Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 23

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 23. DE SCIENTIA ET DEMONSTRATIONE PROPTER QUID ET QUOT SUNT QUAESTIONES.	Chapter 23. On science and a priori demonstration and how many questions there are.
Post scientiam et demonstrationem quia sequitur videre de scientia et demonstratione propter quid. Ad cuius habendam notitiam oportet primo scire quod, sicut tactum est prius, omne demonstrabile est dubitabile et per consequens quaeribile. Non tamen e converso omne dubitabile est demonstrabile nec per consequens omne quaeribile est demonstrabile.	After science and a posteriori demonstration, it follows to see about science and a priori demonstration. In order to have knowledge of this, we must first know that, as was touched on before, everything that can be demonstrated is doubtable and consequently questionable. However, on the contrary, not everything that can be doubted is demonstrable, nor consequently is everything that can be questioned demonstrable.
Unde ut sciatur quid est demonstrabile demonstratione propter quid et quid non, oportet primo scire quot sunt dubitabilia et quaeribilia ad demonstrationem pertinentia. Et est sciendum, secundum Aristotelem, quod quatuor sunt genera quaeribilium sicut quatuor sunt genera vere scitorum, hoc est, evidenter cognitorum.	Therefore, in order to know what is demonstrable by a priori demonstration and what is not, it is first necessary to know how many doubts and inquiries there are pertaining to a demonstration. And it must be known, according to Aristotle, that there are four kinds of things that can be inquired of, just as there are four kinds of things that are truly known, that is, clearly known.
Omnis enim demonstrator, si dubitet aliquid quod debet scire, aut dubitat de aliqua propositione in qua praedicatum importat aliam rem --- vel eandem rem alio modo --- ab illo quod importatur per subiectum.	For every demonstrator, if he doubts something that he ought to know, he either doubts about some proposition in which the predicate implies another thing, or the same thing in another way, from that which is implied by the subject.
Sicut potest dubitare de tali propositione ‘luna est eclipsabilis’, et tunc potest tripliciter quaerere circa talem propositionem.	Just as one can doubt such a proposition 'the moon is eclipseable', and then one can ask threefold questions about such a proposition.
Primo enim potest quaerere an talis propositio sit vera. Secundo potest quaerere, supposito quod sit certum apud eum quod est propositio vera, quid est medium per quod potest fieri notum quod illa propositio est vera.	For at first one may ask whether such a proposition is true. Secondly, he may ask, supposing that it is certain with him that a proposition is true, what is the means by which it can be known that that proposition is true.
Et istos duos modos quaerendi comprehendit Aristoteles sub quaestione ‘quia est’, ita quod haec coniunctio ‘quia’ non est ibi nota quaerendi, quasi per hanc coniunctionem ‘quia’ fiat quaestio, sed magis est nota terminandi et respondendi.	And Aristotle includes these two ways of inquiry under the question 'because of what is it?', so that this conjunction 'because' is not there the mark of inquiry, as if through this conjunction 'because' a question is made, but rather it is the mark of terminating and answering.
Scito autem quod haec propositio est vera, sive scito quod luna eclipsatur, et scito quod est aliquod medium per quod certificari potest quod luna eclipsatur, et scito quid est illud medium, puta scitur aliquis effectus vel aliquid ƿ aliud per quod certificari potest quod luna eclipsatur, contingit ulterius quaerere quare vel propter quid luna eclipsatur.	Now know that this statement is true, if you know that the moon is eclipsed, and know that there is some means by which it can be certified that the moon is eclipsed, and know what that means is, for example, if some effect or something else is known by which it can be certified that the moon is eclipsed, it is possible to inquire further why or for what reason the moon is eclipsed.
Unde potest aliquis scire evidenter quod luna eclipsatur, et per consequens habet aliquod medium, hoc est, habet aliquid per quod scitur quod luna eclipsatur et tamen potest ignorare causam quare luna eclipsatur, et ita potest quaerere quare luna eclipsatur.	Hence one can clearly know that the moon is eclipsed, and consequently has some means, that is, he has something by which it is known that the moon is eclipsed, and yet he can be ignorant of the cause why the moon is eclipsed, and thus he can inquire why the moon is eclipsed.
Et tunc quaeritur medium propriissimum per quod sciri potest quod luna eclipsatur. Et ista est alia quaestio, scilicet ‘propter quid’. Et istae sunt duae quaestiones ponentes in numerum, quia videlicet quaerunt de rebus diversis, quia praedicatum et subiectum important diversas res, vel saltem eandem rem alio modo. Aliter potest demonstrator dubitare de aliquo an sit, puta potest dubitare an Deus sit vel esse possit, et tunc quaerit an sit medium deveniendi in notitiam huius et quid est medium deveniendi in notitiam.	And then we ask for the most appropriate means by which it can be known that the moon is eclipsed. And that is another question, that is, 'because of what'. And these are the two questions put in the number, because they ask about different things, because the predicate and the subject mean different things, or at least the same thing in a different way. In another way, the demonstrator can doubt whether something exists, for example, he can doubt whether God is or can be, and then he asks whether there is a means of coming to the knowledge of this and what the means of coming to the knowledge of this is.
Hoc autem scito, quaerit ulterius: quid est? Sicut scito quod Deus est, quaerit: quid est Deus?	Knowing this, he asks further: what is it? Just as you know that God is, he asks: what is God?
Et tunc quaeritur medium propriissimum per quod sciri potest quod res est. Et istae duae quaestiones non ponunt in numerum, quia praedicatum et subiectum non significant distinctas res distinctis modis.	And then we ask for the most appropriate means by which it is possible to know what a thing is. And these two questions do not place in the number, because the predicate and the subject do not signify distinct things in distinct ways.
Ex praedictis patet quod omnis quaestio vel quaerit si est medium deveniendi in notitiam primi quaesiti, sicut quaestio quia est et quaestio si est, vel quaerit quid est illud medium, sicut quaestio quid est et quaestio propter quid est.	From the above it is clear that every question either asks if there is a means of arriving at the knowledge of the first thing asked, like the question because it is and the question if it is, or asks what that means is, like the question what it is and the question because of what it is.
Ex quo patet quod omnis quaestio est quodammodo quaestio medii. Sed sciendum est quod medium hic non accipitur pro medio syllogistico, sicut dicit	From this it is clear that every problem is in some way the problem of the medium. But it must be known that the medium is not taken here as a syllogistic medium, as says
Lincolniensis, sed vocatur hic medium omne illud per quod devenit ratio in notitiam prius ignoti. Et ita experientia ƿ potest hic vocari medium, quia quandoque aliquis per experientiam cognoscit illud quod prius ignoravit. Oportet etiam scire quod quandoque omnes istae quatuor quaestiones eriguntur super aliquam conclusionem vel terminos illius conclusionis demonstrabilis, de quibus non est necesse praecognoscere quia est. Et in isto casu verum est quod dicit Lincolniensis, scilicet quod ‘‘quaerentes duo ut fines, scilicet si est et quia est, non quaerimus ut illud super quod fit discursus sive decursus in fines, nisi medium syllogisticum ordinatum in esse debito ad extrema. In isto enim casu omnes quaestiones quaerunt medium syllogisticum per quod demonstrari potest conclusio.	Lincoln, but here is called a medium all that by which reason comes to the notice of the previously unknown. And thus experience can here be called a medium, because sometimes a person knows by experience what he was ignorant of before. It is also necessary to know that sometimes all these four questions are raised on some demonstrable conclusion or terms of that conclusion, about which it is not necessary to know in advance because it is. And in this case it is true what Lincoln says, namely that "seeking two as ends, namely, if there is and because it is, we do not seek as that upon which the discussion takes place or proceeds to the ends, unless the syllogistic medium is ordered into being due to the extremes." For in this case all the questions seek a syllogistic means by which the conclusion may be demonstrated.
Verbi gratia si haec conclusio sit demonstrabilis ‘luna eclipsatur’ et de luna non potest esse quaestio, cum debeat praecognosci quia est, non potest fieri quaestio nisi utrum luna eclipsetur vel propter quid luna eclipsatur vel si est eclipsis vel quid est eclipsis.	For example, if this conclusion is demonstrable 'the moon is eclipsed' and there can be no question about the moon, since it must be known in advance that it is, the question can only be whether the moon is eclipsed or why the moon is eclipsed or if there is an eclipse or what the eclipse is.
Et omnes istae quaestiones quaerunt aliquo modo medium per quod demonstrari potest quod luna eclipsatur.	And all these questions seek some means by which it may be shown that the moon is eclipsed.
Et in isto casu quaestio quid est et propter quid est idem sunt. Et similiter medium et causa idem; hoc est, definitio passionis explicat causam per quam respondetur ad quaestionem factam per quid.	And in this case the question of what it is and why it is are the same. And likewise the means and the cause are the same; that is, the definition of passion explains the reason by which it is answered to the question made by what.
Et ita tunc medium et causa idem; hoc est, medium syllogisticum explicat causam propter quam ita est sicut denotatur per conclusionem.	And so then the medium and the cause are the same; that is, the syllogistic medium explains the reason for which it is as it is denoted by the conclusion.
Verbi gratia sit haec conclusio demonstrabilis ‘luna eclipsatur’. Isti conclusioni et demonstrationi per quam debet demonstrari praesupponendum est quia est et quid est de luna, et de eclipsi praesupponendum est quid est quod dicitur per nomen.	For example, let this be the demonstrable conclusion 'the moon is eclipsed'. To the conclusion and demonstration by which it must be shown, it must be presupposed why is and what is of the moon, and of the eclipse it must be presupposed what is said by the word.
Unde praesupponitur ista definitio exprimens quid nominis ‘eclipsis est carentia luminis in aliquo receptivo ex interpositione corporis impedientis luminosum causare lumen in corpore receptivo luminis’.	Therefore, this definition is presupposed, expressing what the name 'eclipse' is, the lack of light in a receptive body caused by the interposition of a body obstructing the light causing light in the receptive body of light.
ƿ Omnibus istis praesuppositis potest demonstrator dubitare an eclipsis sit in rerum natura vel esse possit. Et certificato quod sit, per experientiam, quia videmus defectum luminis in aliquo ex hoc quod lignum vel paries interponitur inter candelam et aliquid illuminabile; vel hoc facto noto, per aliquam aliam viam potest dubitari quid est carentia luminis etc..	With all these presuppositions, the demonstrator can doubt whether an eclipse exists in nature or can exist. And it is certified that it is, by experience, because we see a lack of light in some of this, when a wood or a wall is interposed between a candle and something that can be illuminated; or, knowing this fact, by some other means it may be doubted what is the lack of light, etc.
Quod non est aliud quam dubitare cuiusmodi est illud corpus quod debet impedire influentiam lucis. Et notificato quod est corpus opacum vel aliquid tale, potest ulterius quaeri utrum luna sit eclipsabilis.	This is no other than doubting the nature of that body which must prevent the influence of light. And having noticed that it is an opaque body or something like that, it can be further inquired whether the moon is eclipsed.
Et ostenso per experientiam vel per aliam viam quod sic, et ita dato aliquo medio per quod evidenter cognoscitur quod luna est eclipsabilis, potest quaeri ulterius quare luna est eclipsabilis.	And if it is shown by experience or by some other means that yes, and thus given some means by which it is evidently known that the moon is eclipsable, it may be further inquired why the moon is eclipsable.
Et cum constiterit quod luna est eclipsabilis propter hoc quod terra potest poni inter lunam et solem, cessat omnis quaestio circa istam conclusionem ‘luna eclipsatur’. Patet autem in isto processu quod definitio exprimens quid nominis passionis praesupponitur omni quaestioni et quod prima quaestio est quaestio si est de passione, quae quaerit medium, id est viam deveniendi in notitiam passionis, quod est possibilis, hoc est, quod esse de ea possibiliter praedicatur.	And when it is established that the moon is eclipsed because of the fact that the earth can be placed between the moon and the sun, all questions about the conclusion that 'the moon is eclipsed' cease. It is clear in this process that the definition expressing what the name of effect is is presupposed to every question and that the first question is the question if it is about effect, which seeks a medium, that is the way to arrive at the knowledge of effect, which is possible, that is, that being is possibly predicated of it.
Secunda autem quaestio est quaestio quid est de passione, quia illud quod definitio sua exprimens quid nominis explicat in generali illa quaestio quaerit magis in speciali. Quod quidem quaesitum est generale ad illud propter quod luna eclipsatur, quia corpus opacum est commune ad terram.	And the second question is the question of what is effect, because that which, expressing its definition, explains what the name explains in general, that question seeks more in particular. This is indeed a general inquiry into that for which the moon is eclipsed, because an opaque body is common to the earth.
Scito autem si est et quid est de passione in speciali, quaeritur ulterius an passio sit praedicabilis de isto subiecto et quid est medium deveniendi in notitiam illius. Quo scito quaeritur in speciali causa propter quam passio competit isti subiecto, et ita quid et propter quid quaerunt idem; sed quaestio quid est de passione quaerit magis in generali et quaestio propter quid quaerit magis in speciali, quamvis forte quandoque sit possibile quod utraque quaerat idem aeque ƿ in speciali.	Now knowing if it is and what it is about the effect in particular, it is further asked whether the effect is predicable of this subject and what is the means of arriving at the knowledge of it. Wherefore it is inquired in a special case, on account of what effect belongs to the subject, and thus what and for what reason they seek the same thing; but the question of what the effect is asks more in general, and the question because of what it asks more in the particular, although it may sometimes be possible that both seek the same in the particular.
Et propter ista vult Philosophus quod in tali processu quaestio quid est et propter quid est idem sunt et quod medium et causa idem, quia medium syllogisticum explicat causam frequenter in tali processu propter quam ita est a parte rei sicut denotatur esse per conclusionem demonstrationis.	And for this reason the Philosopher intends that in such a process the question of what is and why is are the same, and that the medoum and the cause are the same, because the syllogistic medium frequently explains the cause in such a process because of which it is so on the part of the thing as it is denoted to be by the conclusion of the demonstration.
In multis autem aliis casibus non sunt ista vera nec multa alia quae dicit Aristoteles circa istam materiam, nec in aliis vult ea intelligi generaliter.	But in many other cases these are not true, nor are many other things which Aristotle says about this matter, nor does he want them to be understood generally in other cases.