Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 59

Latin	English
Cap. 59. De mixtione propositionum de possibili et aliarum modalium in secunda figura	Chapter 59. On the mixture of propositions of posibility and of other modes in the second figure.
Si utraque istarum propositionum sumatur in sensu compositionis, si ille modus non sit inferior ad necessarium vel aequivalens ei, non valet mixtio in secunda figura. Sicut non sequitur 'nullum Deum esse hominem est scitum a te; quamlibet personam divinam esse hominem est possibile; igitur nullam personam divinam esse Deum est possibile’. Nec sequitur ‘omnem Deum esse hominem est scitum a te; nullam personam divinam esse hominem est possibile; igitur nullam personam divinam esse Deum est possibile’. Si autem illa de modo inferat illam de necessario, sequitur conclusio de possibili. ƿ	If both of these propositions are taken in the sense of composition, if that mode is not inferior to the necessary or equivalent to it, the mixture in the second figure is not valid. Just as it does not follow that 'no God is known by you to be a man; it is possible for any divine person to be a man; therefore it is possible for no divine person to be God'. Nor does it follow that 'every God is known by you to be a man; it is possible for no divine person to be a man; therefore it is possible for no divine person to be God'. But if the modal proposition infers the proposition of necessity, the conclusion of possibility follows.
Consimiliter, si altera sumatur in sensu compositionis et altera in sensu divisionis, si illa de modo non inferat illam de necessario, mixtio non valet; si inferat eam, valet respectu conclusions de possibili.	Similarly, if one is taken in the sense of composition and the other in the sense of division, if the latter does not infer the former of the mode, the mixture is not valid; if it does infer it, it is valid with respect to conclusions of possibility.
Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, et illa de alio modo is non inferat illam de necessario, non valet mixtio. Sicut non sequitur 'omnis Deus scitur esse homo; quaelibet persona divina potest non esse homo; igitur quaelibet persona divina potest non esse Deus’. Nec sequitur 'omnis persona divina potest non esse homo; omnis Deus scitur esse homo; igitur quilibet Deus potest non esse persona divina’. Si autem illa de modo inferat illam de necessario, tenet mixtio talis quando ex illa de necessario et illa de possibili valet mixtio.	But if both are taken in the sense of division, and the one in another mode does not infer the one of necessity, the mixture is not valid. Just as it does not follow that 'every God is known to be man; it is possible that any divine person is not a man; therefore it is possible that any divine person is not God'. Nor does it follow that 'it is possible that every divine person is can a man; every God is known to be a man; therefore it is possible that any God is not a divine person'. But if the one of a mode infers it of necessity, such a mixture holds when from the one of necessity and the one of possibility the mixture is valid.