Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 17

Latin	English
[CAP. 17. DE SOLUTIONE DUBIORUM QUAE MOVERI POSSUNT CONTRA PRAEDICTA]	[Chapter 17. Of the resolution of doubts which can be raised against the foregoing].
Et quoniam solutio dubiorum est veritatis manifestatio, ideo contra praedicta aliquae obiectiones sunt ponendae, ut solvantur. Multis enim non parvae auctoritatis viris videtur quod universale sit aliquo modo extra animam et de essentia substantiarum particularium. Ad quod probandum nonnullas rationes et auctoritates adducunt. Unde dicunt quod quando aliqua realiter conveniunt et realiter differunt, per aliud conveniunt et per aliud differunt. Socrates autem et Plato conveniunt realiter et realiter differunt, igitur distinctis conveniunt et differunt; sed conveniunt in humanitate et etiam in materia et forma; igitur includunt aliqua praeter ista, quibus distinguuntur. Illa vocant differentias individuales.	And since the resolution of doubts is a manifestation of truth, therefore some objections should be raised against the foregoing, in order to resolve them. For to many men of no little authority it seems that a universal is in some way outside the soul, and that it is of the essence of particular substances. To prove this, they cite a few arguments and authoritative passages. Hence they say that when some things really agree and really differ, they agree by means of something, and they differ by means of something. Now Socrates and Plato really agree and really differ, therefore they agree and differ in distinct things. But they agree in humanity, and also in material and form; therefore they include some things beyond themselves, by which they are distinguished. These they call ‘individual differentiae’.
Item, plus conveniunt Socrates et Plato quam Socrates et asinus; igitur in aliquo conveniunt Socrates et Plato in quo non conveniunt Socrates et asinus; sed non conveniunt in aliquo uno numeraliter; igitur illud in quo conveniunt non est unum numero; igitur est aliquid commune.	Likewise, Socrates and Plato agree more than Socrates and a donkey, therefore Plato and Socrates agree in something in which Socrates and the donkey do not agree. But they do not agree in something one in number, therefore what they agree in is not one in number. Therefore it is something common.
Item, X Metaphysicae: In omni genere est unum primum quod est mensura omnium aliorum quae sunt in illo genere. Sed nullum singulare est mensura omnium aliorum, quia non omnium individuorum eiusdem speciei; igitur est aliquid praeter individuum.	Likewise (X Metaphysics), “In every genus there is some one primary thing that is the measure of all other things in that genus. But no singular is the measure of all others, because not [the measure] of all individuals of the same species. Therefore it is something beyond the individual.
Item, omne superius est de essentia inferioris, igitur universale est de essentia substantiae; sed non-substantia non est de essentia substantiae; igitur aliquod universale est substantia.	Likewise, every superior is of the essence of its inferior, therefore the universal is of the essence of a substance. But non-substance is not of the essence of substance, therefore some universal is a substance.
Item, si nullum universale esset substantia, igitur omnia universalia essent accidentia, et per consequens omnia praedicamenta essent accidentia, et ita praedicamentum substantiae esset accidens, et per consequens aliquod accidens esset per se superius ad substantiam. Immo sequeretur quod idem esset superius ad se, quia illa universalia non possent poni nisi in genere qualitatis si sint accidentia, et per consequens praedicamentum qualitatis esset commune ad omnia universalia; igitur esset commune ad hoc universale quod est praedicamentum qualitatis.	Likewise, if no universal were a substance, then all universals would be accidents, and as a consequence all categories would be accidents, and so the category of substance would be an accident, and as a consequence some accident would be per se superior to a substance. On the contrary, it would follow that the same thing would be superior to itself, because those universals could only be supposed to be in the genus of qualitity if they were accidents, and as a consequence the category of quality would be common to all universals. Therefore it would be common to the universal which is the category of quality.
Aliae rationes et auctoritates innumerae adducuntur pro ista opinione, quas causa brevitatis omitto ad praesens, dicturus de eis in diversis locis inferius. Et ad istas respondeo.	Other innumerable arguments and authorities are cited for this opinion, which I leave out by reason of brevity for the moment. I am going to speak about them in diverse places below. And to those [above] I reply.
Ad primum concedo quod Socrates et Plato realiter conveniunt et realiter differunt, quia realiter conveniunt specifice et realiter differunt numeraliter. Et per idem conveniunt specifice et differunt numeraliter, sicut alii habent dicere quod differentia individualis per idem convenit realiter cum natura et differt formaliter.	To the first, I allow that Socrates and Plato really agree and really differ, because they really agree in species, and really differ in number. And they agree by the same thing in species, and they differ in number, just as others have to say that individual differentia really agrees with a nature by the same thing, and differs formally.
Et si dicas quod idem non est causa convenientiae et differentiae, dicendum quod verum est quod idem non est causa convenientiae et differentiae oppositae illi convenientiae, quo modo non est in proposito, nam inter convenientiam specificam et differentiam numeralem nulla est penitus oppositio.	And if you say that the same thing is not the cause of agreement and difference, it should be said that it is true that the same thing is not the cause of agreement and of the difference opposed to that agreement, which is not the way we assumed, for between agreement in species and numerical difference there is no complete opposition.
Concedendum est igitur quod Socrates per idem convenit specifice cum Platone et differt numeraliter ab eodem.	It should be conceded therefore that Socrates agrees in the same thing in species with Plato, and differs numerically by the same thing.
Secundum etiam argumentum non movet: non enim sequitur ‘Socrates et Plato plus conveniunt quam Socrates et asinus, igitur in aliquo plus conveniunt’, sed sufficit quod se ipsis plus conveniant. Unde dico quod Socrates per animam suam intellectivam plus convenit cum Platone quam cum asino, et se toto plus convenit cum Platone quam cum asino.	Also, the second argument is not conclusive: for ‘Socrates and Plato agree more than Socrates and a donkey, therefore they agree more in something’ does not follow. But it is sufficient that they agree more in themselves. Hence I say that Socrates agrees more by his intellective soul with Plato than Plato agrees with a donkey, and in his whole agrees more with Plato than with a donkey.
Unde de virtute sermonis non debet concedi quod Socrates et Plato conveniunt in aliquo quod est de essentia eorum, sed debet concedi quod conveniunt aliquibus, quia formis suis et se ipsis; quamvis si per contradictionem esset una natura in illis, convenirent in illa, sicut si - per contradictionem - Deus esset fatuus, male regeret mundum.	Hence, literally speaking, it ought not to be conceded that Socrates and Plato agree in something which is of their essence, but it ought to be conceded that they agree in some things, because by their forms and by themselves; although if by contradiction there were one nature in them, they would agree in that, just as if - by contradiction – God were unnecessary, he would rule the world badly.
Ad aliud dicendum est quod quamvis unum individuum non sit mensura omnium individuorum eiusdem generis vel eiusdem speciei specialissimae, idem tamen individuum potest esse mensura individuorum alterius generis vel individuorum multorum eiusdem speciei, et hoc sufficit pro intentione Aristotelis.	To the third argument, it should be said that although an individual may not be the measure of all individuals of the same genus or the same most specific species, nonetheless the same individual can be the measure of individuals of another genus or of many individuals of the same species, and this suffices [to explain] what Aristotle means.
Ad aliud dicendum est quod loquendo de vi vocis et secundum proprietatem sermonis concedi debet quod nullum universale est de essentia cuiuscumque substantiae. Omne enim universale est intentio animae vel aliquod signum voluntarie institutum; nullum autem tale est de essentia substantiae, et ideo nullum genus, nec aliqua species nec aliquod universale est de essentia substantiae cuiuscumque, sed magis proprie loquendo debet dici quod universale exprimit vel explicat naturam substantiae, hoc est naturam quae est substantia.	To the fourth, it should be said that in speaking literally and in propriety of speech, it ought to be conceded that no universal is of the essence of any substance. For every universal is an intention of the soul or some sign voluntarily established. But no such thing is of the essence of substance, and therefore no genus, nor any species nor any universal is of the essence of any substance, but more properly speaking it ought to be said that a universal expresses or explicates the nature of substance, i.e. the nature which is substance.
Et hoc est quod dicit Commentator, VII Metaphysicae, ‘quod impossibile est quod aliquod illorum quae dicuntur universalia sit substantia alicuius rei, etsi declarent substantias rerum’. Unde omnes auctoritates quae sonant universalia esse de essentia substantiarum vel esse in substantiis vel esse partes substantiarum, debent sic intelligi quod auctores non intendunt nisi quod talia universalia declarant, exprimunt, explicant, important et significant substantias rerum.	And this is what the Commentator says (VII Metaphysics): ‘that any of what are called universals are the substance of any thing, even if they indicate the substances of things’. Hence all authorities who suggest that universals are of the essence of substances, or are in substances, or are parts of substances, ought to be understood as follows: the authorities do not mean anything except that such universals indicate, express and explain, convey and signify the substances of things.
Et si dicas: nomina communia, puta talia ‘homo’, ‘animal’ et huiusmodi, significant aliquas res substantiales et non significant substantias singulares, quia tunc ‘homo’ significaret omnes homines, quod videtur falsum, igitur talia nomina significant aliquas substantias praeter substantias singulares: Dicendum est quod talia nomina significant praecise res singulares. Unde hoc nomen ‘homo’ nullam rem significat nisi illam quae est homo singularis, et ideo numquam supponit pro substantia nisi quando supponit pro homine particulari.	And if you say that common names, e.g. ‘man’, ‘animal’ and so on, signify certain substantial things and do not signify singular substances, because then ‘man’ would signify all men, which seems false, therefore such names signify certain substances beyond singular substances. It should be said that such names signify precisely singular things. Hence the name ‘man’ does not signify any thing except what is a singular man, and therefore never supposits for a substance except when it supposits for a singular man.
Et ideo concedendum est quod hoc nomen ‘homo’ aeque primo significat omnes homines particulares, nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod hoc nomen ‘homo’ sit vox aequivoca, et hoc quia quamvis significet plura aeque primo, tamen unica impositione significat illa et subordinatur in significando illa plura tantum uni conceptui et non pluribus, propter quod univoce praedicatur de eis.	And therefore it must be conceded that the name ‘man’ equally primarily signifies all particular men, yet on that account it does not follow that the name ‘man’ is an equivocal utterance, and this is because although it signifies several things equally primarily, still by a unique imposition it signifies those things, and is subordinated in signifying those several things only to one concept, and not by several, on account of which it is univocally predicated of them.
Ad ultimum habent dicere illi qui ponunt intentiones animae esse qualitates mentis, quod omnia universalia sunt accidentia. Non tamen omnia universalia sunt signa accidentium, sed aliqua sunt signa substantiarum tantum et illa quae sunt tantum signa substantiarum constituunt praedicamentum substantiae, alia constituunt alia praedicamenta. Concedendum est igitur quod praedicamentum substantiae est accidens, quamvis declaret substantias et non accidentia. Et ideo concedendum est quod aliquod accidens, illud scilicet quod est signum tantum substantiarum, est per se superius ad substantiam. Nec est hoc magis inconveniens quam dicere quod aliqua vox est nomen multarum substantiarum.	To the final argument, those who suppose that intentions of the soul are qualities of the mind have to say that all universals are accidents. Yet not all universals are signs of accidents, but rather some are signs of substances only, and those which are only signs of substances constitute the category of substance, others constitute other categories. Therefore it should be conceded that the category of substance is an accident, although it indicates substances and not accidents. And therefore it should be conceded that some accident, namely that which is the sign of substances only, is per se superior to a substance. Nor is this more inappropriate than saying that some utterance is the name of many substances.
Sed numquid idem est superius ad se ipsum? Potest dici quod non, quia ad hoc quod aliquid sit superius ad aliud requiritur distinctio inter illa. Et ideo potest dici quod non omnia universalia sunt per se inferiora ad hoc commune ‘qualitas’, quamvis omnia universalia sint qualitates, quia hoc commune ‘qualitas’ est qualitas, non tamen est inferius ad illud sed est ipsummet. Et si dicatur: idem non praedicatur de diversis praedicamentis, igitur qualitas non est communis ad diversa praedicamenta, dicendum est quod sive idem praedicetur de diversis praedicamentis quando stant significative sive non, tamen quando illa praedicamenta stant et supponunt non significative non est inconveniens idem praedicari de diversis praedicamentis.	But can the same thing be superior to itself? It can be said that it cannot, because for something to be superior to another, a distinction between them is required. And therefore it can be said that not all universals are per se inferior to the common term ‘quality’, although all universals are qualities, because the common term ‘quality’ is a quality, yet it is not inferior to its very own self. And if it is said, the same thing is not predicated of diverse categories, therefore quality is not common to diverse categories, it should be said that whether the same thing is predicated of diverse categories when they stand significatively, or not, nonetheless when those categories stand and supposit non-significatively, it is not inconsistent that the same thing is predicated of diverse categories.
Unde si in ista ‘substantia est qualitas’ subiectum stet materialiter vel simpliciter pro intentione, ipsa est vera. Et eodem modo ista est vera ‘quantitas est qualitas’, si ‘quantitas’ non stet significative: et ita idem praedicatur de diversis praedicamentis. Sicut istae duae ‘substantia est vox’,’quantitas est vox’ verae sunt si subiecta supponant materialiter et non significative.	Hence if, in ‘substance is a quality’ the subject stands materially or simply for an intention, it is true. And in the same way ‘quantity is a quality’ is true, if ‘quantity’ does not stand significatively, and so the same thing is predicated of diverse categories. Just as the two [propositions] ‘substance is an utterance’ and ‘quantity is an utterance’ are true if the subjects supposit materially and not significatively.
Et si dicas: qualitas spiritualis est in plus quam quodcumque praedicamentum, eo quod praedicatur de pluribus, nam praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, et nullum praedicamentum praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis: Dicendum est quod qualitas spiritualis non praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis significative sumptis, sed tantum pro signis sumptis, et propter hoc non sequitur quod sit in plus quam quodcumque praedicamentum. Nam superioritas et inferioritas inter aliqua sumitur ex hoc quod unum significative sumptum praedicatur de pluribus quam aliud significative sumptum.	And if you say that a spiritual quality is more extensive than any category, in that it is predicated of several things, for it is predicated of all categories, and no category is predicated of all categories. It should be said that a spiritual quality is not predicated of all categories significatively taken, but only when they are taken as signs, and because of this it does not follow that it is more extensive than any category. For superiority and inferiority between items arises from one term, significatively taken, being predicated of more than the other, significatively taken.
Unde ista est difficultas talis qualis est de isto nomine ‘dictio’, nam hoc nomen est unum contentum sub nomine, nam hoc nomen dictio est nomen, et non omne nomen est hoc nomen ‘dictio’. Et tamen hoc nomen ‘dictio’ est quodammodo superius ad omnia nomina et ad hoc nomen ‘nomen’, nam omne nomen est dictio, sed non omnis dictio est nomen.	Hence this is a difficulty similar to that with the name ‘expression’, for this name is one subsumed under ‘name’. For ‘expression’ is a name and not every name is the name ‘expression’. And yet the name ‘expression’ is in some way a superior of all names, and to the name ‘name’; for every name is an expression, but not every expression is a name.
Et ita videtur quod idem respectu eiusdem est superius et inferius. Quod potest solvi dicendo quod argumentum concluderet si in omnibus propositionibus quibus probatur conclusio termini supponerent uniformiter. Nunc autem aliter est in proposito. Si tamen hoc vocetur ‘inferius’ de quo aliquo modo supponente praedicatur aliud et de pluribus, quamvis illud si aliter supponeret non praedicaretur de eo universaliter sumpto, potest concedi quod idem respectu eiusdem est superius et inferius, sed tunc ‘superius’ et ‘inferius’ non sunt opposita sed disparata.	And so it seems that the same thing is both a superior and an inferior in respect of the same thing, which can be resolved by saying that the argument would be conclusive if in all propositions in which the conclusion is proved, the terms were suppositing uniformly.  But it is otherwise in the case we are considering now.  Nevertheless, if ‘inferior’ means that of which, suppositing in some way, another thing is predicated, as well as being predicated of several [other] things (although that other thing would not be predicated of it, universally taken, if it supposited in some other way) it can be conceded that the same thing is both a superior and an inferior in respect of the same thing, but then ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ are not opposites but different things.