Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 10

Latin	English
CAP. 10. DE MODO SCIENDI PER EXPERIENTIAM ET QUALITER HABETUR EXPERIMENTUM.	Chapter 10. On the mode of knowing through experience, and how experience is obtained.
Quia dictum est quod aliqua principia et aliquae conclusiones sciri possunt per experientiam, de isto modo deveniendi ad notitiam principii vel conclusionis est breviter disserendum.	Since it has been said that some principles and some conclusions can be known through experience, it is necessary to briefly discuss this way of arriving at knowledge of the principle or conclusion.
Unde sciendum est quod sensu apprehendente aliquod sensibile, potest virtus phantastica idem imaginari, et non solum phantastica sed etiam intellectus potest idem apprehendere, quo apprehenso potest inƿtellectus aliquas propositiones contingentes evidenter cognoscere.	Hence it is to be known that by apprehending something sensible with the sense, the perceptive power can imagine the same thing, and not only the perceptive power but also the intellect can apprehend the same thing, by which apprehension it can clearly know certain propositions that are contingent upon the understanding.
Sicut apprehenso per sensum calore, potest intellectus eundem calorem cognoscere, et scire quod illud est calidum, et quod illo approximato alteri calefacit illud aliud quod non esset calidum nisi sibi primum calidum approximaretur.	Just as heat is apprehended by the sense, the intellect can know the same heat, and know that it is hot, and that when it approaches another, it warms that other thing which would not be hot unless it were first brought warm to itself.
Et ita intellectus evidenter cognoscit hanc propositionem ‘hoc calidum calefacit’. Ista autem propositione nota et scita, et scito quod quando aliquid convenit uni individuo potest consimile competere alteri individuo eiusdem speciei, accipit istam propositionem universalem ‘omnis calor est calefactivus’, cum non sit maior ratio quod unus calor sit magis calefactivus quam alius. Ista propositio sic nota per experientiam est unum universale, quia est propositio universalis; quae si non possit aliter cognosci quam sic per sensum, erit principium artis et scientiae. Si autem possit cognosci isto modo, et praeter hoc possit cognosci sine sensu per propositiones notas, necessarias, dispositas in modo et figura, erit conclusio scientiae et demonstrationis.	And so the intellect clearly knows this proposition 'this heat warms'. But with this proposition known and comprehended, and knowing that when something suits one individual it may similarly suit another individual of the same species, he accepts this universal proposition 'all heat is warming', since there is no greater reason that one heat is more warming than another. This proposition, thus known by experience, is a universal one, because it is a universal proposition; which, if it cannot be known otherwise than through the senses, will be the principle of art and science. But if it can be known in this way, and besides this it can be known without sense by propositions known, necessary, arranged in a manner and form, it will be the conclusion of science and demonstration.
Est autem sciendum quod quandoque talis propositio habet pro subiecto speciem specialissimam, aliquando habet pro subiecto aliquod communius. Illa quae habet pro subiecto speciem specialissimam potest evidenter cognosci per notitiam unius singularis, sicut evidenter scito quod hic calor calefacit, potest evidenter cognosci quod omnis calor est calefactivus.	But it must be known that sometimes such a proposition has for its subject a very special species, sometimes it has for its subject something more general. That which has for its subject a very special species can be clearly known by the knowledge of one particular, just as it is clearly known that this heat warms, it can be clearly known that all heat is heating.
Unde notitia evidens unius talis singularis contingentis ‘hic calor calefacit’ sufficit sine aliis singularibus ad habendum notitiam evidentem de universali.	Hence, the evident knowledge of one such singular contingent 'this heat warms' is sufficient without other singulars to have evident knowledge of the universal.
Si autem illa universalis habeat pro subiecto aliquid communius specie specialissima, requiritur semper vel frequenter quod aliqua singularis cuiuscumque speciei contentae sub illo cognoscatur, et ita ad cognoscendum talia requiruntur plura singularia.	But if that universal has for its subject something more general than a very particular species, it is always or frequently required that some singular of whatever species is contained under it be known, and thus to know such things several singulars are required.
Oportet etiam scire quod, ut frequenter, ad cognoscendum univerƿsale requiruntur multa singularia, quamvis subiectum talis universalis sit species specialissima, quia, ut frequenter, non potest evidenter cognosci aliqua singularis contingens sine multis apprehensionibus singularium.	It is also necessary to know that, as is often the case, many particulars are required to know the universal, although the subject of such a universal is a very special species, because, as is often the case, it is not possible to clearly know any particular contingent without many apprehensions of particulars.
Unde non est facile scire quod haec herba sanavit talem infirmum, nec quod iste syrupus sanavit talem infirmum, et sic de multis aliis, quia non facile capitur experimentum, eo quod idem effectus specie potest esse a multis causis distinctis specie.	Hence it is not easy to know that this herb cured such a sick person, nor that this syrup cured such a sick person, and so on with many others, because the experiment is not easily grasped, because the same effect can be specifically caused by many distinct causes.