Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 14

Latin	English
CAP. 14. QUAE PROPOSITIONES DICUNTUR ESSE IMMEDIATAE ET DE MODIS PRIORITATIS.	Chapter 14. What properties are said to be immediate
Ex hoc autem quod principia debent esse prima, sequitur quod debent esse immediata et indemonstrabilia.	And from the fact that principles must be first, it follows that they must be immediate and indemonstrable.
Propositio autem immediata est illa qua non est altera prior per quam possit demonstrari. Oportet autem scire quod quamvis omnia principia quae sunt prima, sunt immediata et e converso, ita quod isti termini ‘principia prima’, ‘principia immediata’ sunt convertibiles, tamen isti termini diversas possunt habere definitiones exprimentes quid nominis, propter quod non sunt termini synonymi, et ideo sine nugatione possunt poni a parte eiusdem extremi.	But an immediate proposition is that in which there is no other prior by which it can be demonstrated. It is necessary to know that although all principles which are first are immediate and vice versa, so that these terms 'first principles' and 'immediate principles' are convertible, yet these terms can have different definitions expressing the meaning of the name, for which reason they are not synonymous terms, and therefore they can be placed on the side of the same end without confusion.
Et quia omne primum est prius alio, ex hoc quod principia sunt prima, sequitur quod sunt priora conclusione. Est autem advertendum quod aliter accipitur prioritas in rebus extra animam quae non sunt signa et in terminis incomplexis et in propositionibus.	And since everything first is prior to another, from the fact that principles are first, it follows that they are prior to the conclusion. But it must be noted that priority is taken differently in things outside the soul which are not signs, and in complex terms and propositions.
Nam inter res dicitur una prior alia: vel quia praecedit eam tempore, vel quia potest esse sine ea et non e converso, vel quia est perfectior ea. Inter terminos autem incomplexos dicitur unus prior alio quia est communior eo, vel quia respectu esse exsistere ab uno ad alium est bona consequentia et non e converso.	For among things one thing is said to precede another: either because it precedes it in time, or because it can exist without it and not vice versa, or because it is more perfect. But among uncomplicated terms one is said to be prior to another because it is more common to it, or because it is a good consequence to exist with respect from one to another and not the other way around.
Inter propositiones autem una dicitur prior alia: vel quia una est magis explicativa eiusdem rei vel plurium rerum quam alia, vel quia una est ex terminis communioribus quam alia, vel quia una consequentia ƿ naturali infert aliam et non e converso.	Now among propositions one is said to precede the other: either because one is more explanatory of the same thing or of several things than another, or because one is of more general terms than another, or because one natural consequence implies another and not vice versa.
Sicut ista ‘omnis triangulus habet tres’ etc. est prior ista ‘omnis isosceles habet tres angulos’, tum quia prima habet terminum communiorem, tum quia prima consequentia naturali infert secundam et non e converso.	Like that 'every triangle has three' etc. it is prior to 'every isosceles has three angles', both because the first has a more common term, and also because the first natural consequence entails the second and not the other way around.
Similiter ista ‘omnis res composita ex materia et forma est corruptibilis’ est prior ista ‘omne corpus est corruptibile’, quia prima explicat aliquas res quas secunda non explicat et non e converso, sicut definitio explicat plures res quam definitum.	Similarly, this, 'every thing composed of matter and form is corruptible', is prior to this, 'every body is corruptible', because the first explains some things which the second does not explain and not vice versa, just as a definition explains more things than what is defined.
Ista autem prioritas non habet locum in propositionibus illis quarum una accipit definitum et alia definitionem exprimentem quid nominis tantum; et hoc, quia significatum vocabuli non potest sciri sine definitione exprimente quid nominis, si habet quid nominis.	This priority, however, has no place in those propositions, one of which takes the definite, and the other the definition expressing what is only a name; and this, because the signification of a term cannot be known without a definition expressing the meaning of the name, if it has the meaning of the name.
Potest autem sciri significatum vocabuli sine definitione exprimente quid rei, quamvis habeat definitionem exprimentem quid rei, et ideo illa prioritas in propositionibus quarum una accipit definitum et alia definitionem exprimentem quid rei habet locum.	It is possible to know the meaning of a term without a definition expressing what a thing is, although it may have a definition expressing what the thing is, and therefore that priority takes place in propositions of which one takes the defined and another the definition expressing what the thing is.
Propter quod arguendo a definitione exprimente quid nominis ad definitum est petitio principii, non autem arguendo a definitione exprimente quid rei ad definitum.	Because of this, arguing from a definition expressing what a name is to the defined is a petition to a principle (petitio principii), but not arguing from a definition expressing what the thing defined.