Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 11

Latin	English
CAP. 11. DE PRAESCIENTIA CONCLUSIONIS IN DEMONSTRATIONE.	Chapter 11. On foreknowledge of the conclusion in demonstration.
Sicut autem conclusio debet esse dubitabilis, ita debet esse talis quod eius notitia prima evidens possit accipi per propositiones necessarias evidenter notas et dispositas in modo et in figura. Hoc patet, quia demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire; sed non potest facere scire praescitum, ergo conclusio quam debet facere sciri non est necessario praescita; et potest sciri virtute demonstrationis, ergo prima eius notitia potest adquiri per praemissas demonstrationis.	But just as the conclusion must be doubtful, so it must be such that its first evident information can be received by the necessary propositions clearly known and arranged in a manner and form. This is clear, because demonstration is a syllogism, making one to know; but he cannot try know what is foreknown, therefore the conclusion which he must make to be known is not necessarily foreknown; and it can be known by virtue of demonstration, therefore the first knowledge of it can be acquired through the premises of demonstration.
Verumtamen aliquando praescitur conclusio ipsis praemissis, quod dupliciter contingere potest: quandoque enim est praecognita per experientiam, quandoque per alias praemissas.	Nevertheless, sometimes the conclusion is foretold by the premisses themselves, which can happen in two ways: for sometimes it is foreknown through experience, sometimes through other premises.
Non enim est inconveniens quod eadem conclusio per diversa principia demonstretur. Et si quaeratur an notitia accepta per experientiam alicuius conclusionis et notitia eiusdem accepta per demonstrationem sint eiusdem speciei; et similiter, notitia accepta per diversas praemissas sit eiusdem speciei, potest probabiliter dici quod si talis notitia praecise sit notitia conclusionis et nihil aliud, non est inconveniens ponere quod talis notitia sit eiusdem speciei specialissimae. Nulla enim apparet ƿ necessitas ponendi illas notitias specie diversificari, nisi quia causantur a distinctis causis.	For it is not inconvenient for the same conclusion to be demonstrated by different principles. And if it is asked whether the information received through experience of a conclusion and the information received through demonstration are of the same type; and similarly, if the information received through different premises is of the same type, it can probably be said that if such information is precisely the information of the conclusion and nothing else, it is not inappropriate to hold that such information is of the same very special type. For there appears no necessity of positing that these data are specifically differentiated, except because they are caused by distinct causes.
Sed hoc non obstat, quia non est impossibile effectus eiusdem speciei a causis specie distinctis causari.	But this does not stand in the way, because it is not impossible for effects of the same kind to be caused by causes distinct in kind.