Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 9

Latin	English
CAP. 9. DE PROPRIETATIBUS CONCLUSIONUM QUAE NON POSSUNT COMPETERE OMNIBUS PRAEMISSIS.	On properties of a conclusion that cannot belong to all the premises.
Declaratis quibusdam proprietatibus quae possunt competere omnibus propositionibus demonstrationis potissimae, videlicet tam praemissis quam conclusioni, dicendum est de proprietatibus communibus conclusionibus quae non possunt competere omnibus praemissis demonstrationis potissimae.	Having explained certain properties that can belong to every proposition in the most important form of demonstration, that is, to the premises as well as to the conclusion, we must speak of the properties common to conclusions which cannot belong to every premise of the most important form of demonstration.
Quarum una est quod omnis conclusio demonstrationis est dubitabilis, ita quod non est per se nota. Cum enim demonstratio sit syllogismus faciens scire, et nihil facit scire aliquid praescitum, necesse est, si apprehendatur illa conclusio sine praemissis, quod illa conclusio possit ignorari et per consequens de ea possit aliquis dubitare, cum non possit sciri esse falsa.	Of these, one is that every conclusion of a demonstration is capable of doubt, so that it is not known per se. For since a demonstration is a syllogism bringing about knowledge, and nothing brings about knowledge of something that is known beforehand, it is necessary (if the conclusion is to be grasped without the premises) that the conclusion can be unknown. In consequence, someone can have a doubt concerning it, for it cannot be known to be false.
Hoc etiam vult Lincolniensis in diversis locis I Posteriorum, ubi dicit in principio: ‘‘Non docemur vel addiscimus aliquid nisi illud quod cum primo concipimus est nobis dubium vel apparet falsum.	And this is what Grosseteste holds in various places on Posterior Analytics I, where he says at the beginning, ‘We do not teach or learn anything except what, when we first conceive it, is capable of doubt, or seems false to us’.
Dicendum est igitur quod omnis conclusio demonstrationis est dubitabilis propositio, quia quaelibet conƿclusio demonstrationis est quaestio; quaestio autem est dubitabilis propositio, secundum Boethium.	It must be said, therefore, that every conclusion of a demonstration is a proposition capable of doubt, since every conclusion of a demonstration is a question, but a question is capable of doubt according to Boethius.
Quamvis autem omnis conclusio demonstrationis sit dubitabilis propositio, non tamen oportet quod semper dubitetur quousque per demonstrationem certificetur, quia conclusio demonstrationis duabus viis cognosci potest.	But although every conclusion of a demonstration is a proposition capable of doubt, still it is not necessary that it should always be doubted until it is made certain by demonstration, for the conclusion of a demonstration can be cognized in two ways.
Aliqua enim cognosci potest per demonstrationem, quando ex notitia praemissarum devenitur in notitiam conclusionis.	Some can be cognized through demonstration, when from knowledge (notitiam) of the premises we arrive at knowledge of the conclusion.
Aliqua autem non solum sic cognosci potest, sed cognosci potest per experientiam, illo modo quo Aristoteles docet I Metaphysicae et II Posteriorum principia per experientiam cognosci.	Some can be cognized not only in this way, but also through experience, in the way that Aristotle teaches, in Metaphysics I and Posterior Analytics II, that principles are cognized through experience.
Sicut enim potest aliquis per experientiam cognoscere quod omnis talis herba sanat, ita potest per experientiam cognoscere quod luna est eclipsabilis. Oportet autem scire quod non solum omnis conclusio potest dubitari, sed etiam aliqua principia demonstrationis sunt dubitabilia, quamvis non omnia.	For just as someone can cognize through experience that every such herb cures, so one can cognize through experience that the moon is capable of an eclipse. But you have to know that not only can every conclusion be doubted, but also some principles of demonstration are capable of doubt, although not all.
Unde omnia quae nonnisi per experientiam cognosci possunt dubitabilia sunt, quantumcumque sint prima, ita quod ex aliis demonstrari non possunt.	Hence all which can be cognized only through experience are capable of doubt even if they are primary, so that they cannot be demonstrated from others.