Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 9

Latin	English
[CAP. 9. DE NOMINIBUS CONCRETIS ET ABSTRACTIS QUORUM ABSTRACTA NON SUPPONUNT NISI PRO MULTIS SIMUL SUMPTIS ET CONCRETA PRO UNO SOLO VERIFICARI POSSUNT]	[Chapter 9. Of concrete and abstract names where the abstract names do not supposit except for many items taken together, and the concrete names can be verified for one item alone]
Restat adhuc de alio modo nominum concretorum et abstractorum disserere. Unde quaedam sunt abstracta quae non supponunt nisi pro multis simul sumptis, concreta autem pro uno solo verificari possunt, sicut se habent 'populus' et 'popularis', 'plebs' et 'plebeius'. Quilibet enim homo quamvis possit esse plebeius et popularis, nullus tamen homo populus vel plebs esse potest.	It remains to discuss another mode of concrete and abstract names. Therefore, there are certain abstract names that do not supposit except for many items taken together, although the concrete forms can be verified for one item alone. For example, ‘people’ and ‘popular’, ‘plebs’and ‘plebeian’ are related in this way. For although any man could be plebeian and popular, nevertheless no man can be the plebs or the people.
Inter nomina talia illi qui ponunt numerum non esse aliam rem a rebus numeratis computare debent omnia nomina abstracta et concreta numerorum, si concreta et abstracta inter talia reperiantur. Unde secundum talem opinionem debet concedi quod homines sunt numerus et multa animalia sunt numerus et quod anguli sunt ternarius, quaternarius et sic de aliis, nisi forte velint talem praedicationem negare, dicendo quod tales termini in significando aequivalent multis dictionibus, modo quo dictum est in praecedenti capitulo de multis dictionibus, saltem secundum usum auctorum.	Among such names, those who maintain that number is not a thing other than the numbered things ought to include all the abstract and concrete names of numbers, if any concrete and abstract forms are found among such names. Therefore, according to such an opinion, it ought to be conceded that men are a number, and many animals are a number, and that angles are ternary or quaternary, and so on. Unless perhaps they wanted to deny such a predication, by saying that such terms are equivalent in signifying to many expressions, in the way stated in the preceding chapter about ‘many expressions’, at least, according to the usage of the writers.
Et de concretis et abstractis ista sufficiant, quamvis forte alii modi nominum concretorum et abstractorum possent assignari. Nec aliquis me reprehendat si in hoc opere aliqua praetermitto, quia non promitto me omnia velle discutere et nihil perscrutandum studiosis relinquere, sed aliqua brevia ad utilitatem simplicium velle percurrere.	And may these observations about concrete and abstract names be sufficient, even though perhaps other modes of concrete and abstract names could be assigned. And may no one blame me if I pass over some things in this work, because I do not promise to want to discuss all things, and leave nothing for the diligent to investigate, but rather to run through some brief matters for the utility of simple persons.