Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 36

Latin	English
[CAP. 36. DE ISTO TERMINO 'OPPOSITA']	[Chapter 36. On the term ‘opposites’]
Post praedicta dicendum est de oppositis . Et est sciendum quod hoc nomen 'opposita' significat tam res extra animam et in anima, quam signa rerum. Sed omnes res extra animam, quae non sunt signa, si sint oppositae, non opponuntur nisi contrarie; vel secundum unam opinionem aliquae opponuntur relative. Hoc patet: nam omnes res quae sunt oppositae vel sunt res absolutae, et tunc non potest inter eas esse oppositio nisi contraria tantum, sicut inductive patet; vel sunt relativae, et tunc non possunt esse oppositae nisi vel contrarie vel relative; vel una est absoluta et alia relativa, et si ita sit, non opponuntur. Unde quando aliquae res sic se habent quod possunt sibi succedere in eodem subiecto, si non possunt esse simul in eo, si sint formae absolutae sunt contrariae. Tamen, sicut dicetur inferius, in tali contrarietate sunt gradus.	After the above, we should speak of ‘opposites’. And it should be known that the name ‘opposites’ signifies both things outside the soul and in the soul, as well as signs of things. But all things outside the soul which are not signs, if they are opposites, are only opposed if they are contraries (although according to one opinion some things are opposed relatively). This isclear, for all things which are opposites are either absolutes – and then there cannot be opposition between them unless they are contraries only, as is clear by example; or they are relatives, and then they cannot be opposites unless either contrariwise or relatively; or one is absolute and the other relative, in which case they are not opposed. Hence, when some things are related that they can succeed each other in the same subject, if they cannot exist together in it, if they are absolute forms they are contraries. Nevertheless, as will be said below, there are degrees in such contrariety.
Sed si loquamur de oppositione quae est inter signa rerum, cuiusmodi sunt conceptus, voces et scripturae, sic hoc nomen 'opposita' secundum Peripateticos tam de complexis quam de incomplexis praedicatur. Complexorum autem oppositorum potest triplex modus assignari. Quaedam enim opponuntur contradictorie, quando scilicet aliquae propositiones habent idem subiectum et idem praedicatum sed una est affirmativa et alia negativa. Sed hoc non sufficit, sed oportet quod una sit universalis et alia particularis vel indefinita, vel quod utraque sit singularis. Verbi gratia istae opponuntur contradictorie 'omnis homo est animal', 'aliquis homo non est animal', similiter istae 'omnis homo est animal', 'homo non est animal', et hoc quia indefinita, quando subiectum sumitur significative, semper convertitur cum particulari.	But if we are speaking of opposition between signs of things, of which sort are concepts, utterances and writing, then the name ‘opposites’ according to the Peripatetics is predicated of both simples and complexes. Of complex opposites there are three kinds. For some things are contradictorily opposed, namely when some propositions have the same subject and the same predicate, but one is affirmative and the other negative. But this is not sufficient, but it has to be that one is universal and the other particular or indefinite, or that both are singular. For example, ‘every man is an animal’ and ‘some man is not an animal’ are opposed as contradictories, and similarly ‘every man is an animal’ and ‘a man is not an animal’, and this is because indefinites, when the subject is taken significatively, always convert with the particular.
Et ideo universalis contradicit tam particulari quam indefinitae. Similiter istae contradicunt 'nullus homo est animal' et 'aliquis homo est animal' sive 'homo est animal'. Istae etiam contradicunt 'Socrates est animal', 'Socrates non est animal'.	And therefore the universal contradicts the particular as well as the indefinite. Similarly ‘no man is an animal’ and ‘some man is an animal’ or ‘a man is an animal’ are contradictory. Also ‘Socrates is a animal’ and ‘Socrates is not an animal’ are contradictory.
Aliquae autem propositiones opponuntur contrarie, scilicet universalis affirmativa et universalis negativa. Et hoc verum est quando subiecta sumuntur significative, aliter non oportet. Sicut istae non opponuntur contrarie 'omnis homo: est terminus communis cum signo universali', 'nullus homo: est terminus communis cum signo universali'.	But some propositions are opposed contrarily, namely the universal affirmative and the universal negative. And this is true when the subjects are taken significatively, otherwise it does not have to be so. For example, ‘every man is a common term with a universal sign’ and ‘no man is a common term with a universal sign’ are not opposed contrarily.
Pro tertio modo oppositionis non habemus nomen impositum. Est tamen tertius modus quando aliquae propositiones nec sunt contradictoriae nec contrariae, sed inferunt propositiones contradictorias, vel una infert contradictoriam alterius; et propter hoc nullo modo possunt esse simul verae. Sicut istae propositiones opponuntur 'nullum animal currit', 'aliquis homo currit', non tamen contrarie nec contradictorie, quia non habent idem subiectum. Sed opponuntur, quia ista 'aliquis homo currit' infert contradictoriam istius 'nullum animal currit', quia sequitur 'aliquis homo currit, ergo aliquod animal currit'. Ex praedictis patet quod propositiones subalternae et subcontrariae non opponuntur, quia possunt simul esse verae.	For the third kind of opposition, we do not have a name. But it is the third kind when some propositions are neither contradictories nor contraries, but imply contradictory propositions, or one implies the contradictory of the other, and because of this in no way can they both be true at the same time. For example, ‘no animal runs’ and ‘some man runs’ are opposed, but not in a contrary or contradictory way, for they do not have the same subject. But they are opposed, becaue ‘some man runs’ implies the contradictory of ‘no animal runs’, because ‘some man runs, therefore some animal runs’ follows. From what has been said, it is clear that subalternate and subcontraries are not opposed, because they can both be true at the same time.
Oppositorum autem incomplexorum quatuor modi ponuntur. Quia quaedam incomplexa sunt contraria, scilicet illa quae significant quidquid significant positive et affirmative, non negative; hoc est in definitione exprimente quid nominis eorum nulla negatio nec aliquid aequivalens negationi debet poni, et simul cum hoc quod illa non possunt verificari de eodem pro eodem simul sed successive; vel significant res quae possunt successive inesse eidem, non simul, quamvis non possint verificari de eodem nec simul nec successive.	Now of simple opposites, four types are given. For some simples are contraries, namely those which signify whatever they signify positively and affirmatively, not negatively. That is, in their nominal definition no negation, nor anything equivalent to negation ought to be given, and at together with this they cannot be verified of the same thing and for the same thing at the same time, but only successively. Or they signify things which can successively, not simultaneously inhere in the same thing, although they could not be verified of the same thing either at the same time or successively.
Exemplum primi: sicut est de 'albo' et 'nigro', quia isti termini nihil significant negative et tamen isti termini significative sumpti non possunt verificari de eodem pro eodem simul, sed successive possunt. Verumtamen, sicut dicetur inferius, in isto modo sunt gradus. Exemplum secundi est de 'albedine' et 'nigredine', quia isti termini significant tales res, qui tamen termini nec simul nec successive possunt verificari de eodem pro eodem. Et in isto modo, sicut in priori, sunt gradus.	An example of the first is ‘white’ and ‘black’, for these terms signify nothing negatively and yet taken significatively cannot be verified of the same thing and for the same thing at the same time, but can be verified successively. But nevertheless, as will be said below, there are degrees in this mode. An example of the second is ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’, for these terms signify things such that the terms can neither simultaneously nor successively be verified of the same and for the same thing. And in this mode, as with the first, there are degrees.
Quaedam autem opposita incomplexa sunt privatio et habitus, et sunt illa quorum unum significat quidquid significat positive, alterum autem aliquid significat positive, et illud idem quod suum oppositum significat affirmative ipsum significat negative. Quod patere potest ex definitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius, quia in illa definitione negatio praecedit habitum oppositum sibi. Sic se habent 'visus' et 'caecitas'; nam 'visus' quidquid significat affirmative significat, quia in sua definitione exprimente quid nominis nulla negatio debet poni; sed 'caecitas' vel 'caecus' significat aliquid affirmative et aliquid negative, quia 'caecus' definitur sic 'caecus est ille qui non habet visum quem natus est habere', ubi aliquid praeponitur negationi et significatum illius importatur per 'caecum' affirmative, et aliquid sequitur negationem et significatum illius importatur per 'caecum' negative.	And some simple opposites are privation and possession, and they are those of which one signifies whatever it signifies positively, and the other signifies something positively, but signifies negatively what its opposite signifies affirmatively. Which can be clear from its nominal definition, for in that definition, negation precedes the possession of what is opposite to it. ‘Sight’ and ‘blindness’ are related in this way, for ‘sight’ signifies whatever it signifies affirmatively, for in its nominal definition no negation ought to be given. But ‘blindness’ or ‘blind’ signifies something affirmatively and something negatively, for ‘blind’ is defined as: ‘blind is that which does not have sight, which naturally has sight’, where something precedes the negation and its significate is conveyed by ‘blind’ affirmatively, and something follows the negation and its significate is conveyed by ‘blind’ negatively.
Si autem illud idem, propter sequentem particulam, dicatur importari affirmative, non curo; sufficit enim mihi quod negative importetur. Nec est inconveniens idem per idem importari affirmative et negative, sicut dictum est prius quod idem per idem potest significari in recto et in obliquo.	Now if that same thing, because of the following part, is said to convey affirmatively, I do not mind. For it is sufficient to me that it is conveyed negatively. Nor is it inappropriate that the same thing is conveyed by the same thing both affirmatively and negatively. It is like what we said earlier, that the same thing can be signified by the same thing in the nominative or the oblique case.
Istam autem distinctionem, scilicet significare aliquid affirmative vel negative, insinuat Anselmus, De casu diaboli, cap.11, ubi dicit sic: "Constat, quoniam, haec vox, scilicet 'nihil', quantum ad significationem nullatenus differt ab eo quod dico 'non aliquid'. Nihil quoque hoc apertius quam quod haec vox, scilicet 'non aliquid', omnem rem penitus et omne quod est aliquid in intellectu removendum, nec omnino ullam rem aut penitus quod aliquid sit in intellectu retinendum sua significatione constituit”.	And that distinction, namely between signifying affirmatively and negatively, is suggested by Anselm (in chapter 11 of The Fall of the Devil), where he says “It is plain that the utterance ‘nothing’ in no way differs as regards signification from ‘non something’. And nothing shows this more clearly than that the utterance ‘non something’ establishes by its signification that absolutely everything and everything that is something in the understanding is to be removed, and that absolutely nothing that is something in the understanding is to be kept”.
“Sed quoniam remotio alicuius rei nullatenus significari potest nisi cum significatione ipsius cuius significatur remotio, - nullus enim intelligit quid significet 'non-homo' nisi intelligendo quid sit 'homo' -, necesse est ut haec vox quae est 'non-aliquid', destruendo illud quod est aliquid significet aliquid". Et sequitur: "Significat aliquid removendo, et non significat aliquid constituendo". Et sequitur: "Hoc itaque modo non repugnat malum nihil esse et mali nomen esse significativum, si sic aliquid perimendo significat ut nullius rei sit constitutivum".	“But the removal of a thing cannot at all be signified except together with the signification of that very thing whose removal is signified. (For example, no one understands what ‘not-man’ signifies except by understanding what a man is.) Therefore, it is necessary that the word ‘not- something’ signify something by ‘destroying’ that which is something.” And as follows: “It signifies by removing and does not signify by establishing.” And as follows: “And so, in this aforementioned way the fact that evil is nothing is not opposed to the fact that the name “evil” is significative, if in this way “evil” signifies something by destroying it and, thus, is constitutive of no thing.”
Ex his verbis aliisque pluribus quae ibidem scribit Anselmus evidenter habetur quod aliquod incomplexum aliquid significat removendo, perimendo, negando et aliquod incomplexum aliquid significat constituendo et affirmando. Ex quo sequitur quod privatio non est aliquid in re extra animam, distinctum quocumque modo a quolibet positivo, sicut caecitas non est a parte rei in oculo, dicente Anselmo, ubi prius: "Multa dicuntur secundum formam quae non sunt secundum rem, ut 'timere' secundum formam vocis dicitur activum, cum sit passivum secundum rem. Ita quoque dicitur 'caecitas' aliquid secundum formam loquendi, cum non sit aliquid secundum rem.	From these words, and from several others which Anselm writes in the same place, evidently it is held that something simple signifies something by removing, by destroying, by negating, and something simple signifies something by establishing and affirming. From which it follows that privation is not something in reality outside the soul, distinct from any mode and anything positive, just as blindness is not on the side of reality in the eye. Anselm says, as before, ‘Many things are predicated according to form which are not predicated according to reality, such as ‘to fear’ is called active according to the form of the utterance, although it is called passive according to reality. So also ‘blindness’ is called something according to the form of speaking, although it is not something according to reality.
Sicut enim dicimus de aliquo quia habet visum et visus est in eo, ita dicimus quia habet caecitatem et caecitas est in eo, cum haec non sit aliquid sed potius non-aliquid; et hanc habere non est aliquid, immo eo carere quod est aliquid. Caecitas namque non est aliud quam non-visus aut absentia visus ubi visus debet esse. Non-visus vero vel absentia visus non magis est aliquid ubi debet esse visus quam ubi non debet esse. Quare caecitas non magis est aliquid in oculo quia ibi debet esse visus quam non-visus vel absentia visus in lapide ubi visus non debet esse".	For just as we say about someone that he has sight and that sight is in him, so we say that he has blindness and blindness is in him, since this is not something, but rather non-something; and to have that is not something, but rather to lack that which is something. For blindness is nothing other than non-seeing or the absence of sight where sight should be. In truth, non-sight or the absence of sight is not anything more where there should be sight than it is where there should not be sight. Thus blindness is not anything more in the eye because sight should be there than non-seeing or the absence of seeing is in a stone where sight should not be.
Ex ista auctoritate patet quod caecitas non est aliquid a parte rei in oculo exsistens, et per consequens nullibi est a parte rei. Et ideo illa quae sunt extra animam non opponuntur privative, sed signa rerum, quorum unum significat aliquid affirmative et aliquid negative reliquum vero significat aliquid tantum affirmative, privative opponuntur. Relative autem opponuntur nomina relativa quae non possunt de eodem respectu eiusdem verificari. Et hoc verum est sive res extra animam aliquae opponantur relative sive non. Nec propter hoc quod dico 'nomina relativa' nego relationem esse extra animam, quia 'relativum' potest dici tam de re quam de nomine ret.
Quod enim sint aliqua nomina relativa patet per grammaticos, qui nomen relativum ponunt esse unam speciem nominum. Incomplexa autem contradictoria sunt illa quorum unum significat aliquid vel aliqua affirmative et aliud significat praecise illud vel illa negative, nihil affirmative significando. Sicut 'homo' significat omnes homines affirmative et 'non-homo' significat eosdem homines negative, nihil determinate vel finite affirmative significando. Quod addo propter cavillationem quae posset fieri, dicendo quod 'non-homo' significat asinum, ex quo supponit pro asino, sic dicendo 'asinus est nonhomo. Et est sciendum quod quodlibet istorum oppositorum est vere in se quoddam ens positivum et absolutum, et de quolibet eorum pro se sumpto verificatur 'ens reale'. Unde si in ista 'non-ens est ens' subiectum supponeret pro se, vera esset, quia illud subiectum vere est ens, cum sit subiectum et pars propositionis ; nulla autem propositio componitur ex non-entibus.
Et si proterviatur quod tunc unum oppositorum praedicaretur de reliquo, dicendum est quod non est inconveniens unum oppositorum praedicari de reliquo, non significative sed simpliciter vel materialiter sumpto. Sic enim tales sunt verae 'non-dictio est dictio', 'non-incomplexum est incomplexum', 'non-pars est pars', et sic de multis aliis, sicut haec est vera quando profertur 'non-vox est vox'. Si enim subiectum supponat pro se, certum est quod illud est vox, quia haec vox quam profero non-vox' est vox. Et ista de oppositis ad praesens sufficiant, quia multa hic omissa super librum Praedicamentorum exposui.