Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 35

Latin	English
[CAP. 35. DE ISTO TERMINO 'TOTUM']	[Chapter 35. On the term ‘whole’]
'Totum' multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo dicitur aliquid complectens plures partes, sine quibus in rerum natura esse non potest. Sicut impossibile est quod homo sit sine anima rationali exsistente et corpore; et similiter impossibile est quod aer sit nisi tam materia quam forma sit; similiter impossibile est quod hoc lignum sit nisi haec pars sit. Et tunc semper pars est de essentia totius et non e converso.	‘Whole’ is understood in many ways. In one way, something is called ‘whole’ which comprehends several parts, without which it cannot exist in a state of nature. For example, it is impossible that a man exists, without a rational soul existing, and without a body. And similarly it is impossible that air exists unless both material and form exists. Similarly it is impossible that this wood exists unless this part exists. And then always the part is of the essence of the whole, and not conversely.
Aliter accipitur 'totum' pro aliquo communi ad multa. Et sic genus dicitur totum respectu specierum; et species dicitur totum respectu individuorum. Et tunc 'totum' idem est quod 'commune'. Et sic logici communiter utuntur 'toto'. Et quot modis dicitur 'totum', tot modis, proportionaliter, dicitur 'pars'.	In another way, ‘whole’ is understood of something common to many things. And thus genus is called whole in respect of species, and species is called whole in respect of individuals. And then ‘whole’ is the same as ‘common’. And logicians commonly use ‘whole’ in this way. And in as many ways as ‘whole’ is predicated, in correspondingly many ways ‘part’ is predicated.
Unde quaedam pars est de essentia totius, quaedam pars non propter aliud dicitur pars nisi quia est minus communis quam illud cuius dicitur pars. Et ista vocatur 'pars subiectiva', quae non plus est de essentia totius quam e converso; et sicut illa pars potest esse sine toto, ita totum potest esse sine parte illa. Et quamvis aliis modis posset accipi 'totum' et 'pars', tamen isti modi ad praesens sufficiant.	Hence one sort of part is of the essence of the whole, another sort of part is only called a part because it is less common than that of which it is called a part. And this is called a ‘subjective part’, which is no more of the essence of the whole than conversely. And just as that sort of part can be without a whole, so the whole can be without that part. And although there are other ways in which ‘part’ and ‘whole’ can be accepted, nonetheless these ways will suffice for the present.