Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 16

Latin	English
[CAP. 16. DE OPINIONE CIRCA ESSE UNIVERSALIS: QUOMODO HABET ESSE EXTRA ANIMAM? CONTRA SCOTUM]	[Chapter 16. Of an opinion about universal being: in what way does it have being outside the soul? Against Scotus]
Quamvis multis sit perspicuum quod universale non sit aliqua substantia extra animam exsistens in individuis, distincta realiter ab eis, videtur tamen aliquibus quod universale est aliquo modo extra animam in individuis, non quidem distinctum realiter ab eis, sed tantum distinctum formaliter ab eisdem.	Although it is clear to many that a universal is not some substance outside the mind existing in individuals but distinct from them in reality. Nevertheless, it seems to some that a universal is, in some way, outside the soul and in the individuals; not really distinct from them, to be sure, but only distinct from them formally.
Unde dicunt quod in Sorte est natura humana, quae contrahitur ad Sortem per unam differentiam individualem, quae ab illa natura non distinguitur realiter sed formaliter. Unde non sunt duae res, una tamen non est formaliter alia. Sed ista opinio omnino improbabilis videtur mihi.	Hence they say that in Socrates there is human nature which is contracted to Socrates by an individual difference which is not in reality distinct from that nature, but rather formally distinct. Hence there are not two things, yet one is not formally the other. But this opinion seems altogether improbable to me.
Primo, quia in creaturis numquam potest esse aliqua distinctio qualiscumque extra animam nisi, ubi res distinctae sunt; si igitur inter istam naturam et istam differentiam sit qualiscumque distinctio, oportet quod sint res realiter distinctae. Assumptum probo per formam syllogisticam sic. Ista natura non est distincta formaliter ab ista natura; haec differentia individualis est distincta formaliter ab hac natura; igitur haec differentia individualis non est haec natura.	First, because in creatures there can never be any distinction outside the mind of any sort, except where the things are distinct. Therefore, if some kind of distinction exists between this nature and this difference, they have to be really distinct things. I prove the assumption in syllogistic form as follows. This nature is not formally distinct from this nature, this individual difference is formally distinct from this nature; therefore this individual difference is not this nature.
Item, eadem res non est communis et propria; sed secundum eos differentia individualis est propria, universale autem est commune; igitur nullum universale et differentia individualis sunt eadem res.	Likewise, the same thing is not common and proper; however, according to them, the individual difference is proper, but the universal is common; therefore the individual difference is not common; consequently no universal is the same thing as the individual difference.
Item, eidem rei creatae non possunt convenire opposita; commune autem et proprium sunt opposita; ergo eadem res non est communis et propria. Quod tamen sequeretur si differentia individualis et natura communis essent eadem res.	Likewise, opposites cannot belong to the same created thing; but ‘common’ and ‘proper’ are opposites; therefore the same thing is not common and proper, which would nevertheless follow if individual difference and common nature were the same thing.
Item, si natura communis esset eadem realiter cum differentia individuali, igitur tot essent realiter naturae communes quot sunt differentiae individuales, et per consequens nullum eorum esset commune, sed quodlibet esset proprium differentiae cui est eadem realiter.	Likewise, if common nature were the same in reality as the individual difference, therefore there would be in reality as many common natures as there are individual differences, and as a consequence, none of them would be common, but each one would be proper to the difference with which it is the same in reality.
Item, quaelibet res se ipsa vel per aliquid sibi intrinsecum distinguitur a quocumque distinguitur; sed alia est humanitas Sortis et alia Platonis; igitur se ipsis distinguuntur; non igitur per differentias additas.	Likewise, every thing is distinguished from whatever it is distinguished from either by itself, or through some thing intrinsic to itself, but the humanity of Plato is different from the humanity of Socrates, therefore they are distinguished of themselves; and therefore not through additional differences.
Item, secundum sententiam Aristotelis quaecumque differunt specie, differunt numero; sed natura hominis et natura asini se ipsis distinguuntur specie, ergo se ipsis distinguuntur numero; ergo se ipsa quaelibet illarum est una numero.	Likewise, according to the view of Aristotle, whatever differ by species, differ in number. But the nature of a man and the nature of a donkey by themselves are distinguished by species, therefore, by themselves, they differ in number. Therefore, each of these natures is of itself one in number.
Item, illud quod per nullam potentiam potest competere pluribus, per nullam potentiam est praedicabile de pluribus; sed talis natura, si sit eadem realiter cum differentia individuali, per nullam potentiam potest convenire pluribus, quia nullo modo potest competere alteri individuo; ergo per nullam potentiam potest esse praedicabile de pluribus, et per consequens per nullam potentiam potest esse universale.	Likewise, that which through no power can belong to several things, through no power is predicable of several. But such a nature, if it is the same thing in reality as the individual difference, through no power can belong to several things, because in no way can it belong to another individual. Therefore through no power can it be predicable of several, and as a consequence through no power can it be universal.
Item, accipio illam differentiam individualem et naturam quam contrahit et quaero: aut inter ea est maior distinctio quam inter duo individua aut minor. Non maior, quia non differunt realiter, individua autem differunt realiter. Nec minor, quia tunc essent eiusdem rationis, sicut duo individua sunt eiusdem rationis, et per consequens si unum est de se unum numero et reliquum erit de se unum numero.	Likewise, I take that individual difference and the nature which it contracts, and I ask whether the difference between these is greater than the difference between two individuals, or less? Not greater because they do not differ in reality, whereas individuals do differ in reality. Not less, because then they would be of the same definition, just as two individuals are of the same definition. And as a consequence, if one of them is of itself one in number, the other will of itself be one in number.
Item, quaero: aut natura est differentia individualis aut non. Si sic, arguo syllogistice sic: haec differentia individualis est propria et non communis; haec differentia individualis est natura; ergo natura est propria et non communis. Quod est intentum.	Likewise, I ask whether the nature is an individual difference or not. If it is, I argue syllogistically as follows: this indvidual difference is proper and not common; this individual difference is the nature; therefore the nature is proper and not common. Which is what was wanted.
Similiter arguo syllogistice sic: haec differentia individualis non est distincta formaliter a differentia individuali; haec differentia individualis est natura; ergo natura non est distincta formaliter a differentia individuali. - Si autem detur quod haec differentia individualis non est natura, habetur intentum, nam sequitur: differentia individualis non est natura, ergo differentia individualis non est realiter natura; quia ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis, sic arguendo: differentia individualis est realiter natura; ergo differentia individualis est natura.	Similarly, I argue syllogistically as follows: this individual difference is not formally distinct from the individual difference; this individual difference is the nature, therefore the nature is not formally distinct from this individual difference. But if it be granted that this individual difference is not the nature, I have what I wanted, for “an individual difference is not the nature, therefore an individual difference is not the nature in reality” follows, because from the opposite of the consequent follows the opposite of the antecedent, when arguing “the individual difference is the nature in reality, therefore the individual difference is the nature”.
Consequentia patet, quia a determinabili, sumpto cum determinatione non distrahente nec diminuente, ad determinabile per se sumptum est bona consequentia. ‘Realiter’ autem non est determinatio distrahens nec diminuens. Igitur sequitur: differentia individualis est realiter natura, ergo differentia individualis est natura.	The consequence is valid, for an argument from a determinable, taken with its determination that is neither ‘detracting’ nor ‘diminishing’, to a determinable per se is a good consequence. But ‘really’ is not a detracting or diminishing determination, hence “the individual difference is really the nature, therefore the individual difference is the nature” follows.
Dicendum est igitur quod in creaturis nulla est talis distinctio formalis, sed quaecumque in creaturis sunt distincta, realiter sunt distincta, et sunt res distinctae si utrumque illorum sit vera res.	Therefore it should be said that in creatures there is no such formal distinction; but rather, whatever in creatures are distinct, are really distinct, and are distinct things, if each of them is a true thing.
Unde sicut in creaturis tales modi arguendi numquam negari debent ‘hoc est a, hoc est b, ergo b est a’, nec tales ‘hoc non est a, hoc est b, igitur b non est a’, ita numquam debet negari in creaturis quin quandocumque contradictoria verificantur de aliquibus, illa sunt distincta, nisi aliqua determinatio vel aliquod syncategorema sit causa talis verificationis; quod proposito poni non debet.	Hence, just as in creatures such modes of arguing as “This is A, this is B, consequently B is A”, or ‘This is not A, this is B, consequently B is not A’, never ought to be denied, so it never ought to be denied in creatures, but that whenever contradictories are verified of certain things, they are distinct (unless some determination or some syncategorematic term is the cause of such verification, which should not be supposed in the present case).
Et ideo debemus dicere cum Philosophis quod in substantia particulari nihil est substantiale penitus nisi forma particularis et materia particularis vel aliquid compositum ex talibus. Et ideo non est imaginandum quod in Sorte sit humanitas vel natura humana distincta a Sorte quocumque modo, cui addatur una differentia individualis, contrahens illam naturam, sed quidquid imaginabile substantiale exsistens in Sorte vel est materia particularis vel forma particularis vel aliquid compositum ex his.	And therefore we ought to say with the Philosopher that in a particular substance nothing whatsoever is substantial except the particular form and the particular matter or some compound of those. And therefore we should not imagine that in Socrates there is a human nature or humanity distinct from Socrates in any way, to which is added an individual difference ‘contracting’ this nature. But whatever imaginable substantial reality existing in Socrates is either the particular matter or the particular form or a compound of these.
Et ideo omnis essentia et quidditas et quidquid est substantiae, si sit realiter extra animam, vel est simpliciter et absolute materia vel forma vel compositum ex his, vel substantia immaterialis abstracta, secundum doctrinam Peripateticorum.	And therefore every essence and quiddity and whatever belongs to substance, if it really exists outside the mind, is either simply and absolutely matter and form, or a compound of these, or it is a separate immaterial substance, according to the teaching of the Peripatetics.