Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 2

Latin	English
CAP. 2. DE DIVISIONE TERMINI, ET QUOD DIVERSIMODE POTEST ACCIPI HOC NOMEN 'TERMINUS' IN SPECIALI	Chapter 2. On the division of the term, and that 'term' can be specifically understood in different ways.
(1) Est autem sciendum quod hoc nomen 'terminus' tripliciter accipitur. Uno modo vocatur terminus omne illud quod potest esse copula vel extremum propositionis categoricae, subiectum delicet [scilicet?] vel praedicatum, vel etiam determinatio extremi vel verbi. Et isto modo etiam una propositio potest esse terminus, sicut potest esse pars propositionis. Haec enim vera est 'homo est animal: est propositio vera' in qua haec tota propositio 'homo est animal' est subiectum, et 'propositio vera' est praedicatum.	Now you should know that the name ‘term’ is understood in three ways. In one way, everything is called a term that can be the copula or an extreme of a categorical proposition (i.e. its subject or predicate), or also a determination of an extreme or of the verb. In this way, even a proposition can be a term, just as it can be part of a proposition. For ‘ “A man is an animal” is a true proposition’ is true, in which the whole proposition ‘A man is an animal’ is subject, and ‘true proposition’ is the predicate.
(2) Aliter accipitur hoc nomen 'terminus'secundum quod distinguitur contra orationem, et sic omne incomplexum vocatur terminus. Et sic de termino in praecedenti capitulo sum locutus.	In another way, the name ‘term’ is understood as contrasted with ‘expression’ [oratio]. In this way, every non-complex [word] is called a term. I was talking about ‘term’ in this way in the preceding chapter.
(3) Tertio modo accipitur terminus praecise et magis stricte pro illo quod significative sumptum potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. Et isto modo nullum verbum, nec coniunctio nec adverbium nec praepositio nec interiectio est terminus; multa etiam nomina non sunt termini, scilicet nomina syncategorematica, quia talia quamvis possint esse extrema propositionum si sumantur materialiter vel simpliciter, quando tamen sumuntur significative non possunt esse extrema propositionum.	In a third way, ‘term’ is taken precisely and more strictly for that which, taken significatively, can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. And in this way no verb, or conjunction, or adverb, or preposition or interjection is a term. Many names also are not terms, namely syncategorematic names. For such names, although they could be the extremes of propositions if they were taken materially or simply, nevertheless when taken significatively they cannot be the extremes of propositions.
Unde ista oratio 'legit: est verbum' congrua est et vera si hoc verbum 'legit' sumatur materialiter, si autem significative sumeretur non intelligibilis esset. Similiter est de talibus 'omnis: est nomen'; 'olim: est adverbium'; 'si: est coniunctio'; 'ab: est praepositio'. Et isto modo accipit Philosophus terminum quando definit terminum I Priorum.	Hence the expression “Reads is a verb’ is congruous and true if the verb ‘reads’ is taken materially,but if taken significatively it would be unintelligible. It is similar for cases such as “‘every” is a name’, “‘once” is an adverb’, “‘if’ is a conjunction’, “‘from” is a preposition’. And the Philosopher takes ‘term’ in this way when he defines the term in Prior Analytics I.
(4) Non solum autem unum incomplexum potest esse terminus, sic accepto termino, sed etiam compositum ex duobus incomplexis, scilicet compositum ex adiectivo et substantivo; et etiam compositum ex participio et adverbio vel praepositione cum suo casuali potest esse terminus, sicut potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. In ista enim propositione 'omnis homo albus est homo' nec 'homo' nec 'albus' est subiectum, sed hoc totum 'homo albus'. Similiter hic 'currens velociter est homo' nec 'currens' nec 'velociter' est subiectum, sed hoc totum 'currens velociter'. [	Now not only can one non-complex thing be a term, taking ‘term’ in this way, but also a composite of two non-complexes , namely the composite of an adjective and a substantive, and even the composite of a participle and an adverb, or a preposition with its noun in the appropriate case – can also be a term, just as it can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. For in the proposition ‘Every white man is a man’, neither ‘man’ nor ‘white’ is the subject, but rather the whole ‘white man’. Similarly, in ‘someone running quickly is a man’,neither ‘running’ nor ‘quickly’ is the subject, but rather the whole expression ‘someone running quickly’.
(5) Est autem sciendum quod non tantum nomen acceptum in recto potest esse terminus, sed etiam casus obliquus potest esse terminus, quia potest esse subiectum propositionis et etiam praedicatum. Verumtamen obliquus non potest esse subiectum respectu cuiuscumque verbi: non enim bene dicitur 'hominis videt asinum', quamvis bene dicatur 'hominis est asinus'. Quomodo autem et respectu quorum verborum potest obliquus esse subiectum et respectu quorum non, ad grammaticum pertinet, cuius est constructiones vocum considerare.	Now it should be known that not only can a name taken in the nominative case [in recto] be a term, but also an expression in the oblique case can also be a term, for it can be the subject of a proposition, and also a predicate. Yet an expression in the oblique case cannot be a subject in respect of any verb. For ‘Of a man sees an ass’ is not well-said, although ‘Of a man is an ass’ is well-said. But in what way and in respect of which verbs an expression in the oblique case can be the subject, and with respect to which ones not - belongs to the grammarian, of whom it belongs to consider the constructions of words.