Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 32

Latin	English
CAP. 32. DE DEFINITIONE DATA PER ADDITAMENTUM: QUOMODO SCITUR DE DEFINITO?.	Chapter 32. On definition given per additamentum – how is it known of what is defined?
Definitio data per additamentum non solum explicat essentiam rei, sed etiam simul cum hoc explicat aliquid aliud a re, et hoc vel affirmative vel negative.	The definition given by addition not only explains the essence of the thing, but also at the same time explains something different from the thing, and this either positively or negatively.
Et ideo talis definitio non solum componitur ex aliquo praedicabili per se primo modo, sed etiam componitur ex aliquibus praedicabilibus secundo modo, quae sunt passiones definiti. Et ideo ad sciendum quomodo talis definitio scitur de definito, viƿdendum est quomodo diversae partes diversimode sciuntur de eodem.	And therefore such a definition is not only composed of something predicable in itself in the first way, but it is also composed of some predicables in the second way, which are defined passions. And therefore, in order to know how such a definition is known about the defined, we must see how different parts are known about the same thing in different ways.
Unde illa pars quae explicat essentiam rei, quae est genus, non potest sciri de definito per syllogismum sed per notitiam intuitivam alicuius rei tantum, sicut dictum est prius. Aliae autem partes definitionis diversimode sciuntur de diversis definitis, secundum quod diversae passiones diversimode sciuntur de diversis subiectis.	Hence that part which explains the essence of a thing, which is the genus, cannot be known about the defined term by syllogism, but only by the intuitive knowledge of something, as was said before. But other parts of the definition are known in different ways for different defined, according as different passions are known in different ways from different subjects.
Sicut enim quaedam passiones demonstrantur de subiectis et quaedam non possunt demonstrari de subiectis suis primis, sed tantum possunt per experientiam sciri de subiectis, ita quaedam partes talis definitionis possunt demonstrative probari de definitis et quaedam non possunt demonstrari de eis; et sicut quaedam passiones possunt probari a priori de subiectis et quaedam a posteriori, ita quaedam partes talis definitionis possunt probari de definitis a priori et quaedam a posteriori.	For just as some passions are demonstrated from their subjects and some cannot be demonstrated from their first subjects, but can only be known from their subjects through experience, so some parts of such a definition can be demonstratively proved from the defined and some cannot be demonstrated from them. and as some passions can be proved a priori from their subjects and some from the latter, so some parts of such a definition can be proved from those defined a priori and some from the latter.
Verbi gratia, si haec sit definitio albedinis ‘color disgregativus visus’, prima particula, quae est genus albedinis, nullo modo potest demonstrari de albedine, sed tantum potest fieri evidenter nota per notitiam intuitivam et non per syllogismum; secunda autem particula tantum potest fieri nota per experientiam.	For example, if this is the definition of whiteness, 'a disintegrating color of sight', the first particle, which is the type of whiteness, cannot in any way be demonstrated about whiteness, but can only be clearly known by intuitive knowledge and not by syllogism; but the second particle can only become known through experience.
Si enim nullus experiretur albedinem disgregare visum, nullus sciret an albedo esset disgregativa visus. Similiter, si haec sit definitio angeli ‘substantia incorruptibilis’, prima pars non potest demonstrari de angelo; secunda posset aliquo modo demonstrari, sic ‘omne carens parte sive omne simplex est incorruptibile; angelus est simplex; igitur angelus est incorruptibilis’, vocando ‘incorruptibile’ illud quod non potest desinere esse per separationem unius partis ab alia.	For if no one had tried to disintegrate the sight of white, no one would have known whether the sight of white was disintegrating. Similarly, if this is the definition of an angel, 'an incorruptible substance', the first part cannot be demonstrated about an angel; the second could be demonstrated in some way, thus 'everything lacking in part or everything simple is incorruptible; an angel is simple; therefore an angel is incorruptible', calling 'incorruptible' that which cannot cease to exist by the separation of one part from another.
Constat itaque ex praedictis quod nulla definitio alicuius mere absoluti, affirmativi et simplicis potest de definito demonstrari, quia semper una pars est indemonstrabilis de definito tali.	It is therefore clear from what has been said that no definition of something purely absolute, positive and simple can be demonstrated from the defined, because there is always one part that cannot be demonstrated about such a defined.