Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 34

Latin	English
[CAP. 34. DE ISTO TERMINO 'DIVIDI']	[Chapter 34. On the term ‘divided’]
Non solum autem universale significat plura, sed etiam in plura dividitur. Sed 'dividi' multipliciter accipitur. Aliquid enim dividi dicitur quando alicuius totius per realem sectionem una pars ab alia separatur, sicut carpentarius dividit lignum et latomus lapidem et faber ferrum.	And not only does a universal signify several things, but it is also divided into several things. But ‘divided’ is taken in many ways. For something is said to be divided when one part of some whole is separated from another by real dissection. For example, the carpenter divides wood, the mason divides stone, and the blacksmith, iron.
Aliter accipitur 'dividi' quando sub aliquo uno, cuius una pars non separatur ab alia, plura sumuntur, sicut si dividam hanc vocem 'canis' in sua significata, sic dicendo 'canis alius latrabile animal, alius caeleste sidus' etc., non separo unam partem istius vocis ab alia, sed plura ad quae est ista vox communis sub illo communi accipio. Et sic loquuntur logici de divisione.	But in another way we speak of dividing when several things are subsumed under a single thing, without any part being separated from another. For example, if I divide the word ‘dog’ into its significates saying that one kind of dog is a barking animal and another is a celestial body, etc., I do not separate one part of the word from another. Rather, I take the several things to which the word is common, and I take them under that commonality. And in this way logicians speak of division.
"Sunt autem", secundum Damascenum, in Logica sua, cap. 12, "octo modi divisivi: vel ut genus in species, ut animal dividitur in rationale et irrationale. Vel ut species in individua, ut 'homo' dividitur in Petrum et Paulum et reliquos secundum partem hominis. Vel ut totum in partes, et hoc dupliciter: vel in similes partes vel in dissimiles partes. Similes quidem partes illae sunt quando partes suscipiunt nomen et definitionem totius et ad invicem, ut cum dividimus carnem in multas carnes et unaquaeque pars carnis caro dicitur et definitionem carnis suscipit".	‘There are,’ according to Damascene in chapter 12 of his Logic, ‘eight ways of dividing things. (i) a genus can be divided into species, e.g. animal is divided into rational and irrational. (ii) Species can be divided into individuals, e.g. man is divided into Peter and Paul and all the rest on the side of ‘man’. (iii) Whole can be divided into parts, and this in two senses, either similar or dissimilar parts. Now similar parts are those when the parts receive the name and definition of the whole and of each other, such as when we divide flesh into many [bits of] flesh, and each part of the flesh is called ‘flesh’, and receives the definition of flesh.
Dissimiles partes sunt cum partes neque nomen neque definitionem, neque totius neque ad invicem, suscipiunt, ut quando dividimus Socratem in caput et manus et pedes. Neque enim caput neque manus neque pedes suscipiunt nomen vel definitionem Socratis, neque ad invicem. Vel ut aequivoca vox in diversa significata; et hoc dupliciter: vel ut totum vel ut pars. Et exemplificat ibidem: Vel ut substantia in accidentia, ut cum dico 'hominum hi quidem sunt albi hi autem nigri’.	Dissimilar parts are when the parts receive neither the name nor definition of the whole or of each other, such as when we divide Socrates into head and hands and feet. For neither the head nor the hands nor the feet receive the name and definition of Socrates, nor of each other. (iv) Equivocal utterance can be divided into diverse significata, and this in two ways: either as whole or as part. And he gives an example in the same place: ‘either as substance into accidents’ such as when I say ‘of men, some are white and some are black’.
Vel ut accidens in substantias, ut cum dico 'alborum haec quidem animata haec autem inanimata'. Vel ut accidens in accidentia, ut cum dico 'frigidorum haec quidem sicca haec autem humida'. Vel ut ab uno et ad unum: ab uno quidem ut a medicinali medicinalis liber, medicinale instrumentum; ad unum autem ut sanativum [pharmacum] sanativus cibus ad sanitatem.	(v) Or accident can be divided into substances, such as when I say ‘of white things, some are animate and some are inanimate’. (vi) Or as accident can be divided into accidents, such as when i say ‘of cold things, some are dry and some are moist’. (vii) Or as one can be divided from another, or (viii) into another. From another, for example, when from ‘medical’ we get ‘medical book’, ‘medical instrument’. Into another, for example ‘healthy’: healthy food to health.
Est autem advertendum quod quamvis in praedictis modis dividendi accipiatur unum, sub quo sine reali divisione et reali separatione unius partis ab alia accipiuntur plura, tamen in aliquibus modis illud quod dividitur importat aliquid quod potest realiter dividi in illa quae importantur per dividentia, scilicet in tertio et quarto modo. In aliis autem modis non sic: non enim quando dicitur 'hominum alii albi, alii nigri' aliquod totum dividitur in suas partes reales ubi illae partes separantur realiter inter se.	But it should be noted that although in the previous modes of dividing one thing is accepted, under which several are accepted without real division or real separation of one part from another, still, in some modes, that which is divided conveys something which can really be divided into those which are conveyed by the items of the division, namely in the third and fourth mode. But in other modes it is not so, for it is not the case, when it is said that ‘some men are white, some black’, that some whole is divided into its real parts, where those parts are really separated from one another.
Est autem advertendum quod quando dividitur substantia in accidentia vel accidens in substantias vel accidens in accidentia, accipitur ibi hoc nomen 'accidens' pro praedicabili contingenter de aliquo, ipso quod importatur per subiectum permanente in rerum natura. Et ita patet quod frequenter in auctoritatibus accipitur accidens non pro aliqua re accidentali realiter inhaerente substantiae, sed pro contingenter praedicabili de substantia. Si enim praedictus auctor accepisset 'accidens' pro re realiter alteri inhaerente, debuit dixisse quod 'homo dividitur in albedinem et nigredinem', non 'in homines albos et nigros', et similiter debuit dixisse de aliis.	But it should be noted that when substance is divided into accidents, or accidents into substances, or accidents into accidents, the name ‘accident’ is accepted there for something contingently predicable of another, by that which is conveyed by the subject remaining in a state of natura. And so it is clear that frequently in the authorities ‘accident’ is taken not for some accidental thing really inhering in a substance, but for a something contingently predicable of a substance. For if the previous author had accepted ‘accident’ for a thing really inhering in another, he would have had to have said that ‘man is divided into whiteness and blackness’, not ‘into white men and black men’. And it would similarly have to be said of the others.