Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 15

Latin	English
[CAP. 15. QUOD UNIVERSALE NON SIT ALIQUA RES EXTRA ANIMAM]	[Chapter 15. That a universal is not some thing outside the soul]
Et quia non sufficit ista narrare nisi manifesta ratione probentur, ideo pro praedictis aliquas rationes adducam, necnon et auctoritatibus confirmabo.	And because it is not sufficient to relate things unless they are proved by manifest reason, therefore I shall adduce some reasons for what has been said above, and also confirm it by appeal to authorities.
Quod enim nullum universale sit aliqua substantia extra animam exsistens evidenter probari potest. Primo quidem sic: nullum universale est substantia singularis et una numero. Si enim diceretur quod sic, sequeretur quod Socrates esset aliquod universale, quia non est maior ratio quare unum universale sit una substantia singularis quam alia. Nulla igitur substantia singularis est aliquod universale, sed omnis substantia est una numero et singularis, quia omnis substantia vel est una res et non plures vel est plures res. Si est una et non plures, est una numero; hoc enim ab omnibus vocatur unum numero. Si autem aliqua substantia est plures res, vel est plures res singulares vel plures res universales.	For that a universal is not some substance existing outside the soul can be evidently proved as follows. In the first place, no universal is a substance that is single and one in number. For if it were said to be so, it would follow that Socrates were some universal, since there is no greater reason for one universal being one singular substance rather than being another. Therefore no singular substance is some universal, but rather every substance is one in number and singular - for every substance is either one thing and not several, or it is several things. If it is one and not several, it is one in number. But if some substance is several things, it is either (i) several singular things or (ii) several universal things.
Si primum detur, sequitur quod aliqua substantia esset plures substantiae singulares, et per consequens eadem ratione aliqua substantia esset plures homines; et tunc, quamvis universale distingueretur a particulari uno, non tamen distingueretur a particularibus. Si autem aliqua substantia esset plures res universales, accipio unam istarum rerum universalium et quaero: aut est plures res aut una et non plures.	(i) If the first is granted, it follows that a substance would be several singular substances, and as a consequence by the same reasoning some substance would be several men; and then, although a universal would be distinguished from one particular thing, it would still not be distinguished from particular things. But (ii) if some substance were several universal things, I take one of these universal things and I ask whether (a) it is several things, or (b) one thing and not several?
Si secundum detur, sequitur quod est singularis, si primum detur, quaero aut est plures res singulares aut plures res universales. Et ita vel erit processus in infinitum vel stabitur quod nulla substantia est universalis ita quod non singularis, ex quo relinquitur quod nulla substantia est universalis.	If the second (b) is granted, it follows that it is singular; if the first (a) is granted, I ask whether it is several singular or several universal things. And so either this will go on ad infinitum, or it will stand that no substance is universal in such a way that it is not singular. From which it remains that no substance is universal.
Item, si aliquod universale esset substantia una, exsistens in substantiis singularibus, distincta ab eis, sequeretur quod posset esse sine eis, quia omnis res prior naturaliter alia potest per divinam potentiam esse sine ea; sed consequens est absurdum.	Likewise, if some universal were one substance, existing in singular things, distinct from them, it would follow that it could exist without them, for every thing naturally prior to another thing can exist apart from it by divine power. But the consequent is absurd.
Item, si opinio ista esset vera, nullum individuum posset creari si aliquod individuum praeexsisteret, quia non totum caperet esse de nihilo si universale quod est in eo prius fuit in alio. Propter idem etiam sequeretur quod Deus non posset unum individuum substantiae adnihilare nisi cetera individua destrueret, quia si adnihilaret aliquod individuum, destrueret totum quod est de essentia individui, et per consequens destrueret illud universale quod est in eo et in aliis, et per consequens alia non manerent, cum non possent manere sine parte sua, quale ponitur illud universale.	Likewise, if that opinion were true, no individual could be created if something of the individual were pre-existent; for it would not get its entire being from nothing, if the universal which is in it, was in another beforehand. For the same reason it would also follow that God could not annihilate one individual of a substance, if he did not destroy the other individuals. For if he annihilated some individual, he would destroy the whole that is of the essence of the individual, and consequently he would destroy that universal which is in it and in others, and as a consequence the other individuals would not remain, since they could not remain without a part of themselves, such as the universal is supposed to be.
Item, tale universale non posset poni aliquid totaliter extra essentiam individui; esset igitur de essentia individui, et per consequens individuum componeretur ex universalibus, et ita individuum non esset magis singulare quam universale.	Likewise, such a universal could not be supposed to be something totally outside of the essence of an individual; therefore, it would be of the essence of the individual, and as a consequence the individual would be composed of universals; and so the individual would not be more singular than universal.
Item, sequeretur quod aliquid de essentia Christi esset miserum et damnatum, quia illa natura communis exsistens realiter in Christo et in damnato esset damnata, quia in Iuda. Hoc autem absurdum est. Aliae multae rationes adduci possent, quas causa brevitatis pertranseo, et eandem conclusionem confirmo per auctoritates.	Likewise, it wouild follow that something of the essence of Christ would be miserable and damned; since that common nature which really exists in Christ, and in the damned, would be damned because in Judas. But that is absurd. Many other reasons could be adduced which I pass over for the sake of brevity, and the same conclusion I now confirm by the authorities.
Primo, per Aristotelem, VII Metaphysicae, ubi ex intentione istam tractans quaestionem an universale sit substantia, demonstrat quod nullum universale est substantia. Unde dicit: "Impossibile est substantiam esse quodcumque universaliter dictorum".	First, through Aristotle (Metaphysics VII 1038b8), where he is dealing with the question of whether a universal is a substance, he shows that no universal is a substance. Hence he says, ‘it is impossible for substance to be something that can be predicated universally’.
Item, X Metaphysicae dicit: "Si itaque nullum universalium esse substantiam est possibile, sicut in sermonibus de substantia et ente dictum est, nec ipsum hoc substantiam ut aliquid unum praeter multa". Ex quibus patet quod secundum intentionem Aristotelis nullum universale est substantia, quamvis supponat pro substantiis.	Likewise, (Metaphysics X 1053 b16), he says, “Therefore, if it is not possible for a universal to be a substance, as we stated in the discussions on substance and being, neither is it possible that a universal be a substance in the sense of a one apart from the many”. From which it is clear that, according to Aristotle’s intention, no universal is a substance, although it may supposit for substances.
Item, Commentator, VII Metaphysicae, commento 44: "In individuo non est substantia nisi materia et forma particularis, ex quibus componitur".	Likewise, the Commentator (Metaphysics VII comment 44) says, “In the individual, there is no substance except the particular form and matter out of which it is composed’.
Item, ibidem, commento 45: "Dicamus igitur quod impossibile est ut aliquod illorum quae dicuntur universalia sit substantia alicuius rei, etsi declarent substantias rerum".	Likewise (comment 45), he says, ‘Let us say, therefore, that it is impossible that one of those things which are called universals are the substance of anything, even if they indicate the substances of things’.
Item, ibidem, commento 47: "Impossibile est ut ista sint partes substantiarum exsistentium per se".	Likewise, (comment 47), ‘It is impossible that [universals] are parts of substances existing per se’.
Item, VIII Metaphysicae, commento 2: "Universale non est substantia neque genus".	Likewise, (Metaphysics VIII comment 2), he says, “A universal is neither substance nor genus”.
Item, X Metaphysicae, commento 6: "Cum universalia non sint substantiae, manifestum est quod ens commune non est substantia exsistens extra animam".	Likewise, (Metaphysics X comment 45), he says “Since universals are not substances, it is manifest that common being is not a substance existing outside the mind”.
Ex praedictis auctoritatibus pluribusque aliis colligi potest quod nullum universale est substantia, qualitercumque consideretur. Unde consideratio intellectus non facit quod aliquid sit substantia vel non sit substantia, quamvis significatio termini faciat quod de ipso, non pro se, praedicetur hoc nomen ‘substantia’ vel non praedicetur. Sicut si iste terminus ‘canis’ in ista propositione ‘canis est animal’ stet pro animali latrabili vera est, si pro caelesti sidere falsa est. Quod tamen eadem res propter unam considerationem sit substantia et propter aliam non sit substantia est impossibile.	From the previous authorities and several others, it can be gathered that no universal is a substance, howsoever it is considered. Hence the consideration of the understanding does not bring it about that something is a substance or not, although the signification of a term may bring it about that of the thing itself, though not for itself, the name ‘substance’ is predicated, or not. Thus, if the term ‘dog’ in the proposition ‘the dog is an animal’ is used to stand for the animal capable of barking, the proposition is true; but if it is used for the celestial body [the dog star], it is false. But it is impossible that the same thing should be a substance from one consideration and not a substance from another.
Et ideo simpliciter concedendum est quod nullum universale est substantia, qualitercumque consideretur. Sed quodlibet universale est intentio animae, quae secundum unam opinionem probabilem ab actu intelligendi non differt. Unde dicunt quod intellectio qua intelligo hominem est signum naturale hominum, ita naturale sicut gemitus est signum infirmitatis vel tristitiae seu doloris; et est tale signum quod potest stare pro hominibus in propositionibus mentalibus, sicut vox potest stare pro rebus in propositionibus vocalibus.	Therefore, it should be conceded that no universal is a substance, howsoever it is considered. But every universal is an intention of the soul which, according to one probable opinion, does not differ from the act of understanding. Hence, they say that the act of understanding by which I understand man is a natural sign of men in the way that groaning is a natural sign of sickness, or of sadness or of sorrow, and it is such a sign that it can stand for men in mental propositions just as a spoken word can stand for things in uttered propositions.
Quod enim universale sit intentio animae, satis exprimit Avicenna, V Metaphysicae, ubi dicit: "Dico ergo quod universale dicitur tribus modis. Dicitur enim universale secundum hoc quod praedicatur in actu de multis, sicut ‘homo’, et dicitur universale intentio quam possibile est praedicari de multis".	That the universal is an intention of the soul is sufficiently expressed by Avicenna (Metaphysics V) where he says, “I say, therefore, that there are three senses of ‘universal’. For something is called a universal according as it is actually predicated of many things, e.g. ‘man’, and and intention is also called a universal if it is possible to predicated it of many”.
Et sequitur: "Dicitur etiam universale intentio quam nihil prohibet opinari quin praedicetur de multis".	And he follows, “an intention is also called a universal if there is nothing to prevent its being entertained but that predicated of many”.
Ex quibus aliisque multis patet quod universale est intentio animae nata praedicari de multis. Quod etiam ratione confirmari potest, nam omne universale, secundum omnes, est de multis praedicabile; sed sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum natum est praedicari et non substantia aliqua; ergo sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum est universale. Sed nunc non utor ‘universali’ pro signo voluntarie instituto, sed pro illo quod naturaliter est universale. Quod enim substantia non sit nata praedicari patet, quia si sic, sequeretur quod propositio componeretur ex substantiis particularibus, et per consequens subiectum esset Romae et praedicatum in Anglia, quod absurdum est.	From these and many other passages it is clear that a universal is an intention of the soul, made to be predicated of many things. This can also be confirmed by reason, for every universal (according to all) is predicable of many, but only an intention of the soul or a sign instituted by convention is made to be predicated , and not any substance, therefore only an intention of the soul or a sign instituted by convention is a universal. But here I do not use ‘universal’ for a sign instituted by convention, but for that which is universal by nature. For it is clear that a substance is made to be predicated, for if so, it would follow that a proposition were composed from particular substances, and as a consequence a subject would be in Rome and the predicate in England, which is absurd.
Item, propositio non est nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; igitur partes eius non sunt nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; huiusmodi autem non sunt substantiae particulares. Constat igitur quod nulla propositio ex substantiis componi potest. Componitur autem propositio ex universalibus, universalia igitur non sunt substantiae ullo modo.	Likewise, a proposition only exists in the mind, or in speech, or in writing; therefore, its parts only exist in the mind, in speech, and in writing. But particular substances are not of this sort. It is plain, therefore, that no proposition can be composed of substances. But a proposition is composed of universals, therefore universals are not substances in any way.