Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 3

Latin	English
CAP. 3. DE DIVISIONE TERMINI INCOMPLEXI	Chapter 3: on the division of incomplex terms.
(1) Visa aequivocatione istius nominis 'terminus' prosequendum est de divisionibus termini incomplexi. Unde non solum terminus incomplexus dividitur in terminum prolatum, scriptum et conceptum, sed etiam singula membra consimilibus divisionibus subdividuntur. Nam sicut vocum quaedam sunt nomina, quaedam sunt verba, quaedam sunt aliarum partium, quia quaedam sunt pronomina, quaedam participia, quaedam adverbia, quaedam coniunctiones, quaedam praepositiones, et consimiliter est de scriptis, sic intentionum animae quaedam sunt nomina, quaedam verba, quaedam sunt aliarum partium, quia quaedam sunt pronomina, quaedam adverbia, quaedam coniunctiones, quaedam praepositiones.	Having seen the equivocation in the name 'term', the divisions of the non-complex term are to be investigated. Hence the non-complex term is not only divided into the spoken, written and conceived term, but each branch is also subdivided by similar divisions, etc. - for, just certain utterances are names, certain are verbs, certain ones are of other parts of speech - since certain ones are pronouns, certain are participles, or adverbs, or conjunctions, or prepositions (and similarly for things that are written), so certain intentions of the soul are names, certain are verbs, certain are of other parts of speech. For certain ones are pronouns, certain are adverbs, or conjunctions, or prepositions.
(2) Utrum autem participiis vocalibus et scriptis correspondeant in mente quaedam intentiones a verbis distinctae potest esse dubium, eo quod non videtur magna necessitas talem pluralitatem ponere in mentalibus terminis. Nam verbum et participium verbi sumptum cum hoc verbo 'est' semper videntur in significando aequivalere.	But there may be a doubt whether to spoken and written participles there correspond certain intentions in the mind, distinct from verbs, seeing that there does not seem to be a great necessity to suppose such a plurality of mental terms. For a verb and the participle of the verb taken with the verb 'is' always seem to be equivalent in signifying.
Propter quod sicut nominum synonymorum multiplicatio non est propter necessitatem significationis inventa, sed propter ornatum sermonis vel aliam causam consimilem accidentalem, quia quidquid per omnia synonyma significatur posset per unum illorum exprimi sufficienter, et ideo multitudo conceptuum tali pluralitati synonymorum non correspondet, ita videtur quod distinctio inter verba vocalia et participia non est propter necessitatem expressionis inventa, propter quod videtur quod non oportet participiis vocalibus distinctos conceptus in mente correspondere. Et de pronominibus posset esse consimilis dubitatio.	Because of this, just as the multiplication of synonymous names is found not on account of the necessity of signification, but rather for the sake of ornament of speech or another similar accidental cause (for whatever is signified by all synonymous names could be sufficiently expressed by one of them, and therefore a multitude of concepts does not correspond to such a plurality of synonyms) so it seems that the distinction between spoken verbs and participles was not devised on account of the necessity of expression. Because of this, it seems that there do not have to be distinct concepts in the mind corresponding to spoken participles. And concerning pronouns there could be a similar doubt.
(3) Est autem inter nomina vocalia et mentalia differentia, quia quamvis omnia accidentia grammaticalia quae conveniunt nominibus mentalibus etiam nominibus vocalibus sint convenientia, non tamen e converso, sed quaedam sunt communia tam istis quam illis, quaedam autem sunt propria nominibus vocalibus et scriptis, quia quaecumque conveniunt vocalibus, et scriptis et e converso.	Now there is a difference between mental and spoken names, because, although all the grammatical accidents appropriate to mental names are also appropriate to spoken names, yet not conversely. Rather, certain grammatical accidents are common as much to the latter as to the former, others however are proper to spoken and written names. For whatever are appropriate to the spoken are also appropriate to the written, and conversely.)
(4) Accidentia communia nominibus vocalibus et mentalibus sunt casus et numerus. Sicut enim istae propositiones vocales `homo est animal', 'homo non est animalia' distincta habent praedicata quorum unum est numeri singularis et aliud pluralis, ita propositiones mentales quarum una mens ante omnem vocem dicit quod homo est animal et alia dicit quod homo non est animalia distincta habent praedicata quorum unum potest dici numeri singularis et aliud pluralis. Similiter sicut istae propositiones vocales 'homo est homo' et 'homo non est hominis' habent distincta praedicata variata per casus, sic proportionaliter dicendum est de propositionibus in mente correspondentibus.	The accidents common to spoken and mental names are case and number. For, just as the spoken propositions 'A man is an animal' and 'A man is not animals' have distinct predicates, of which one is singular and the other plural, so the mental propositions - by one of which the mind, before any utterance, says that a man is an animal, and by the other of which it says that a man is not animals - have distinct predicates, one of which can be said to be of singular number, and the other of the plural. Similarly, just as the spoken propositions 'A man is a man' and 'A man is not of a man' have distinct predicates, varied through case, so proportionally it should be said of the corresponding propositions in the mind.
(5) Accidentia autem propria nominibus vocalibus et scriptis sunt genus et figura. Talia enim accidentia nominibus propter necessitatem significationis non conveniunt. Unde et aliquando accidit quod duo nomina sunt synonyma et tamen sunt generum diversorum et aliquando diversarum figurarum, propter quod talem multiplicitatem non oportet naturalibus signis tribuere. Unde quaecumque pluralitas et varietas talium accidentium, quae potest competere nominibus synonymis, potest convenienter a mentalibus amoveri.	Now the accidents proper to spoken and written names are gender and figure. For such accidents do not belong to names on account of the necessity of signification. Hence also it sometimes happens that two names are synonyms and still are of diverse genders and sometimes in different figures, on account of which we do not have to attribute such a multiplicity to natural signs. Hence any plurality and variety of such accidents which can belong to synonymous names can appropriately be set aside in the case of mental terms.
(6) De comparatione autem, an conveniat solis nominibus ad placitum institutis, posset esse difficultas, quam tamen quia non est magnae utilitatis pertranseo. De qualitate posset esse consimilis difficultas, quam alias pertractabo in sua radice.	Now concerning comparison, there can be a difficulty about whether it belongs only to names assigned by convention. But which I pass over, because it is of no great use. A similar difficulty could arise over quality, which I shall treat of in detail elsewhere.
(7) Per praedicta autem potest studiosus evidenter perpendere quod quamvis aliquando ex sola variatione accidentium terminorum, scilicet casus, numeri et comparationis, propter tamen rem significatam, potest propositio una verificari et alia falsificari, hoc tamen numquam accidit propter genus et figuram. Quamvis enim frequenter ad congruitatem orationis habendam oportet aspicere ad genus, - haec enim est congrua 'homo est albus' et haec incongrua 'homo est alba', quod ex sola diversitate generis oritur -, tamen supposita congruitate nihil refert cuius generis vel cuius figurae sit subiectum vel praedicatum. Sed certe, cuius numeri vel casus sit subiectum vel praedicatum, ad sciendum an propositio sit vera vel falsa oportet aspicere. Haec enim est vera 'homo est animal' et haec falsa 'homo est animalia', et sic de aliis.	Now, through what has been said above, the keen student can evidently consider that, although sometimes by variation alone of the accidents of the terms (namely, case, number and comparison), one proposition can be verified and another one falsified, on account of the thing signified, nevertheless this never happens with gender and figure. For, even though you often have to pay attention to gender for the agreement of speech (for example, Homo est albus agrees, and Homo est alba does not, which happens from diversity of gender alone), still, assuming agreement, it does not matter what gender or figure the subject or predicate is. But certainly we have to pay attention to the number or case the subject or predicate has, to know whether the proposition is true or false. For 'a man is an animal' is true, and 'A man is animals' is false, and so for other cases.
(8) Et sicut nominibus vocalibus et scriptis quaedam sunt accidentia propria, quaedam communia illis et mentalibus, consimiliter de verborum accidentibus est dicendum. Communia sunt modus, genus, numerus, tempus, persona. De modo patet, nam alia oratio mentalis comrespondet isti orationi vocali Socrates legit et isti alia utinam Socrates legeret . De genere patet, nam alia oratio mentalis correspondet isti orationi vocali 'Socrates amat' et isti 'Socrates amatur'.	And just as there are certain accidents that are proper to spoken and written names, and certain that are common also to mental names, a similar thing should be said about the accidents of verbs. The common ones are mood, kind [genus], number, tense, and person. Concerning mood it is clear. For one mental expression corresponds to the spoken expression 'Socrates read' and another to 'Would that Socrates read!'. It is clear with active and passive, for one mental expression corresponds to the spoken expression 'Socrates loved' and another to 'Socrates is loved'.
Verumtamen in mente non sunt nisi tria genera, nam deponentia et communia vocalia non sunt propter necessitatem significationis inventa, cum verba communia aequivaleant activis et passivis et deponentia neutris vel activis, et ideo non oportet talem pluralitatem in verbis mentalibus ponere.	Nevertheless there are just three kinds in the mind, for spoken deponents and common verbs are not found on account of the necessity of signification, since common verbs are equivalent to active and passive ones, and deponent ones to middle ones and active ones. And for that reason we do not have to suppose such a plurality in mental verbs.
(9) De numero etiam patet, nam distinctae orationes mentales correspondent istis 'tu legis', 'vos legitis'. Idem patet de tempore, nam istis 'tu legis', 'tu legisti' distinctae orationes mentales correspondent. Hoc idem patet de persona, ut istis 'tu legis', 'ego lego' aliae correspondent.	Concerning number it is also clear, for distinct mental expressions correspond to 'he reads' [and] 'they read'. The same is clear with tense, for distinct mental expressions correspond to 'You read [present]' and 'You read [past]'. The same is clear about person. For example, different mental terms correspond to 'he reads' [and] 'I read'.
(10) Sed quod oporteat ponere talia nomina mentalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et praepositiones ex hoc convincitur quod omni orationi vocali correspondet alia mentalis in mente, et ideo sicut illae partes propositionis vocalis quae sunt propter necessitatem significationis impositae sunt distinctae, sic partes propositionis mentalis correspondenter sunt distinctae.	But the need of supposing such mental names, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions and prepositions can be proved from the fact that to every spoken expression there corresponds another mental one in the mind, and therefore, just as those parts of the spoken proposition that are imposed because of the necessity of signification are distinct, so also the corresponding parts of the mental proposition are distinct.
Propter quod sicut nomina vocalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et praepositiones sunt necessariae diversis propositionibus et orationibus vocalibus, ita quod impossibile est omnia exprimere per nomina et verba solum quae possunt per illa et alias partes exprimi, sic etiam distinctae partes consimiles sunt necessariae mentalibus propositionibus.	Because of this, just as spoken names, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions and prepositions are necessary for diverse spoken propositions and expressions - so that it is impossible to express alone everything by means of names and verbs that can be expressed through those, together with the other parts of speech – so, also, similar distinct parts are necessary for mental propositions.
(11) Accidentia autem propria verbis institutis sunt coniugatio et figura. Tamen quandoque verba diversarum coniugationum possunt esse synonyma et similiter verba diversae figurae.	The accidents proper to instituted verbs are conjugation and figure. Yet sometimes verbs of different conjugations can be synonymous, and similarly verbs of diverse figure.
(12) Per praedicta potest studiosus faciliter advertere quomodo proportionaliter de aliis partibus orationis et earum accidentibus est dicendum.	From what has been said, the keen student will easily recognize what there is to be said, proportionally, about the other parts of speech and their accidents.
(13) Nec miretur aliquis quod dico aliqua nomina et verba esse mentalia, sed prius legat Boethium super Perihermenias , et hoc ibidem inveniet. Et ideo quando Aristoteles tam nomen quam verbum definit per vocem, accipit ibi nomen et verbum magis stricte, scilicet pro nomine et verbo vocali.	Nor should anyone wonder that I say that some names and verbs are mental, but let him first read Boethius on the Perihermenias, and he will find it there. And for that reason, when Aristotle defines the name, as well as the verb, by ‘utterance', he understands there 'name' and 'verb' strictly, i.e., for a spoken name and verb.