Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 33

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 33. DE DEFINITIS CONNOTATIVIS: QUOMODO DEFINIUNTUR?.	Chapter 33 On connotative definata – how are they defined?
Non solum autem definita absoluta definiuntur, sed etiam definita connotativa definiuntur. Et illa sunt in duplici diff.erentia: quaedam enim sunt talia de quibus significative sumptis impossibiliter praedicatur esse, cuiusmodi sunt ‘chimaera’, ‘hircocervus’, ‘vacuum’, ‘corpus infinitum’ et huiusmodi. Alia sunt de quibus non impossibiliter praedicatur esse, cuiusmodi sunt ‘album’, ‘nigrum’, ‘risibile’, ‘calefactivum’, ‘creativum’ et huiusmodi.	But not only absolute definites are defined, but connotative definites are also defined. And these are in a twofold difference: for there are certain things of which, taken as significant, it is impossible to be predicated, such as 'chimaera', 'goat', 'void', 'infinite body' and the like. There are others of which it is not impossible to be predicated, such as 'white', 'black', 'laughable', 'warming', 'creative' and the like.
Prima habent praecise definitiones exprimentes quid nominis et nullo modo exprimentes quid rei; sicut ‘chimaera’ habet definitionem exprimentem quid hoc nomen ‘chimaera’ significat, sed non habet definitionem exprimentem quid est illa res quae est chimaera, quia nulla talis res est nec esse potest.	The first have precise definitions expressing what a name is and in no way expressing what a thing is; just as 'chimaera' has a definition expressing what this name 'chimaera' means, but it does not have a definition expressing what that thing is which is a chimera, because there is no such thing and cannot be.
Alia autem connotativa, hoc est illa quae significant diversa vel idem diversimode, hoc est affirmative vel negative vel in recto vel in obliquo vel aliquibus talibus modis diversis, possunt habere duplicem definitionem: scilicet unam quae exprimit quid nominis tantum, et illa est propriissima definitio talis definiti, propter quod vocatur a nonnullis definitio formalis et definitio secundum speciem; aliam, exprimentem quid rei, habet, quae non est propriissima definitio talis definiti.	But other connotatives, that is, those that signify different things or the same thing in different ways, that is, affirmatively or negatively, or in a direct or oblique way, or in some such different ways, can have a double definition: namely, one that expresses what the name is only, and that is the most proper definition of such a definition, for which reason it is called by some a formal definition and a definition according to species; another, expressing the nature of the matter, is not the most proper definition of such a term.
Propter quod frequenter dixi quod tale connoƿtativum non habet definitionem nisi exprimentem quid nominis tantum et non definitionem exprimentem quid rei, quia talis oratio non est propriissima definitio talis definiti; immo, forte non est proprie definitio sua, et propter hoc talis definitio vocatur ab aliquibus definitio materialis.	For this reason I have often said that such a connotative has no definition except that which expresses what is only a name, and not a definition expressing what is a thing, because such an expression is not the most proper definition of such a term; nay, perhaps it is not properly its own definition, and for this reason such a definition is called by some a material definition.
Verbi gratia hoc nomen ‘serra’ potest dupliciter definiri. Uno modo sic ‘serra est aliquid quo possumus ligna dividere’. Sit ita quod haec sit definitio sua exprimens quid debemus intelligere per hoc nomen	For example, this word 'serra' (saw) can be defined in two ways. In one way, a saw is something with which we can split wood. Let it be so that this is its own definition expressing what we are to understand by this name
‘serra’; ita quod si sit aliquid cui non convenit haec oratio, eo ipso non significatur hoc nomine, saltem in recto. Ista oratione nota de hoc definito ‘serra’ possum ignorare an serra sit aer vel aqua, lignum vel lapis, caro vel os, et ita ignoro qualis res est serra et nescio quid est serra.	'saw'; so that if there is something to which this speech does not apply, it is not signified by this name, at least in the correct sense. In that well-known speech about this defined 'saw', I can ignore whether the saw is air or water, wood or stone, flesh or bone, and so I do not know what kind of thing a saw is and I do not know what a saw is.
Et ideo definitio exprimens illas res quibus, et non aliis, potest competere haec oratio ‘aliquid quo possumus dividere ligna’, erit oratio exprimens quid est serra, puta quod sit tale ferrum quo possumus dividere ligna.	And therefore the definition expressing those things to which, and not others, this sentence 'something with which we can cut wood' can belong, will be a sentence expressing what a saw is, suppose that it is such a piece of iron with which we can cut wood.
Quae tamen non est definitio proprie dicta, quamvis exprimat quid est serra, hoc est, quamvis exprimat quae res est serra; et hoc quia si esset aliquid aliud a ferro quo possemus dividere ligna, illud esset serra, et tamen non esset ferrum quo possemus dividere ligna.	This, however, is not a definition properly so called, although it expresses what a saw is, that is, although it expresses what a thing is a saw; and this because if there were anything other than iron with which we could cut wood, it would be a saw, and yet there would be no iron with which we could cut wood.
Istae autem duae definitiones serrae --- si sint definitiones; quia exempla ponimus, non ut ita sint, sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt --- sic se habent quod quidquid significatur per definitionem secundam, significatur etiam per definitionem primam, quamvis generalius.	Now these two definitions of saws --- if they are definitions; because we set examples, not that they should be so, but that those who learn should feel that they are in such a way that whatever is signified by the second definition is also signified by the first definition, although more generally.
Et ita est frequenter quod talium orationum, quarum una est definitio exprimens quid nominis et alia exprimens quid rei, una accipit pro prima parte aliquid communius et alia accipit pro prima parte aliquid inferius ad illud commune, et ceterae partes sunt eadem in utraque oratione. Verumtamen praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis possunt dari aliae definitiones exprimentes alias causas; puta, si in definiƿtione exprimente quid nominis ponatur causa finalis, possunt dari aliae definitiones accipientes alias causas, quae non erunt definitiones exprimentes quid nominis nec erunt definitiones exprimentes quid rei, proprie loquendo de definitione exprimente quid rei. Oportet tamen quod semper vel frequenter quando dantur diversae definitiones per diversas causas, hoc est per diversa nomina exprimentia diversas causas, et una illarum est definitio exprimens quid nominis, in illa ponatur nomen indicans causam finalem et non in aliis, quamvis forte aliquando sit e converso.	And so it frequently happens that of such speeches, of which one definition expresses what is the name and another expresses what the thing is, one takes for the first part something more common and the other takes for the first part something inferior to that common, and the other parts are the same in both speeches. Nevertheless, in addition to the definition expressing what the name is, other definitions can be given expressing other causes; for example, if in a definition expressing the meaning of a name the final cause is put, other definitions may be given taking other causes, which will not be definitions expressing the meaning of a name, nor will they be definitions expressing the meaning of a thing, properly speaking of a definition expressing the meaning of a thing. It is necessary, however, that always or frequently when different definitions are given by different causes, that is, by different names expressing different causes, and one of these is a definition expressing what the name is, the name indicating the final cause should be placed in it and not in the others, although sometimes it may be the other way around.