Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 29

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 29. DE DEFINITIONE EXPRIMENTE QUID REI, NON DATA PER ADDITAMENTUM.	Chapter 29 Concerning definition expressing the quid (what is?) of a thing
Definitio exprimens quid rei, non data per additamentum, semper continet pro prima parte aliquod genus definiti et pro alia parte vel pro aliis partibus continet differentiam vel differentias essentiales vel aliquos obliquos significantes per se et primo partes rei. Et istae partes sunt diversae; nam genus importat totum, aliae partes significant partes distinctas rei.	A definition expressing what a thing is, not given by an addition, always contains for the first part some kind of thing defined and for another part or for other parts it contains a difference or essential differences or some indirect signifiers by itself and the first parts of the thing. And these parts are different; for the genus signifies the whole, the other parts signifying the distinct parts of the thing.
Prima pars definitionis, puta genus, nec a priori nec a posteriori potest demonstrari de definito; sicut quod homo sit animal demonstrari non potest, sed propositio talis sine syllogismo accipitur, mediante notitia intuitiva.	The first part of the definition, for example the genus, cannot be demonstrated a priori (from the prior) nor a posteriori (from the posterior) of the defined; just as it cannot be demonstrated that man is an animal, but such a proposition is accepted without a syllogism, by means of intuitive information.
Unde istis conceptibus ‘homo’ et ‘animal’ exsistentibus in intellectu et aliquo homine viso statim scitur quod homo est animal. Non quod isti conceptus praecedant notitiam intuitivam hominis, sed iste est processus quod primo homo cognoscitur aliquo sensu particulari, deinde ille idem homo cognoscitur ab intellectu, quo cognito habetur una notitia generalis et communis omni homini.	Hence, with these concepts 'man' and 'animal' existing in the intellect and having seen any man, it is immediately known that man is an animal. Not that these concepts precede man's intuitive knowledge, but this is the process by which man is first known by some particular sense, then the same man is known by the intellect, by which knowledge is held to be one general and common knowledge to all men.
Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio, qui conceptus communis est omni homini; quo exsistente in intellectu statim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu.	And this knowledge is called concept, intention, passion (experience), which concept is common to every man; by which, existing in the intellect, the intellect immediately knows that man is something, without discourse.
Deinde apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis omni animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae sive conceptus communis omni animali.	Then, when another animal is caught by man or other animals, one general information is elicited for every animal, and that general information for every animal is called the passion (experience) or intention of the soul or a concept common to every animal.
Quo exsistente in anima potest intellectus componere istum conceptum cum conceptu priori, quibus compositis ad invicem mediante hoc verbo ‘est’, statim intellectus assentit illi complexo, sine omni syllogismo.	With what exists in the soul, the intellect can combine this concept with the previous concept, which being combined to each other by means of this word 'is', the intellect immediately assents to that complex, without any syllogism.
Et ita quaelibet talis propositio in qua praedicatur genus de definito propriissime dicto habetur sine syllogismo. Et hoc est universaliter verum de omni genere ƿ respectu speciei quae est mere absoluta, quia talis propositio statim scitur cognitis terminis perfecte.	And so any proposition of this kind in which a genus is predicated as the most properly defined is considered without a syllogism. And this is universally true of every genus with respect to a species which is merely absolute, because such a proposition is immediately known by perfectly known terms.
Sed forte dices quod hic est syllogismus ex prioribus ‘omne animal est substantia; omnis homo est animal; igitur omnis homo est substantia’, igitur hic est demonstratio a priori: Praeterea, secundum dicta, quaelibet talis propositio esset per se nota, quia quaelibet talis propositio cognosceretur cognitis terminis, secundum istum processum.	But perhaps you will say that this is a syllogism from the previous ones, 'every animal is a substance; every man is an animal; Therefore, every man is a substance', so here is a prior demonstration: Further, according to what has been said, every such proposition would be known in itself, because every such proposition would be known by known terms, according to this process.
Et ita ista esset per se nota ‘homo est animal’ et ista ‘albedo est qualitas’, et sic de aliis.	And so it would be known by itself that 'man is an animal' and that 'whiteness is a quality', and so on.
Quod videtur manifeste falsum, cum multae tales sint dubiae multis: Praeterea, viso aliquo a remotis, potest ignorari an sit animal, et possum ulteriori experientia certificari quod est animal; igitur quod homo sit animal, potest demonstrari: Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod non omnis syllogismus ex prioribus est demonstratio, quia non quilibet talis syllogismus facit scire.	This seems manifestly false, since there are many such doubts for many people: Further, when something is seen from a distance, it can be unknown whether it is an animal, and I can be certified by further experience that it is an animal; Therefore, it can be demonstrated that man is an animal: To the first of these we must say that not every syllogism is a demonstration from priors, because not every such syllogism makes one aware.
Et hoc, quia conclusio non potest esse primo ignota et postea per illum syllogismum, tamquam per causam efficientem et sufficientem, fieri nota, quod tamen requiritur ad demonstrationem, ideo ille syllogismus non est demonstratio.	And this, because the conclusion cannot be at first unknown and later become known through that syllogism, as if through an efficient and sufficient cause, which is nevertheless required for demonstration, therefore that syllogism is not a demonstration.
Ad secundum dicendum quod quaelibet talis propositio mentalis in qua subiciuntur et praedicantur tales conceptus mere absoluti est per se nota, quia statim sciuntur cognitis terminis.	To the second reply that any such mental proposition in which such purely absolute concepts are submitted and predicated is known in itself, because they are immediately known in known terms.
Tamen non quaelibet propositio talis vocalis est per se nota, nam ex quo voces sunt ad placitum, voces mere absolutae possunt imponi eisdem de quibus habemus, vel alii habent, tales conceptus.	However, not every proposition of such a vocal symbol is known in itself, for since vocal symbols are by convention, mere absolute vocal symbols can be imposed on those of which we have, or others have, such concepts.
Et tunc aliquis, qui talem conceptum mentalem non habet, potest scire significata vocabulorum et simul cum hoc potest nescire eam, eo quod aliquos conceptus mentales non habet; sed habet conceptus mentales plures, quorum aliqui, si componantur ad invicem, totum resultans ex eis erit convertibile cum illa voce.	And then someone who does not have such a mental concept can know the meaning of terms and at the same time he can not know it, because he does not have some mental concepts; but he has several mental concepts, some of which, if they are combined with each other, the whole resulting from them will be convertible with that word.
ƿ Et ita talis propositio vocalis non est per se nota, quia non quaelibet notitia qua scitur quid significant termini sufficit ad sciendum talem propositionem. Et sicut illa propositio vocalis non est per se nota, ita illa mentalis quae componitur ex conceptibus compositis non est per se nota, quia potest haberi, quamvis nesciatur.	And so such a vocal proposition is not known in itself, because not every information by which it is known what the terms signify is sufficient to know such a proposition. And just as that vocal proposition is not known in itself, so the mental one which is composed of compound concepts is not known in itself, because it can be had, although it is not known.
Unde ego modo de facto scio quid significat hoc nomen ‘leo’ et scio quid significat hoc nomen ‘animal’ et tamen ignoro istam propositionem ‘leo potest esse animal’, quamvis credam eam esse veram.	So I know for a fact what this word 'lion' means, and I know what this word 'animal' means, and yet I am ignorant of the proposition 'a lion can be an animal', although I believe it to be true.
Et habeo unam propositionem mentalem cuius subiectum est compositum ex multis notitiis incomplexis quarum nulla est simplex et propria leoni; sed propositionem mentalem cuius subiectum sit aliquod simplex mere absolutum proprium leonibus non habeo, quia si talem propositionem mentalem haberem, statim, sine syllogismo, scirem eam.	And I have one mental proposition, the subject of which is composed of many complex facts, none of which is simple and proper to a lion; but I do not have a mental proposition whose subject is some simple, purely absolute thing proper to lions, because if I had such a mental proposition, I would know it immediately, without syllogism.
Sed numquid propositio mentalis in qua subicitur tale compositum et etiam propositio vocalis sunt demonstrabiles, ex quo sunt dubitabiles?	But are the mental proposition in which such a composition is submitted and also the vocal proposition demonstrable, from which they are doubtful?
Potest dici quod large accipiendo demonstrationem, tales sunt demonstrabiles. Et hoc, quia conclusio potest esse ignota et dubia et postea, scita propositione maiore in qua praedicatur idem praedicatum de conceptu mentali adquisito per notitiam intuitivam rei et scita minore in qua praedicatur idem conceptus de subiecto conclusionis, potest conclusio fieri nota.	It may be said that, taking the demonstration broadly, such are demonstrable. And this, because the conclusion may be unknown and doubtful, and afterwards, known by a larger proposition in which the same predicate is predicated of a mental concept acquired through intuitive knowledge of the matter, and known by a lesser proposition in which the same concept is predicated of the subject of the conclusion, the conclusion may become known.
Et ita propositio talis, saltem large accipiendo demonstrationem, potest fieri nota per demonstrationem, ex quo potest concludi syllogismo faciente ipsam conclusionem esse evidenter notam quae prius erat dubia vel apparuit esse falsa.	And so a proposition of this kind, at least by taking the demonstration broadly, can be known by demonstration, from which it can be concluded by making a syllogism that the conclusion itself is clearly known which was previously doubtful or appeared to be false.
Ad tertium concedo quod viso aliquo a remotis potest dubitari an sit animal et potest per aliquos effectus fieri notum quod est animal. Et tamen non erit demonstratio, quia demonstratio non est de singularibus, una autem tantum propositio singularis fit ibi nota. Et posito quod demonstratio esset de singularibus, adhuc non esset ibi demonstratio propositionis mentalis, habentis conceptum simplicem et ƿ mere absolutum et proprium pro subiecto, sed esset demonstratio propositionis habentis unum conceptum compositum pro subiecto.	To the third, I grant that by seeing something at a distance it may be doubted whether it is an animal, and it may be known by certain effects that it is an animal. And yet there will be no demonstration, because the demonstration is not about particulars, but only one singular proposition is known there. And supposing that the demonstration were of particulars, there would still not be a demonstration of a mental proposition, having a simple and purely absolute and proper concept for its subject, but there would be a demonstration of a proposition having a single composite concept for its subject.
Unde de talibus dico, proportionaliter, sicut dixi alias de illa propositione ‘Deus est’, quam format beatus videns essentiam divinam et de ista propositione quam nos habemus modo de facto, quia sicut sunt distinctae propositiones, ita illae propositiones quarum unam posset habere de leone ille qui videt vel vidit intuitive substantiam leonis et illa propositio quam modo de facto habeo de leone sunt distinctae propositiones, et una est demonstrabilis, large accipiendo demonstrationem, et alia nullo modo est demonstrabilis.	Wherefore I say of such things, proportionally, as I have said elsewhere of that proposition 'God is', which the blessed one forms when he sees the divine essence, and of that proposition which we have de facto, because just as they are distinct propositions, so those propositions, one of which he who sees or has seen intuitively the substance of a lion could have about a lion, and that proposition which I just de facto have about a lion are distinct propositions, and one is demonstrable, taking the demonstration broadly, and the other is in no way demonstrable.
Similiter illa propositio quam format caecus a nativitate de coloribus, dicendo quod albedo est color, est distincta propositio ab illa quam ego formo in mente, dicendo quod albedo est color; et una est simpliciter indemonstrabilis et alia forte est demonstrabilis, large accipiendo demonstrationem.	Similarly, that proposition which a blind man forms from birth about colors, saying that white is a color, is a distinct proposition from that which I form in my mind, saying that white is a color; and the one is simply indemonstrable, and the other may be demonstrable, taking the demonstration broadly.