Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 33

Latin	English
[CAP. 33. DE ISTO TERMINO 'SIGNIFICARE']	[Chapter 33. On the term ‘signify’]
(1) 'Significare' multipliciter accipitur apud logicos. Nam uno modo dicitur signum aliquid significare quando supponit vel natum est supponere pro illo, ita scilicet quod de pronomine demonstrante illud per hoc verbum 'est' illud nomen praedicatur. Et sic 'album' significat Sortem; haec enim est vera 'iste est albus', demonstrando Sortem. Sic 'rationale' significat hominem; haec enim est vera 'iste est rationalis', demonstrando honminem. Et sic de multis aliis concretis.	(1) ‘To signify’ is taken in many ways among logicians. For in one way a sign is said to signify some thing when it supposits, or is suited to supposit for that thing, namely, so that the name is predicated by means of the verb ‘is’ of a pronoun pointing to the thing. And so ‘white’ signifies Socrates, for ‘that person is white’ is true, pointing to Socrates. Thus ‘rational’ signifies a man, for ‘He is rational’ is true, pointing to a man. And so on for many other concrete names.
(2) Aliter accipitur 'significare' quando illud signum in aliqua propositione de praeterito vel de futuro vel de praesenti vel in aliqua propositione vera de modo potest pro illo supponere. Et sic 'album' non tantum significat illud quod nunc est album, sed etiam illud quod potest esse album; nam in ista propositione album potest currere, accipiendo subiectum pro eo quod potest esse, subtectum supponit pro his quae possunt esse alba.	(2) ‘Signify’ is taken in another way when the sign, in some proposition about the past or about the future or about the present, or in some true proposition about a mode, can supposit for that thing [that is signified]. And so ‘white’ not only signifies what is now white, but also what can be white. For in the proposition ‘A white thing can run’, taking the subject for what can exist, the subject supposits for things that can be white.
(3) Accipiendo ‘significare’ primo modo et significatum sibi correspondens, per solam mutationem rei frequenter vox et etiam conceptus cadit a suo significato, hoc est, aliquid cessat significari quod prius significabatur. Secundo modo accipiendo 'significare' et 'significatum' sibi correspondens, vox vel conceptus per solam mutationem rei extra non cadit a suo significato.	(3) Taking ‘to signify’ in the first sense, and the significate corresponding to it, an utterance (and even a concept) often ‘loses its significate’ only through change in the thing. That is, something ceases to be signified that was signified before. In the second way of taking ‘signify’, and the term significate corresponding to it, an utterance or concept does not lose its significate only through change in the thing outside.
(4) Aliter accipitur 'significare' quando illud dicitur significari a quo ipsa vox imponitur vel illud quod primo modo significatur per conceptum principalem vel vocem principalem. Et sic dicimus quod 'album' significat albedinem, quia 'albedo' significat albedinem, pro qua tamen albedine non supponit hoc signum 'album'. Sic 'rationale', si sit differentia, significat animam intellectivam.	(4) ‘Signify’ is taken in another way when that from which the utterance itself is imposed is said to be signified, or what is signified in the first sense by a primary concept or primary utterance. And so we say that ‘white’ signifies whiteness because ‘whiteness’ signifies a whiteness. Nevertheless, the sign ‘white’ does not supposit for this whiteness. So, ‘rational’, if it is a differentia, signifies the intellective soul.
(5) Aliter accipitur 'significare' communissime quando aliquod signum quod est natum esse pars propositionis vel natum est esse propositio vel oratio aliquid importat, sive principaliter sive secundario, sive in recto sive in obliquo, sive det intelligere sive connotet illud, vel quocumque alio modo significet, sive significet illud affimative sive negative, quo modo hoc nomen 'caecus' significat visum, quia negative, et hoc nomen 'immateriale' significat negative materiam, et hoc nomen 'nihil' sive 'non-aliquid' significat aliquid, sed tamen negative; de quo modo significandi Ioquitur Anselmus, De casu diaboli.	(5) ‘Signify’ is taken in another way, the most general way, when some sign that is suited to be a part of a proposition, or is suited to be a proposition or expression, conveys something, whether primarily or secondarily, whether in the nominative or in an oblique case, or whether it gives understanding, or connotes that thing, or signifies in any other way, or signifies that thing affirmatively or negatively. In this way, the name ‘blind’ signifies sight, because negatively, and the name ‘immaterial’ signifies material negatively, and the name ‘nothing’ or ‘non-something’ signifies something, although negatively. Anselm talks about this way of signifying in On the Fall of the Devil.
(6) Significare igitur secundum aliquam sui significationem competit cuilibet universali. 'Universale enim', secundum Damascenum in Logica sua, cap.48, 'est quod multa significat, ut 'homo', 'animal' Omne enim universale vel significat plura primo modo vel secundo, quia omne universale praedicatur de pluribus, vel in propositione de inesse et de praesenti, vel in propositione de praeterito vel de futuro, vel de modo.	(6) To signify, therefore, according to some of its significations, belongs to any universal term. For “a universal”, according to Damascene in his Logic, Ch. 48, “is what signifies many [things]such as ‘man’, ‘animal’.” For every universal either signifies several things in the first way or the second, because every universal is predicated of several things, either in an assertoric proposition about the present, or in a proposition about the past or future or about a mode.
(7) Ex quo patet quod errant illi qui dicunt quod haec vox 'homo' non significat omnes homines. Cum enim hoc universale 'homo', secundum praefatum Doctorem, significet plura, et non significet plures res quae non sunt homines, oportet quod significet plures homines. Quod concedendum est, quia nihil significatur per hominem nisi homo, et non plus unus homo quam alius.	(7) From this it is clear that those persons are in error who say that the utterance ‘man’ does not signify all men. For, since the universal ‘man’, according to the Doctor above, signifies several things, and does not signify several things that are not men, it has to signify several men. This is to be conceded, because nothing is signified by ‘man’ except a man, and not one man more than another.
(8) Universale igitur omne significat plura. Sed universale quod est genus vel species, quod praedicatur de pronomine demonstrante aliquam rem, non significat plura nisi primo modo vel secundo accipiendo 'significare'. Reliqua autem universalia significant aliqua primo modo vel secundo, et aliqua etiam tertio modo vel quarto, quia omne aliud universale significat aliquid in recto et aliquid in obliquo, sicut patet de 'rationali', 'risibili', 'albo' et sic de consimilibus.	(8) A universal therefore signifies several things. But a universal that is a genus or species, which is predicated of a pronoun pointing to some thing, does not signify several things except by taking ‘to signify’ in the first way or the second way. But the remaining universals signify several [things] in the first way or the second, and some [things] too in the third way or the fourth. For every other universal signifies something in the nominative and something in an oblique case. This is clear with ‘rational’ and ‘capable of laughter’, and so on.