned to the power of an angel, such that he moves the whole of it first (and proportioned such that, according to the Philosopher On the Heavens 2.12.293a9-10 [or rather in the Arabic version], if one star were added, the angel would move it painfully and laboriously), and yet he is not first in the whole heaven; therefore etc. [sc. an angel's place is not just where he operates].
210 Si dicas quod primo movet aliquam unam partem, et ibi est, et per motum illius partis movet aliam (quasi impellendo vel trahendo), - contra hoc: Licet Philosophus imaginetur illum 'rusticum' habere pedes et caput in polis, et brachia protensa vel extensa ad orientem et occidentem, - secundum veritatem tamen, si primum caelum ponatur mobile, non quiescens, nullus punctus est in caelo magis oriens quam alius, sed quilibet punctus est oriens successive. Nullus etiam punctus est ibi magis capax motus quam alius, secundum veritatem, - et ideo non est in caelo ex natura rei dextrum et sinistrum, sicut in animali (pars enim dextra, quae est in animali, magis est capax virtutis animae quam pars sinistra). In nulla ergo parte potest poni angelus primo, ex hoc quod primo moveat illam partem. ƿ	210. And if you say that he first moves some one part [Aquinas ST Ia q.52 a.2] and that part is where he is, and by the motion of that part he moves another part (as by pushing or pulling) - against this: Although the Philosopher [Averroes On the Heavens 2 com.13] supposes the rustic he imagines to have his head and feet at the poles and his arms stretched or extended to East and West - yet in truth, if the first heaven is posited as movable and not resting, no point in the heaven is more East than another but each point is East successively. Also no point there is in truth more capable of motion than another - and so there is no right or left in the heaven from the nature of the thing as there is in an animal (for the right part in an animal is more capable of the virtue of the soul than the left part). So in no part of the heaven can an angel be placed first from the fact that he first moves that part.
211 Hoc etiam confirmatur, quia si esset in aliqua parte quasi quiescens per se, motus tamen per accidens (sicut nauta in navi), ita quod semper circumferretur cum illo motu, - videtur inconveniens talem motum tribuere angelo moventi orbem. Nec etiam potest poni quasi per se quiescens et quod iuxta eum sit quasi fluens pars et pars ipsius caeli, et partem illius magis praesentem semper primo moveat: non enim est assignare in quo quiescat ille angelus, cum continue moveat partem praesentem, - et exsistens in aliquo in quantum est motum, non est in eo quiescens, ut videtur.	211. There is also a confirmation of this, in that if in some part there were an angel resting as it were but moved per accidens (like a sailor in a ship), such that he was always being carried around by the motion, it would seem unacceptable to attribute such motion to the angel moving the sphere. Nor even can this angel be posited as per se resting and that next to him there is part after part of the heaven as it were flowing by, and that he is always moving first the part of it more present to him; for it is impossible to assign where the angel is resting, since he is continually moving the part present to him -and to exist in something insofar as it is moved is not to be resting in it, as it seems.
212 Praeterea, illud quod est angelo ratio exsistendi vel essendi in loco, est in eo formaliter, - alioquin nullo modo angelus erit formaliter in loco; operatio autem transiens in corpus, non est formaliter in eo; ergo etc.	212. Further, that which for an angel is the reason for his existing or being in a place is in him formally - otherwise an angel would never be formally in a place; but a transitive operation on a body is not formally in him; therefore etc.
213 Praeterea, illa operatio est commensurative in loco, per accidens; igitur si per eam angelus esset in loco (et nullo alio modo), esset ibi commensurative.	213. Further, the action is commensurately in a place, per accidens; therefore if the angel were by this in a place (and in no other way), he would be there commensurately.
214 Praeterea, Damascenus - cui maxime innituntur - non est pro eis: Tum quia omnes auctoritates, communiter, copulant semper ƿad esse operari, - ubi esset superfluitas, nisi aliud esset formaliter 'angelum esse in loco' quam 'angelum operari in loco' (dicit enim in prima auctoritate 'ubi adest, operatur', in secunda auctoritate dicit quod angelus 'dicitur esse in loco propter adesse intelligibiliter et operari', et in tertia 'intellectualiter adesse et operari, ubi utique fuerint iussi').	214. Further, Damascene - on whom they most of all rely [n.199] - is not in their favor: Both because all the authorities quoted from him commonly always combine operating with being - and this would be superfluous unless 'an angel's being in place' were formally different from 'an angel's operating in a place' (for Damascene says in the first authority that 'he operates where he is', in the second he says that an angel 'is said to be in a place because of his being intelligibly there and operating there', and in the third that angels 'are intellectually present and operate where they are at least commanded to be' [n.199]).
215 Similiter, idem Damascenus cap. 20 dicit quod 'caelum est continens visibilium et invisibilium creaturarum formas, et infra ipsum angelorum virtutes intellectuales includuntur'. Ita igitur (secundum ipsum) sunt modo angeli in caelo, quod includuntur 'infra caelum'. Non autem sic concludebantur in principio suae creationis, quia ipse cap. 17 videtur assentire Gregorio Theologo, quod conditi fuerint ante corporalem creaturam: tunc igitur non erant in loco sicut modo, quia modo continentur in loco, tunc non continebantur; et tunc tamen potuerunt intelligere creaƿturam localem, secundum Augustinum Super Genesim (quaere quotam), quia prius habuerunt cognitionem matutinam quam vespertinam, et potuerunt intelligere obiectum 'ex parte obiecti' sub eadem ratione qua modo intelligunt. Igitur, per solam intellectionem obiecti, non ponit eos Damascenus esse praesentes obiecto.	215. Likewise, the same Damascene says in ch.20 that "the heaven is the container of the forms of visible and invisible creatures, and below it are included the intellectual virtues of angels." In this way then (according to him), the angels are now in the heaven, because they are included 'below the heaven'. But they would not be thus included at the beginning of their creation, because Damascene himself in ch.17 seems to agree with Gregory the Theologian that they were made before the corporeal creature was; so they were not then in place as they are now, because now they are contained in place but then they were not; and yet then they were able to understand creatures in place, according to Augustine Literal Commentary on Genesis 4.32 n.39, because they had morning knowledge before they had evening knowledge, and they were able to understand the object 'on the part of the object' under the same idea under which they now understand it. Therefore Damascene does not posit that they are present to the object by intellection alone.
	C. Scotus' own Solution 1. How Body is in a Place
216 Ad quaestionem igitur istam solvendam, primo videndum est de loco corporis. Corpori enim cuilibet, praeter 'ultimum' (cuius non est aliud extra continens), quinque conveniunt: esse in loco actuali, esse in loco determinato quia aequali, esse in loco commensurative, esse in loco hoc determinate vel in alio, et esse in loco naturaliter vel violenter.	216. To solve this question, then, we must first consider the place of body. For any body, beside the ultimate one (which has nothing outside it containing it), possesses five features: to be in an actual place, to be in a determinate because equal place, to be in a place commensurately, to be determinately in this place or in that, and to be naturally or violently in a place.
217 Prima quattuor conveniunt corpori in quantum 'quantum' vel corpus, ultimum convenit sibi in quantum est corpus naturale. ƿLicet enim nullum quantum exsistat nisi ipsum sit quale, tamen 'exsistens' prius naturaliter est quantum quam quale, - et secundum hoc, prius naturaliter est mathematicum quam quale, hoc est, tale quale primo consideratur a mathematico, per se et primo.	217. The first four belong to body insofar as it is extended, a quantum, or a body; the last one belong to it insofar as it is a natural body. For although no extended thing exists unless it also has qualities, yet it is naturally an existent with extension before it is an existent with qualities - and in this regard it is an object of mathematics before it possesses quality, that is, it is first such as is considered per se and first by a mathematician.
218 Hoc intendit Philosophus IV Physicorum 'De vacuo', quia vult quod 'si corpus cubicum ponatur in aerem vel in aquam, - licet nullam habeat passionem naturalem, tantum tamen facit distare quantum est ipsum corpus impositum', ita quod quantum est ipsum corpus, tantum facit distare; et hoc non convenit sibi in quantum scilicet est tantum naturale, sed in quantum in se est 'quantum' praecise, et ita mathematicum.	218. This is what the Philosopher means in Physics 4.8.216a27-b8 'On the Vacuum', because he maintains that "if a cube is put in air or water, even if it have no natural qualities, yet it causes as much displacement as an inserted body," so that it causes a distance as great as the body; and this does not belong to it insofar as it is natural only, but insofar as it is precisely an extension, a quantum, and so a mathematical object.
	a. On the First Article
219 Exponendo autem ista per ordinem, dico quod omne corpus tale (aliud a primo) est primo in loco, hoc est in continente praecise et immobili; hoc enim intelligitur per illam definitionem Philosophi IV Physicorum 'De loco', quod scilicet ((locus est ultimum corporis continentis, immobile, primum)). ƿ	219. Now I say, expounding each of these five points in turn [n.216], that every such body (other than the body of the first sphere) is first in place, that is, in that which precisely contains it and is immovable; for this is what is understood by the definition of the Philosopher Physics 4 'On Place' [n.193], namely that "place is the ultimate, immovable, first limit of the containing body."
220 Divisibile enim, secundum illam dimensionem secundum quam est divisibile, non potest immediate esse applicatum alicui nec continens ipsum; et praecisum continens alicuius est indivisibile de genere quantitatis, per se, extra (nihil enim indivisibile de genere quantitatis per se exsistit, sed in aliquo divisibili); et ideo sequitur illud 'praecisum continens' esse ultimum alicuius divisibilis continentis. Ista autem ultimitas non est de ratione loci, sicut nec est de ratione praecise quantitatis, - quia si posset indivisibile per se esse et nullius divisibilis ultimum, posset esse praecisum continens.	220. For the divisible, according to the dimension by which it is divisible, cannot be immediately applied to anything nor can immediately contain it; and that which precisely contains something is an indivisible in the genus of quantity and is per se and extrinsic (for nothing indivisible in the genus of quantity exists per se but exists in something divisible); and so the consequence is that what precisely contains something is the ultimate limit of some divisible container. But this ultimacy does not belong to the idea of place, just as it does not belong to the idea precisely of quantity either - because if an indivisible could per se exist and not be the ultimate limit of anything divisible, it could be what precisely contains a thing.
221 Ultra autem istam continentiam praecisam, adhuc habet locus immobilitatem (qua distinguitur a vase, secundum Aristotelem IV Physicorum), quam immobilitatem nisi sunt diversi diversimode salvare per respectum ad polos et ad centrum.	221. Now place, over and above having this ultimate containing, has immobility in addition (whereby it is distinguished from a vessel, according to Aristotle Physics 4.4.212a14-16), which immobility diverse people have in diverse ways tried to save by reference to the poles and to the center.
222 Sed breviter dico quod si subiectum non manet idem, nullum accidens respectivum manet idem, secundum Philosophum. ƿEt ideo, cum manifestum sit omnem substantiam quae continet hoc corpus praecise, posse moveri localiter et non manere idem numero, patet omne accidens (absolutum et respectivum), quod est in continente illud corpus, posse non manere idem numero; et ideo nec locus, sive locus ponatur aliquid absolutum in tali corpore sive respectivum.	222. But briefly I say that if the subject does not remain the same, no relative accident stays the same, according to the Philosopher [Categories 5.2b4-6]. And therefore, since it is manifest that every substance that precisely contains this body precisely can be moved locally and not remain numerically the same, it is plain that any accident (absolute and relative) that is in what contains the body is able not to remain numerically the same; and so neither will place remain numerically the same, whether place is posited to be something absolute in such containing body or something relative.
223 Et si dicatur quod est ultimum totius universi, et licet ut est ultimum continentis varietur, tamen ut est ultimum totius universi non variatur, - nec hoc solvit, quia non est ultimum totius universi nisi quia partis; et ideo si est aliud partis alterius et alterius, non est idem totius universi. Licet enim in aliquo toto sint multae partes, tamen quod sibi competit per unam partem primo et praecise, et post per aliam praecise, - non est idem numero.	223. And if it be said [Aquinas, Giles of Rome] that place is the ultimate limit of the whole universe and that, although it varies as it is the ultimate limit of the container, yet it does not vary as it is the ultimate limit of the whole universe - this too is not a solution, because place is only the ultimate limit of the whole universe because it is the ultimate limit of part of it; and therefore, if it is different for one part and for another, it is not the same for the whole universe. For although there are many parts in some whole, yet what belongs to the whole through one part first and precisely and afterwards through another part precisely - this is not numerically the same.
224 Dico igitur quod locus habet immobilitatem oppositam motui locali omnino, et incorruptibilitatem secundum aequivalentiam per comparationem ad motum localem. ƿ	224. I say therefore that place has an immobility opposed altogether to local motion, and an incorruptibility by equivalence when compared to local motion.
225 Primum patet, quia si esset aliquo modo mobilis localiter, quantumcumque accipiatur per accidens, posset dici esse in loco et ei assignari posset alius et alius locus; sicut, licet similitudo moveatur quasi accidentaliter per accidens, scilicet quasi in quinto vel quarto gradu (quia primo corpus, et per hoc superficies, et per hoc albedo, et per hoc similitudo), tamen superficies vel similitudo vere est in alio et alio loco.	225. The first point is plain because, if a place were in some way locally movable, however much this is taken to be per accidens [e.g. as a sailor at rest on a ship is moved per accidens], one could say that it is in a place and a different place can be assigned to it one after another; in the same way that a likeness, although it is moved per accidens quasi-accidentally, namely at four or five degrees removed (because first the body moves, and thereby the surface of the body, and thereby the whiteness of the surface, and thereby the likeness [sc. of this whiteness with another whiteness]), yet likeness and surface are truly in different places one after the other.
226 Similiter, tunc aliquid quiescens posset moveri localiter: nam quod habet alium et alium locum successive, localiter movetur; fixum autem posset habere alium et alium locum continentem, si locus moveretur per accidens.	226. In like manner, then, something at rest could be moved locally; for, because it has one place after another successively, it is locally moved; but something fixed could have different places containing it if the place were moved per accidens.
227 Secundum probo, quia licet locus corrumpatur moto eius subiecto localiter, ita quod, moto aere localiter, non manet in eo eadem ratio loci quae prius (sicut patet ex iam probato), nec eadem ratio loci potest manere in aqua succedente, quia idem accidens numero non potest manere in duobus subiectis, - tamen illa ratio loci succedens (quae est alia a ratione praecedente) secundum veƿritatem est eadem praecedenti per aequivalentiam quantum ad motum localem, nam ita incompossibile est localem motum esse ab hoc loco in hunc locum sicut si esset omnino idem locus numero. Nullus autem motus localis potest esse ab uno 'ubi' ad aliud 'ubi', nisi quae duo 'ubi' correspondent duobus locis differentibus specie, quia habentibus alium respectum - non tantum numero sed etiam specie - ad totum universum; ex hoc illi respectus qui sunt tantum alii numero, videntur unus numero, quia ita sunt indistincti respectu motus localis sicut si tantum essent unus respectus.	227. I prove the second point [n.224] by the fact that, although a place is corrupted by the local motion of its subject, such that, when air is moved locally, the same idea of place does not remain in it as before (as is plain from what has already been proved [n.222]), nor can the same idea of place remain in the water that succeeds to the air, because the same accident numerically cannot remain in two different subjects [n.222], yet the succeeding idea of place (which is different in idea from the preceding one) is truly the same as the preceding one by equivalence as to local motion, for that local motion should be from the preceding place to the succeeding one is as incompossible as if the place were altogether the same numerically. But no local motion can be from one 'where' to another 'where' unless these two 'wheres' correspond to two places different in species - relative to the whole universe; hereby these respects, which are only different numerically, seem to be numerically one, because they are as non-distinct with respect to local motion as if they were only one respect.
228 Exemplum huius patet aliqualiter in nominibus significatis, quia haec vox 'homo', quotiescumque prolata, dicitur una vox numero, et differt ab hac voce 'lapis' numero; cum tamen non possit eadem vox numero bis proferri (ita quod quot sunt prolationes, tot sunt voces distinctae numero), et haec vox 'homo' et haec vox 'lapis' non tantum numero sed etiam specie distinguuntur, - tamen quia ad finem vocis (scilicet conceptum) exprimendum, per aequivalentiam sunt idem numero 'homo' vel 'lapis' quotiescumque prolata, ideo dicuntur esse una vox numero respectu illius finis.	228. An example of this is in some way plain in the case of significant names, because this word 'man', however often it is spoken, is called numerically one word, and it differs numerically from this word 'stone'; but since the same word numerically cannot be spoken twice (so that there are as many words distinct in number as there are speakings), and since this word 'man' and this word 'stone' are distinct not only numerically but also specifically - yet because with respect to expressing the goal of a word (namely the concept signified) the word 'man' and the word 'stone', however often each is spoken, are by equivalence numerically the same, therefore they are said to be numerically one word with respect to this goal.
229 Sic dico in proposito quod locus est immobilis per se et per accidens, localiter, - tamen est corruptibilis moto subiecto localiter, quia tunc non manet in eo illa ratio loci; et tamen non est corruptibilis in se et secundum aequivalentiam, quia necessario succedit illi corpori - in quo fuit illa ratio loci - aliud corpus, in ƿquo est alia ratio loci numero a praecedente et tamen eadem praecedenti secundum aequivalentiam per comparationem ad motum localem.	229. So I say in the issue at hand that place is immovable locally per se and per accidens - yet it is corruptible when the subject is moved locally, because there does not then remain in it the same idea of place; and yet it is not corruptible in itself and by equivalence, because necessarily there succeeds to the body, in which that idea of place was, some other body, in which there is an idea of place numerically different from the preceding one yet the same as the preceding one equivalently by comparison with the local motion.
230 Sed numquid omne corpus - aliud a primo corpore - necessario sit in loco quia 'quantum'? Diceret Aristoteles quod sic, quia diceret non posse esse 'aliud corpus a corpore caelesti' in sphaera activorum et passivorum, nisi diceret illud necessario contineri sub aliquo praecise continente.	230. But is it not the case that any body - different from the first body or sphere -is necessarily in a place because it is an extension, a quantum? Aristotle would say so, because he would say there cannot be 'a body different from the celestial body' in the sphere of the active and passive elements [sc. the sublunary sphere where are the elements of earth, air, fire, and water] unless he said it was necessarily contained under something precisely containing it.
231 Oppositum tamen videtur esse verum secundum catholicos, quia Deus posset facere lapidem, non exsistente aliquo alio locante corpore, - aut separatim exsistentem ab omni alio corpore, quia posset illud facere extra universum; et utroque modo esset 'non in loco', et tamen esset idem secundum omne absolutum in se. Per nihil igitur absolutum in alio, requirit necessario esse in loco, sed tantum habet necessario potentiam passivam, qua posset esse in loco; et hoc, posito loco in exsistentia actuali, et posita praesentia eius respectu alicuius corporis locantis. ƿ	231. But the opposite seems to be true according to Catholics, because God could make a stone without any other body existing that was the place of it - or he could make a stone existing apart from every other body, because he could make it outside the universe; and in both ways it would not be in place and yet it would be the same [sc. as other stones] with respect to everything absolute in itself. By nothing absolute in another thing, therefore, must it necessarily be in place, but it has only a passive potency whereby it can be in place; and this would be when a place has been posited in actual existence and when the presence of the stone with respect to some other body as its place has been posited.
	b. On the Other Articles
232 De secundo articulo dico quod - supposito primo - corpus 'quantum' est in loco in actu, quia in praecise continente actualiter; non enim potest esse in loco, quin illud ultimum (quod est proximum continens) faciat illud actu, quia facit latera corporis continentis distare. Secus autem est de parte in toto, quae non facit superficiem in potentia continentem, ipsam in actu; et ideo non est pars in toto sicut locatum in loco (IV Physicorum).	232. About the second article [n.216] I say that - on the supposition of the first article - an extended body is actually in a place, because it is in what actually precisely contains it; for it cannot be in place without the ultimate limit (which is what proximately contains it) making it actual, because it makes the sides of the containing body to be spatially distant. But it is otherwise about a part in the whole, which does not make a surface potentially in the containing body to be actual; and so a part is not in a whole as a placed thing is in a place (Physics 4.5.212b3-6).
233 De tertio dico quod - propter eandem quantitatem - necessario coexigit corpus locum sibi aequalem. Et propter illud est in loco commensurative, ita quod pars superficiei contentae correspondet parti superficiei continentis, et totum toti.	233. About the third article [n.216] I say - because of sameness of quantity - that a body necessarily requires a place equal to it. And for this reason a body is in place commensurately, such that a part of the contained surface corresponds to a part of the containing surface, and the whole of it to the whole.
234 Quintum competit corpori ex determinato loco, locante ipsum.	234. The fifth article [n.216] belongs to a body from the determinate place that places it.
235 Sextum in quantum est corpus naturale competit sibi, ex hoc scilicet quod - in quantum habet formam substantialem determinatam et qualitates determinatas - natum est ab aliquo locante conservari et salvari, et ab aliquo corrumpi: et quando continetur ab 'ultimo' illius quod natum est ipsum salvare, dicitur esse in loco naturali, licet naturalitas illa multum accidat rationi loci; pro tanto igitur est in loco naturali, quia est in locante naturaliter, id est in ultimo alicuius continentis quod natum est salvare contentum. ƿ	235. The sixth article belongs to a body insofar as it is a natural body, namely from the fact that - insofar as it has a determinate substantial form and determinate qualities - it is of a nature to be preserved and saved by some place that contains it and to be corrupted by another; and when it is contained by the ultimate surface of that which is of a nature to save it, it is said to be in its natural place, even though that naturalness is in many respects accidental to the idea of place; therefore it is to this extent in its natural place because it is in what naturally places it, that is, in the ultimate of the thing containing it which is of a nature to save what is contained in it.
	How an Angel is in Place
236 Ad propositum igitur ista applicando, de angelo, dico quod angelus non necessario est in loco, quia multo magis posset fieri sine creatione creaturae corporalis, vel facta creatura corporali posset fieri et esse extra omnem creaturam corporalem. Et tamen in angelo est potentia passiva, qua potest esse in loco; et ipsa potentia vel fundatur immediate in eius substantia, vel in ipsa in quantum est natura limitata actualiter exsistens, vel in aliquo extrinseco angelo (quidquid sit illud). Et ideo non oportet quaerere aliquam intrinsecam rationem essendi angelum in loco, necessario, quia ibi nulla est, - sed tantum est in ipso potentialitas passiva, qua potest esse in loco quia non repugnat sibi.	236. Applying these points to the issue at hand about the angel, I say that an angel is not necessarily in place, because an angel could much more be made without the creation of the corporeal creature or could, after the corporeal creature was made, also be made to be beyond every corporeal creature. And yet there is a passive potency in an angel by which he can be in a place; and this potency is founded either in his substance immediately, or in his substance as it is a limited nature actually existent, or in something extrinsic to the angel (whatever that is). And so there is no need to ask for any intrinsic reason for an angel's being necessarily in place, because there is none in him, but there is only in him a passive potentiality by which he can be in a place, because this is not repugnant to him.
237 Supposito igitur isto primo, non oportet quod sit in loco in actu, quia non oportet quod sit in aliquo continente indivisibili actualiter exsistente; non enim facit latera continentis distare, et ideo non facit superficiem continentem esse in actu.	237. So, on the supposition of this first point [n.236], there is no need for an angel to be in a place actually, because there is no need for him to be in some indivisible container actually existing; for he does not make the sides of the container to be spatially distant, and so he does not make the containing surface to be actual.
238 De tertio autem est dubium, et de hoc mota est secunda quaestio. Conceditur tamen quod non potest esse in loco quantumcumƿque magno, quia hoc est proprium Dei. Et ex hoc videtur non posse esse in loco quantumcumque parvo, ex 35 I Euclidis; vult enim ibi Euclides, - quaere eum ibi.	238. But about the third article [n.216] there is a doubt, and about this article the second question has been moved [n.197]. However, it can be conceded that an angel cannot be in a place ever so large, because this is proper to God. And from this it seems that he cannot be in a place ever so small, from Euclid 1.35, for Euclid maintains there -look at him there ["parallelograms on the same base and on the same parallel lines are equal to each other"].
239 Ex hoc arguo sic: quidquid potest esse in uno aequali, potest esse in altero, si sibi non repugnat figuratio aliqua secundum quam unum distinguitur ab alio; sed in angelo nulla figuratio loci, in quo est, sibi repugnat; igitur si potest esse in uno aequali, et in altero, et per consequens, si potest esse in quadrato parvo, et non repugnat sibi esse in quadrato quantumcumque stricto (quod oportet dicere, dicendo quod non repugnat sibi esse in quantocumque loco), videtur quod non repugnat sibi esse in loco quantumcumque longo, quia quadrangulus est aequalis ipsi quadrato parvo, in quo potest esse.	239. From this I argue as follows: whatever can be in one of two equals can also be in the other, provided no shape by which one of the equals is distinguished from the other is repugnant to it; but in an angel no shape of the place which he is in is repugnant to him; therefore if he can be in one of the equals, he can be in the other - and consequently if he can be in a little square and there is no repugnance in his being in a quadrilateral ever so narrow (which is something one must say in saying there is no repugnance in his being in any size of place), it seems that there is no repugnance in his being in a place ever so long, because the quadrangle is equal to the little square in which he is able to be.
240 Istud declaratur per oppositum in corpore naturali. Ideo enim aqua, quae potest esse in quadrato, non potest esse in quadrangulo quantumcumque longo, quia non potest esse in loco quantumcumque stricto; et ideo non potest quantumcumque protendi secundum magnitudinem: non enim potest protendi secundum longitudinem nisi constringatur secundum latitudinem, et si non potest in infinitum constringi secundum latitudinem, non potest in ƿinfinitum protendi secundum longitudinem. Oppositum est in proposito: si enim angelus non determinet quantumcumque locum in minus (quia tunc poterit esse in loco quantumcumque stricto et strictiore), igitur etc.	240. This fact is made clear by the opposite in natural bodies. For water, which can be in a square, can for this reason not be in a quadrangle ever so long, because it cannot be in a place ever so narrow; and so it cannot be extended ever so much in length; for it cannot be extended in length without being narrowed in width, and if it cannot be narrowed to infinity in width, it cannot be extended to infinity in length. The opposite holds in the issue at hand; for if an angel does not determine a place ever so small (because then he will be able to be in however narrow and narrower a place), then etc.
241 Praeterea, si quantitas aliqua virtutis est in angelo secundum quam potest esse in aliquo loco proportionaliter secundum ultimum potentiae suae (puta iste tantum et ille tantum), posset tamen secundum ultimum potentiae suae facere se in minore isto quantumcumque, sibi adaequato (hoc autem 'posse' est alicuius virtutis activae in eo, quia in potestate sua est ut possit ea uti ad effectum sibi adaequatum, vel non), - igitur magis posse habere istam quantitatem in potestate sua, est perfectius, quia maiorem habet potentiam activam: et ita est potens uti ista virtute activa in infinitum, ad causandum vel essendum in minore et minore loco quam sit ille locus sibi adaequatus; igitur potentiam habet infinitam. Consequens est inconveniens, igitur et antecedens; sicut igitur si posset in infinitum esse in maiore et maiore loco, concluderetur infinitas virtutis eius, ita concludetur infinitas virtutis eius si posset esse in loco minore et minore semper in infinitum. ƿ	241. Further, if there is some quantity of virtue in an angel according to which he can be in some place in proportion to the utmost of his power (namely, this angel so much and that angel so much), yet if he could, in accord with the utmost of his power, make himself to be in a place ever so much smaller than this one, which is adequate to him (and this 'could' belongs to some active power in him, because it is in his power to be able to use it for an effect adequate to him or not) - then ability rather to have this [lesser] quantity is more perfectly in his power, because he has an active power that is greater; and so he is able to use this active virtue ad infinitum so as to cause or be in a smaller and smaller place than is the place adequate to him; therefore he has an infinite power. The consequent is unacceptable, so the antecedent is too; just as, then, an infinity of power in him would be inferred if he could be in a larger and larger place ad infinitum, so an infinity of power in him is inferred if he could be always in a smaller and smaller place ad infinitum.
242 Si tamen posset esse in puncto, vel non, - non videtur ratio necessaria ad unam partem nec ad aliam: quia licet sit indivisibilis, non tamen habet indivisibilitatem limitatam sicut punctus, et ideo non oportet ipsum esse in puncto sicut in loco; nec forte repugnat sibi esse in puncto sicut in loco, quia nullum inconveniens videtur ex hoc inferri, - quia si ex hoc inferatur quod non posset moveri localiter nisi spatium esset ex punctis, non sequitur (posset enim immediate ex loco punctali facere se in continuum, cuius continui punctus est terminus).	242. But as to whether he could be in a point or not [n.197] there seems no necessary reason for one side or the other; because although he is indivisible yet he does not have a limited indivisibility as a point does, and so he need not be in a point as in a place; nor perhaps is there any repugnance for him to be in a point as in a place, because nothing unacceptable seems to follow from this - because if from this is inferred that he could not be moved locally unless space were made of points, the inference does not hold (for he could immediately from a point in space put himself into a continuum, of which continuum the point is the term).
243 De isto articulo videtur concedendum quod habet locum determinatum, indeterminate tamen. Hoc modo et aliquis est quo maiorem non posset habere, et aliquis quo non posset habere minorem (loquendo de loco continuo), licet forte posset esse in puncto.	243. About this article [sc. the third, n.233] it seems one should concede that an angel has a determinate place, but indeterminately. In this way there is both some place which he cannot have a greater than, and some place which he cannot have a smaller than (speaking of continuous place), although perhaps he could be in a point.
244 Utrum autem determinatum locum requirat et determinate, ita quod habens tantam virtutem (si est praesens loco) de necessitate est praesens tanto loco, nec in potestate sua est ut sit praesens maiori vel minori loco (sicut est in corporibus, quia quodlibet necessario est in loco sibi aequali; anima etiam intellectiva necessario est in loco totius corporis animati, ita quod non est in potestate eius esse in loco maiore vel minore illo), - hoc dubium est, quia non videtur posse probari faciliter, necessario, una pars nec alia. ƿQuod enim inconveniens est si quantitas sua virtutis (per quam potest esse praesens alicui loco) sit naturalis ratio essendi in tanto loco suo modo, sicut quantitas corporis naturalis est ratio essendi in loco suo modo (ita quod licet in potestate mea sit esse in hoc loco vel in illo, non tamen est in potestate mea esse in tanto loco vel in tanto, quia iste effectus est naturaliter consequens quantitatem quae non subest potestati meae, et sicut nec in se, ita nec quantum ad effectum istum, esse scilicet in tanto loco vel in tanto)? Nihil igitur videtur sequi inconveniens si ita ponatur in angelis. Vel si ponatur quod quantitas eorum habeat aliquem locum adaequatum quo maiorem non posset habere, licet tamen ipsa subsit voluntati angeli ut possit non semper habere illum locum, sed maiorem vel minorem, non sequitur inconveniens.	244. Now whether an angel requires a determinate place and in a determinate way, such that an angel having so much power is, if he is present to a place, of necessity present to so much place, and it is not in his power to be present to a larger or smaller place (just as is true of bodies, because each body is necessarily in a place equal to it; the intellective soul too is necessarily in the place of the whole animate body, such that it is not in its power to be in a place larger or smaller than the whole body) - this is doubtful, because it does not seem one can easily prove necessarily either one side of the question or the other. For what is unacceptable if an angel's quantity of power (by which he can be present to some place) is the natural reason for his being in so much place in his own way, just as the quantity of a natural body is the reason for the body's being in a place in its own way - such that, although it is in my power to be in this place or in that, yet it is not in my power to be in this much place or in that much, because this effect is naturally consequent to a quantity that is not subject to my power, and just as the quantity in itself is not subject to my power so neither is it subject to my power as to its effect, namely to being in this much place or in that much? So nothing unacceptable seems to follow if this supposition is made about angels. Or if the supposition is made that the quantity of the power of angels has some place adequate to it, than which it cannot have a greater, although however this quantity may be subject to an angel's will so that he is able not to have this place always but sometimes a larger or a smaller one, nothing unacceptable follows.
245 De quarto patet quod non est in loco commensurative, quia non habet partem et partem cum parte loci.	245. About the fourth article [sc. being in a place commensurately, n.233], it is plain that an angel is not in place commensurately, because he does not have one part after another side by side with different parts of the place.
246 De quinto dico quod est in hoc loco vel in illo, quia non est ubique. Et huius ratio quaerenda est. Dico quod licet aliquid possit esse secundum se in potentia passiva ad aliquod genus physicum, et non determinate in potentia ad aliquam speciem illius generis, tamen ab eodem reducitur illud ƿad actum generis et speciei: sicut, licet superficies (unde superficies) sit ex se determinata ad colorem, et non sit ex se determinata ad albedinem vel nigredinem, tamen ab eodem agente reducitur ad actum coloris et huiusmodi coloris, quia non est colorata nisi quia sic est colorata. Ita dico hic quod licet angelus sit in potentia ad 'ubi' in communi, et non ex se determinatus ad hoc 'ubi' vel illud, tamen ab eodem agente reducitur ad hoc ut sit actualiter in loco, et in hoc loco vel in illo adesse quo primo est in loco, producente ipsum supra creaturam corporalem continentem; sed ex tunc potest se ipsum reducere ad actum istum, sicut patebit in quaestione de motu angeli.	246. About the fifth article [sc. being determinately in this place or some other, n.234] I say that an angel is in this place or in that, because he is not everywhere. And the reason for this needs investigating. I say that although something could in itself be in passive potency to some physical genus and not determinately in potency to some species of this genus, yet the same thing reduces it to the act of the genus and of the species; just as a surface (qua surface), although it is of itself determined to a color and is not of itself determined to whiteness and blackness, yet is reduced by the same agent to the act of color and to the act of a color of this sort, because a surface is not colored save because it is colored thus - so I say here that although an angel is in potency to a 'where' in general and is not of himself determined to this 'where' or to that, yet he is reduced by the same agent to his actually being in a place and to his being in this place or in that in which first he is in place, when this agent produces him above the containing corporeal creature; but from then on he can reduce himself to the act of place, as will be plain in the question about the motion of an angel [n.444].
247 De sexto dico quod non est in loco aliquo naturaliter, quia tunc esset in alio loco violenter; tunc etiam aliquod corpus haberet naturalem habitudinem ad ipsum conservandum in loco, et aliud corpus ad ipsum corrumpendum.	247. About the sixth article [sc. being in place naturally or violently, n.235], I say that an angel is not in any place naturally, because then he would be in some other place violently; then too some body would have a natural disposition to conserving him in a place, and some other body to corrupting him.
248 Et confirmatur ratio per Avicennam IX Metaphysicae, ubi vult quod motus caeli non est naturalis ('quia tunc terminaretur ad quietem naturalem, et motus ab illa quiete esset violentus', - et sic esset in proposito), et hoc accipiendo naturalitatem proprie, sicut ƿillud dicitur moveri naturaliter quod inclinatur naturaliter ad motum.	248. And there is a confirmation of this reason from Avicenna, Metaphysics 9.2 f.102va, when he maintains that the motion of the heaven is not natural ("because then it would reach an end in natural rest, and motion away from that rest would be violent" -and so would it be in the issue at hand), and this when taking naturalness properly, in the way that that is said to be moved naturally which is naturally inclined to motion.
249 Ex isto sexto patet quod ista potentia passiva (quae est in, angelo ad essendum in loco) non est naturalis nec violenta, sed neutra, - quia nec istud passum inclinatur ex se naturaliter ad istam formam, nec ad oppositum, sed neutro modo se habet ad ista, sicut superficies ad albedinem vel nigredinem indifferenter se habet.	249. And from this sixth article [n.247] it is plain that this passive potency (which is in an angel for being in place) is not natural or violent but neither - because what has this passive potency is not inclined naturally of itself to this form or to the opposite, but is disposed in neither way toward them, just as a surface is indifferently disposed to whiteness and blackness.
	D. To the Principal Arguments
250 Ad argumenta. Omnes auctoritates quae negant angelum esse in loco, sunt exponendae quod verum dicunt, dicendo ipsum non esse in loco circumscriptive. Circumscriptio autem includit in loco esse 'in actu, et aequali, et commensurative' (scilicet secundum secundam, tertiam et quartam condicionem loci), quae non conveniunt angelo.	250. To the arguments [nn.190-194]. All the authorities that deny an angel is in place [nn.190-192] one must expound to be stating the truth by saying that they mean an angel is not in place circumscriptively. Now circumscription involves being in place 'actually' and 'in a place equal to it' and 'commensurately' (namely, according to the second, third, and fourth conditions of place [nn.237, 243, 245]), and these do not belong to an angel.
251 Ad illud Philosophi potest concedi quod superficies aliqua corporis continent angelum; non tamen ad hoc sequitur quod sit agens vel influens vel continens respectu eius, quia continentia loci est alterius rationis a continentia formae vel continentia speciei. Nihil enim est aliud, hoc, nisi contentum esse infra hanc superficiem continentem, et nihil esse extra, - et hoc verum est in quocumque contento definitive, quia nihil est eius extra locum ambientem. ƿ	251. To the quote from the Philosopher [n.193] one can concede that some surface of a body contains an angel, but from this does not follow that the surface acts or has influence on or contains the angel, because the containing of place is of a different idea from the containing of form or the containing of species. For the containing of place means nothing other than that what is contained in place is under the containing surface and that nothing is outside the surface - and this is true in the case of anything definitively contained in place, because nothing of it is outside the surrounding place.
252 Ad illud de situ, sive ut accipitur pro differentia quantitatis sive prout est praedicamentum: si illud praedicamentum praesupponat quantitatem, neutro modo maior est vera, quia non oportet 'omne ens in loco' habere situm altero istorum modorum, nisi sit in loco circumscriptive.	252. As to the point about location or position [n.194], whether it is taken for a difference of quantity or for a category - if the category presupposes quantity then in neither way is the major [sc. 'everything in place has a location'] true, because there is no need for 'every being that is in place' to have a location in one or other of the ways mentioned, unless it is in place circumscriptively.
	II. To the Second Question
253 Ad secundam quaestionem patet ex dictis in tertio articulo, scilicet de loco determinato.	253. As to the second question [n.197] the answer is plain from what was said in the case of the third article, namely about determinate place [nn.238-244].