Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 19

Latin	English
[1.19. DE INDIVIDUO QUOD CONTINETUR SUB QUOLIBET UNIVERSALI]	[Chapter 19. Of individual, which is contained under every universal]
His praemissis de universali dicendum est de quinque universalibus in speciali. Primo tamen dicendum est de individuo, quod continetur sub quolibet universali.	After these preliminaries about the universal, we must now speak of the five universals specifically. But first we must speak of the individual, which is contained under every universal.
Et est sciendum primo quod apud logicos ista nomina convertibilia sunt ‘individuum’, ‘singulare’, ‘suppositum’, quamvis apud theologos ‘individuum’ et ‘suppositum’ non convertantur, quia apud eos suppositum non est nisi substantia, accidens autem est individuum. Sed in isto capitulo utendum est istis nominibus illo modo quo logici utuntur eis.	And it should first to be known that among logicians the names ‘individual’, ‘singular’, ‘suppositum‘ are convertible, although among theologians ‘individual’ and ‘suppositum‘ are not converted, because for them a suppositum is nothing except substance, but an accident is an individual. But in this chapter, those names are to be used in that way that logicians use them.
Apud logicum autem ‘individuum’ tripliciter accipitur. Nam uno modo dicitur individuum illud quod est una res numero et non plures, et sic potest concedi quod quodlibet universale est individuum. Aliter dicitur individuum res extra animam, quae est una et non plures, nec est signum alicuius; et sic quaelibet substantia est individuum. Tertio modo dicitur individuum signum proprium uni, quod vocatur terminus discretus; et sic dicit Porphyrius quod individuum est quod praedicatur de uno solo.	Now among logicians the word ‘individual’ is understood in three ways. For in one way an ‘individual’ is called that which is one thing in number and not several, and thus it can be allowed that any universal is an individual. In another way, a thing outside the mind is called an individual, which is one and not several, and is not the sign of something, and thus any substance whatever is an individual. In the third way, a sign that is proper to one thing is called ‘individual’; and this is called a discrete term, and thus Porphyry says that an ‘individual’ is what is predicated of one thing alone.
Ista autem definitio non potest intelligi de re exsistente extra animam, puta de Sorte et Platone et huiusmodi, quia res talis non praedicatur de uno nec de pluribus, ideo oportet quod intelligatur de aliquo signo proprio uni, quod non potest praedicari nisi de uno; hoc est non praedicatur de aliquo convertibiliter, quod potest supponere pro pluribus in eadem propositione.	But this definition cannot be understood of a thing existing outside the soul, e.g. of Socrates or Plato and suchlike, because such a thing is not predicated of one nor of many. For this reason it must be understood of some sign proper to one thing, which cannot be predicated except of one thing. This is not predicated of something convertibly, which can supposit for many things in the same proposition.
Tale autem individuum tripliciter potest assignari. Quia aliquod est nomen proprium alicuius, sicut hoc nomen ‘Sortes’ et hoc nomen ‘Plato’. Aliquod autem est pronomen demonstrativum, sicut hic ‘hoc est homo’, demonstrando Sortem. Aliquando autem est pronomen demonstrativum sumptum cum aliquo termino communi, sicut ‘hic homo’, ‘hoc animal’, ‘iste lapis’, et sic de aliis.	Now such an ‘individual’ can be assigned in three ways. For sometimes it is a proper name of something, e.g. the name ‘Socrates’ and the name ‘Plato’. And sometimes it is a demonstrative pronoun, for example ‘this is a man’, pointing to Socrates. And sometimes it is a demonstrative pronoun taken with some common term, such as ‘this man’, ‘this animal’, ‘this stone’ and so on.
Et sicut distinguitur de hoc nomine ‘individuum’, ita potest distingui de hoc nomine ‘singulare’ et de hoc nomine ‘suppositum’. Unde et apud antiquos, sicut puerulus didici, supposita termini communis alicuius duplicia sunt, scilicet per se et per accidens.	And just as the name ‘individual’ has distinct [meanings], so for the name ‘singular’, and the name ‘suppositum’. Hence also among the ancients, just as I was taught as a young boy, the supposita of some common term are twofold, namely per se and per accidens.
Sicut istius termini ‘album’ supposita per se sunt ‘hoc album’, ‘illud album’, supposita per accidens sunt Sortes et Plato et iste asinus. Quod non potest intelligi nisi accipiendo hoc nomen ‘suppositum’ pro individuis quae sunt signa rerum; quia loquendo de supposito quod est a parte rei et non signum alicuius, impossibile est quod aliqua sint supposita alicuius termini per se et aliqua per accidens.	Just as the per se supposita of the term ‘white’ are ‘this white thing’, ‘that white thing’, the per accidens supposita are Socrates and Plato and this donkey. Which cannot be understood except by accepting the name ‘suppositum’ for individuals which are the signs of things, because in speaking of a ‘suppositum’ which is on the part of the thing, and not a sign of something, it is impossible that some are supposita of some term per se and some per accidens.
Sed aliter accipiendo suppositum, scilicet pro termino proprio uni, quod dicitur suppositum quia de illo praedicatur illud commune, non pro se sed pro suo significato, illa dicuntur supposita per se alicuius termini communis quae sunt pronomina demonstrativa sumpta cum eodem termino communi; nomina autem propria et pronomina demonstrativa dicuntur supposita per accidens eiusdem termini.	But, accepting ‘supposita’ otherwise, namely for a term proper to one thing, which is called a ‘suppositum’ because something common is predicated of that thing, not for itself but for its significate, those things are called ‘supposita per se‘ of some common term, which are demonstrative pronouns taken with the same common term. But proper names and demonstrative pronouns are called ‘supposita per accidens‘ of the same term.
Et est differentia magna inter ista individua sive supposita et illa, nam impossibile est unum contrariorum vere praedicari de supposito per se alterius contrarii, sicut haec est impossibilis ‘hoc album est nigrum’, sed de supposito per accidens unius contrarii potest praedicari aliud contrarium, quamvis non dum est suppositum illius, sicut si Sortes sit modo suppositum albi, adhuc est haec possibilis ‘Sortes est niger’, et hoc quia idem potest esse suppositum per accidens duorum contrariorum successive, quamvis non simul	And it is a great difference between these ‘individuals’ or ‘supposita’, and the other sort, for it is impossibile for one contrary to be truly predicated of the suppositum per se of the other contrary, just as ‘this white thing is black’ is impossible. However, of the suppositum per accidens, one contrary can be predicated of the other contrary – although not while it is the suppositum of the other. For example, if Socrates is a suppositum of ‘white’, still it is possible that Socrates is black , and this is because the same thing can be the suppositum per accidens of two contraries successively – although not at the same time.