Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 18

Latin	English
[1.18. DE QUINQUE UNIVERSALIBUS ET EORUM SUFFICIENTIA]	On the five universals [predicables], and the sufficiency of them.
Ostenso quid est universale, videndum est quot ponuntur species universalium. Ponuntur autem quinque universalia, quorum sufficientia et numerus potest sic accipi. Omne universale est de multis praedicabile: aut igitur praedicatur in quid de multis aut non in quid. Si in quid, ita quod convenienter per illud contingit respondere ad quaestionem factam per ‘quid’ de aliquo, hoc contingit dupliciter.	Having shown what a universal is, we must see in how many ways the species of universals are given. For five universals are given, the sufficiency and number of which can be understood as follows. Every universal is predicable of many things, therefore it is either predicated in quid of many things, or not in quid. If in quid - so that by means of that it is to possible to reply appropriately to the question ‘what?’, asked about something - this can happen in two ways.
Quia aut illa multa de quibus praedicatur sunt omnia similia, ita quod omnia essentialiter conveniunt, nisi forte unum componatur ex pluribus aeque similibus, et sic est species specialissima. Aut non omnia de quibus praedicatur praedicto modo conveniunt, sed contingit reperire aliqua duo quae simpliciter secundum se tota et secundum suas partes, si habeant partes, sunt dissimilia, sicut est de ‘animali’.	For either those many things of which it is predicated are all similar, so that all agree essentially (unless perhaps one is composed of several things equally similar, and so is the most specific species), or not all the things of which it is predicated in the previous way agree, but rather it is possible that some two things are found with absolutely and according to themselves wholly and according to their parts (if they have parts) are dissimilar, as with ‘animal’.
Nam ‘animal’ praedicatur de homine et asino, et maior est similitudo substantialis inter duos homines quam inter hominem et asinum. Similiter est de ‘colore’ respectu albedinis et nigredinis, nam nec haec nigredo nec aliqua pars huius nigredinis tantum convenit cum hac albedine vel aliqua parte huius albedinis quantum una albedo convenit cum alia, et propter hoc intentio praedicabilis de albedine et nigredine non est species specialissima sed genus.	For ‘animal’ is predicated of man and donkey, and there is more substantial similarity between two men, than between man and donkey. It is similar with ‘colour’ in respect of whiteness and blackness, for neither this blackness nor any part of this blackness agree with this whiteness or any part of this whiteness as much as one whiteness agrees with the other. And because of this, the intention predicable of whiteness and blackness is not the most specific species but a genus.
Sed albedo est species specialissima respectu albedinum, quia quamvis aliquando una albedo plus conveniat cum una albedine quam cum alia, sicut duae albedines aeque intensae plus convenire videntur quam albedo intensa et remissa, tamen semper altera illarum albedinum tantum convenit cum aliqua parte alterius quantum quaecumque duae albedines conveniunt inter se. Et propter hoc ‘albedo’ est species specialissima et non genus respectu albedinum.	But whiteness is the most specific species in respect of whitenesses, for although sometimes a whiteness agrees with one whiteness more than another, just as two whitenesses that are equally intense seem to agree more than an intense whiteness and a less intense whiteness, still, always one of those whitenesses agrees with some part of the other as much as any two whitenesses agree with each other. And because of this ‘whiteness’ is a most specific species, and not a genus in respect of whitenesses.
Verumtamen sciendum est quod tam genus quam species dupliciter accipitur, scilicet large et stricte. Stricte autem vocatur genus illud per quod convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per ‘quid’ de aliqua re per pronomen demonstrans illam rem. Sicut si quaeratur ‘quid est hoc’, demonstrando Sortem, convenienter respondetur dicendo quod est animal vel homo et sic de aliis generibus. Et consimiliter est de specie.	Yet it should be known that both ‘genus’ and ‘species’ are understood in two ways, namely broadly and narrowly. Now a genus is predicated ‘narrowly’ when it is appropriately replied to a ‘what’ question about some thing by a pronoun pointing to that thing. For example, if it is asked ‘what is this’, pointing to Socrates, it is appropriately replied saying that he is an animal or a man or some other genus. And similarly so with ‘species’.
Large autem dicitur genus vel species omne illud per quod convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per ‘quid est’ per nomen connotativum, quod non est mere absolutum. Sicut si quaeratur ‘quid est album’, convenienter respondetur quod est coloratum. Et tamen si quaereres quaestionem ‘quid est’ per pronomen demonstrativum, numquam contingit convenienter respondere per ‘coloratum’. Quidquid enim demonstrares per hoc pronomen ‘hoc’, sic quaerendo ‘quid est hoc’, numquam convenienter respondebis quod est coloratum.	But a genus or species is predicated broadly, all that through which it is appropriately replied to a ‘what is it’ question about some thing by a connotative name, which is not purely absolute. For example, if it is asked ‘what is a white [thing]’, the appropriate reply is that it is a coloured [thing]. And yet if you were to ask the question ‘what is it’ by a demonstrative pronoun, it is never possible to appropriately reply ‘coloured’. For whatever you were to point out by the pronoun ‘this’, in asking ‘what is this’, you will never appropriately reply that it is a coloured thing.
Quia sic quaerendo vel demonstras subiectum albedinis, et tunc manifestum est quod non convenienter respondes; vel demonstras albedinem, et manifestum est quod non convenienter respondes per ‘coloratum’, nam albedo non est colorata; vel demonstras unum aggregatum, et manifestum est quod non convenienter respondes, quia illud aggregatum non est coloratum, sicut inferius ostendetur; vel demonstras illum terminum, et manifestum est quod ille terminus non est coloratus.	For in asking in this way, either you point out the subject of whiteness, and then it is manifest that you do not appropriately reply, or you point to whiteness, and it is manifest that you do not appropriately reply by ‘coloured’, for whiteness is not coloured. Or you point out an aggregate, and it is manifest that you do not reply appropriately, for that aggregate is not coloured, just as will be shown below, or you point out that term, and it is manifest that this term is not coloured.
Patet igitur quod ad talem quaestionem ‘quid est album’ convenienter respondetur per ‘coloratum’, et propter hoc ‘coloratum’ potest dici genus, large sumendo genus. Quia tamen per ‘coloratum’ non convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem ‘quid est’ factam per pronomen demonstrativum, ideo non est genus, stricte sumendo hoc vocabulum ‘genus’. Et eodem modo, proportionaliter, est de specie.	Therefore it is obvious that to such a question as ‘what is white’, the appropriately reply is ‘a coloured thing’, and because of this ‘coloured’ can be called a genus, taking ‘genus’ broadly. Yet because by ‘coloured’ it is not appropriately replied to the question ‘what is it’, made with a demonstrative pronoun, therefore it is not a genus, taking the word ‘genus’ narrowly. And in the same way, proportionately, it is with ‘species’.
Et est ista distinctio necessaria, quia sine ea non possunt salvari multae auctoritates Aristotelis et aliorum auctorum quin repugnent; sed per eam exponendae sunt, quia multae regulae intelliguntur de genere et specie primo modo dictis, quae non intelliguntur de aliis, sicut in processu patebit.	And that distinction is necessary, for without it many authoritative passages of Aristotle and other authorities cannot be preserved, without conflicting. Rather, by means of the distinction they are to be explained, for many rules are understood about genus and species in the first way mentioned above, as will become obvious as we progress.
Si autem non praedicatur tale praedicabile in quid, vel hoc est quia exprimit partem rei unam et non aliam, nihil extrinsecum exprimendo, et sic est differentia. Sicut ‘rationale’, si sit differentia hominis, exprimit partem hominis, scilicet formam et non materiam. Vel exprimit sive importat aliquid quod non est pars rei, et tunc vel praedicatur contingenter vel necessario: si contingenter, sic vocatur accidens, si necessario, sic vocatur proprium.	But if such a predicable is not predicated in quid, this is either because it expresses one part of a thing and not another, by expressing nothing extrinic, and this is differentia. For example ‘rational’, if it is a differentia of man, expresses part of man, namely form and not material. Or it expresses or conveys something that is not a part of a thing, and then it is predicated either contingently or necessarily. If contingently, it is called an accident. If necessarily, it is called a property.
Verumtamen sciendum est quod aliquando illud extrinsecum importatum potest esse una propositio sine cuius veritate [non] potest esse exsistere vere praedicari de aliquo, sicut secundum ponentes quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate, hoc nomen ‘quantitas’ importat istam propositionem esse veram, si formetur, quando praedicatur de aliquo ‘hoc habet partem distantem a parte’.	Nevertheless it should be known that sometimes the extrinsic thing conveyed can be a proposition without whose truth it is not possible truly to predicate existential being of something. For example, according to those who suppose that quantity is not another thing from substance and quality, the name ‘quantity’ conveys that the proposition is true, if it is formed, when ‘this has part distant from part’ is predicated of something.
Est etiam sciendum quod secundum multas opiniones idem potest esse genus large accipiendo hoc nomen ‘genus’ respectu aliquorum, et proprium vel accidens respectu aliorum. Sicut quantitas respectu aliquorum est genus, puta respectu corporis, lineae, superficiei et huiusmodi, et tamen secundum opinionem quae ponit quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate respectu substantiae et qualitatis est accidens vel proprium. Sed hoc est impossibile de genere, stricte sumendo hoc nomen ‘genus’. Et hoc idem dicendum est de specie.	It should also be known that according to many opinions the same thing can be a genus, by taking the name ‘genus’broadly in respect of some things, and a property or accident in respect of others. For example, quantity in respect of some things is a genus, e.g. in respect of body, line, surface and such things, and yet according to the opinion which supposes that quantity is not another thing from substance and quality, it is an accident or property in respect of substance and quality. But this is impossible of a genus, taking the name ‘genus’ narrowly. And the same thing should be said of ‘species’.
Et si dicas: ens est universale, et similiter unum, et tamen non est genus: Similiter hoc commune ‘universale’ est universale, et tamen non est genus nec species:	And if you say ‘being is a universal’, and similarly ‘one’, and yet it is not a genus. Similarly the common term ‘universal’ is universal, and yet is neither a genus nor species.
Ad primum istorum potest dici quod illa est divisio universalium quae non praedicantur de omnibus, ‘ens’ autem praedicatur de omnibus. De uno autem est alia ratio, quia ‘unum’ potest assignari esse accidens vel proprium.	To the first of these it can be said that this is a division of universals which are not predicated of all, but ‘being’ is predicated of all. But of ‘one’ there is another reason, for ‘one’ can be assigned to be an accident or a property.
Ad secundum potest dici quod hoc commune ‘universale’ est genus, et ideo genus praedicatur de specie, non pro se sed pro specie.	To the second it can be said that the common [term] ‘universal’ is a genus, and therefore genus is predicated of species, not for itself but for species.