Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 1

Latin	English
Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI	Chapter 1. Of the definition of the term, and of its division in general
(1) Omnes logicae tractatores intendunt astruere quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur. Unde terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propositionis. Definiens enim terminum Aristoteles, I Priorum, dicit: "Terminum voco in quem resolvitur propositio, ut praedicatum et de quo praedicatur, vel apposito vel diviso esse vel non esse".	All those who deal with logic mean to show that arguments are composed from propositions and propositions out of terms. Hence, a term is nothing other than a neighbouring part of a proposition. For in defining a term Aristotle says 'I call a 'term', that into which a proposition is analysed, such as a predicate and what it is predicated of, either by putting together to say what is the case, or by separating, to say what is not the case'.
(2) Sed quamvis omnis terminus pars sit propositionis, vel esse possit, non omnes termini tamen eiusdem sunt naturae; et ideo ad perfectam notitiam terminorum habendam oportet aliquas divisiones terminorum praecognoscere.	But although every term is, or could be, part of a proposition, yet not all terms are of the same nature, and for that reason, in order to have a complete acquaintance with terms, we must gain a preliminary acquaintance with some of the divisions of terms.
(3) Est autem sciendum quod sicut secundum Boethium, in I Perihermenias, triplex est oratio, scilicet scripta, prolata et concepta, tantum habens esse in intellectu, sic triplex est terminus, scilicet scriptus, prolatus et conceptus.	Now it should be known that, according to Boethius, just as discourse is threefold, namely, written, spoken, and conceived (which only has being in the understanding) so the term is threefold, namely, written, spoken and conceived.
(4) Terminus scriptus est pars propositionis descriptae in aliquo corpore, quae oculo corporali videtur vel videri potest.	A written term is part of a proposition written down on some corporeal thing, which is seen by the corporeal eye, or can be seen.
(5) Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore prolatae et natae audiri aure corporali.	A spoken term is part of a proposition spoken by the mouth and suited to be heard by the corporeal ear.
(6) Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans vel consignificans, nata esse pars propositionis mentalis, et pro eodem nata supponere. Unde isti termini concepti et propositiones ex eis compositae sunt illa verba mentalia quae beatus Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, dicit nullius esse linguae, quia tantum in mente manent et exterius proferri non possunt, quamvis voces tamquam signa subordinata eis pronuntientur exterius.	A conceived term is an intention or affection of the soul naturally signifying or co-signifying something, suited to be a part of a mental proposition and suited to supposit for the same thing. Hence these conceived terms and the propositions put together from them are the "mental words" that the blessed Augustine says belongs to no language because they remain only in the mind and cannot be uttered outwardly, although utterances are pronounced outwardly as though signs subordinated to them.
(7) Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces semper significent ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem quae per conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter significat aliquid et secundario vox significat illud idem, in [ita?] quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquid significatum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus ille mutaret significatum suum eo ipso ipsa vox, sine nova institutione, suum significatum permutaret.	Now I say that utterances are 'signs subordinated' to concepts or intentions of the soul, not because, by a proper acceptance of the word 'signs', the utterances always signify the concepts of the soul primarily and properly, but rather because utterances are imposed to signify those same things that are signified by the concepts of the mind. In this way the concept primarily signifies something naturally, and secondarily the utterance signifies that same thing, so that, with the utterance assigned to signify something signified by the concept in the mind, if that concept changed its significate, by that very fact the utterance itself would change its significate, without any new signification being imposed.
(8i) Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus quod voces sunt "earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae". Sic etiam intendit Boethius quando dicit voces significare conceptus. Et universaliter omnes auctores, dicendo quod omnes voces significant passiones vel sunt notae earum, non aliud intendunt nisi quod voces sunt signa secundario significantia illa quae per passiones animae primario importantur, quamvis aliquae voces primario importent passiones animae seu conceptus, quae tamen secundario important alias animae intentiones, sicut inferius ostendetur.	And the Philosopher says as much, [saying] that utterances are 'marks of affections that are in the soul';So also Boethius, when he says that utterances signify concepts. And generally all writers, in saying that all utterances signify affections or are the marks of those [affections], do not mean anything other than that the utterances are signs secondarily signifying those things that are primarily conveyed by affections of the soul - although some utterances primarily convey affections of the soul or concepts, which other intentions in the soul still convey secondarily, as will be shown below.
(9) Et sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu passionum seu intentionum seu conceptuum, eodem modo proportionaliter, quantum ad hoc, tenendum est de his quae sunt in scripto respectu vocum.	And just as what was said about utterances in respect of affections, or intentions, or concepts, is to be held, for now, in proportionately the same way , concerning things that are written down in respect of utterances.
(10) Inter istos autem terminos aliquae differentiae reperiuntur. Una est quod conceptus seu passio animae naturaliter significat quidquid significat, terminus autem prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum voluntariam institutionem. Ex quo sequitur alia differentia, videlicet quod terminus prolatus vel scriptus ad placitum potest mutare suum significatum, terminus autem conceptus non mutat suum significatum ad placitum cuiuscumque.	Now among these terms, some differences are found. One is that the concept or affection of the soul signifies naturally whatever it signifies, but a spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to voluntary imposition. From which there follows another difference, namely that a spoken or written term can change what it signifies by convention, but a term that is conceived does not change its significance by convention.
(11) Propter tamen protervos est sciendum quod signum dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid aliud facit in cognitionem venire, quamvis non faciat mentem venire in primam cognitionem eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actualem post habitualem eiusdem. Et sic vox naturaliter significat, sicut quilibet effectus significat saltem suam causam; sicut etiam circulus significat vinum in taberna. Sed tam generaliter non loquor hic de signo.	Still, because of hair-splitters, it should be known that 'sign' is taken in two ways. In one way, for everything that, when apprehended, causes something else come into cognition, although it does not cause the mind to come to a primary cognition of it, just as is shown elsewhere, but to an actual one after its customary one. And in this way, an utterance does naturally signify, just as any effect naturally signifies at least its cause, just as also a circle signifies wine in the tavern. But I am not talking about 'sign' here in such a general way.
(12) Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et verba et illae partes orationis quae finitam significationem non habent, vel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio. Et sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signum' vox nullius est signum naturale.	In another way 'sign' is taken for that which causes something come into cognition and is suited to stand for it, or to be added to such a thing in a proposition. Of such a sort are syncategoremata and verbs and those parts of speech which do not have a definite signification – or which is suited to be put together out of such things, as an expression is. And taking the word 'sign' in this way, an utterance is not a natural sign of anything.