Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 61

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Latin English
Cap. 61. De mixtione propositionum de contingenti et aliarum modalium in prima figura Chapter 61. On the mixture of propositions of contingency and of other modals in the first figure.
Ultimo videndum est de mixtione propositionis de contingenti et ceterarum propositionum modalium. Et prime esset dicendum de mixtione ex propositionibus de contingenti et impossibili, sed illa patet ex mixtione contingentis et necessarii propter causam frequenter dictam[1]; Finally, we must consider the mixture of a proposition of contingency and the other modal propositions. And first we would have to speak of the mixture from propositions of contingency and of impossibility, but that is clear from the mixture of contingency and necessity for the reason frequently stated[2];
ideo dicendum est de mixtione contingentis et aliarum modalium, et primo in prima figura. Therefore, we must speak of the mixture of contingency and other modals, and first in the first figure.
Et est primo sciendum quod si utraque sumatur in sensu compositionis, si illa de modo non inferat illam de necessario, non valet mixtio. Sicut non sequitur 'omne animal esse hominem est scitum a te; omnem asinum esse animal est contingens; igitur omnem asinum esse hominem ƿ est contingens vel possibile'. Nec sequitur 'omne animal esse hominem est contingens; omnem asinum esse animal est scitum a te; igitur omnem asinum esse hominem est possibile vel contingens'. And it must first be known that if both are taken in the sense of composition, if the one does not infer the other of necessity, the mixture is not valid. Just as it does not follow 'every animal is known by you to be a man; that every donkey is an animal is contingent; therefore every donkey is a man is contingent or possible'. Nor does it follow 'that every animal is a man is contingent; every donkey is known by you to be an animal; therefore that every donkey is a man is possible or contingent'.
Si autem illa de modo inferat illam de necessario, est bona mixtio, quia ex tali de necessario et illa de possibili sequitur conclusio de possibili, sicut dictum est prius[3]; sed illa de possibili sequitur ad illam de contingenti, igitur etc. But if the modal proposition infers that of necessity, it is a good mixture, because from such a proposition of necessity and that of possibility the conclusion of possibility follows, as was said before[4]; but that of possibility follows to that of contingency, therefore etc.
Si autem illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis et alia in sensu divisionis, si illa de contingenti fuerit maior, non valet mixtio, Sicut non sequitur 'omne album esse hominem est contingens; omnis asinus scitur esse albus; igitur omnem asinum esse hominem est possibile'. Si autem illa de alio modo inferat illam de necessario, mixtio est bona. Similiter dicendum est si illa de contingenti sit minor. But if the proposition of contingency is taken in the sense of composition and the other in the sense of division, if the one of contingency is major, the mixture is not valid, just as it does not follow that 'every white thing being a man is contingent; every donkey is known to be white; therefore every donkey being a man is possible'. But if the proposition of another mode infers the one of necessity, the mixture is good. The same must be said if the one of contingency is minor.
Si autem illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu divisionis, si sit maior, semper sequitur conclusio de possibili quando minor infert suam de inesse et aliter non, quia dictum est prius[5] quod ex tali de contingenti et illa de inesse sequitur conclusio de possibili. Si autem minor non inferat suam de inesse, non valet mixtio. Quando autem illa de contingenti est minor, non valet mixtio; sicut non sequitur 'omne album esse hominem est scitum a te; omnis asinus contingenter potest esse albus; igitur omnis asinus potest esse homo'. But if the proposition of contingency is taken in the sense of division, if it is a major, a conclusion of possibility always follows when the minor infers its own of inherence and otherwise not, because it was said before[6] that from such a contingent proposition and a proposition of inherence a conclusion of possibility follows. But if the minor does not infer its own of inherence, the mixture is not valid. But when the contingent is a minor, the mixture is not valid; just as it does not follow 'every white thing being a man is known by you; every donkey can contingently be white; therefore every donkey can be a man'.
Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, si maior fuerit de contingenti, sequitur conclusio de possibili quando minor infert suam de inesse; quando non infert suam de inesse, non valet. Si autem illa de contingenti fuerit minor, non valet; sicut non sequitur 'omne album scitur a te esse homo; omnis asinus contingenter est albus; igitur omnis asinus potest esse homo'. ƿ But if both are taken in the sense of division, if the major is contingent, a conclusion of possibility follows when the minor infers its own of inherence; when it does not infer its own of inherence, it is not valid. But if the minor is contingent, it is not valid; just as it does not follow 'every white thing is known by you to be a man; every donkey is contingently white; therefore every donkey can be a man'.

Notes

  1. Quia scilicet propositio de impossibili aequivalet propositioni de necessario, ut dictum est supra, cap. 40, lin. 4-5 et cap. 50, lin. 3-4.
  2. Because, namely, the proposition about the impossible is equivalent to the proposition about the necessary, as was said above, chap. 40, lines 4-5 and chap. 50, lines 3-4.
  3. Supra, cap. 44.
  4. Supra, chap. 44.
  5. Supra, cap. 54 lin. 26-33.
  6. Supra, cap. 54 lin. 26-33.