Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 34

Latin	English
CAP. 34. QUOMODO DEFINITIONES CONNOTATIVORUM POSSUNT COGNOSCI DE DEFINITIS?.	Chapter 34 How can definitions of connotatives be known from what is defined?
Declarata praemissa divisione definitionum connotativorum, videndum est quomodo istae definitiones possunt cognosci de definitis.	Having clarified the premise of the division of connotative definitions, it is necessary to see how these definitions can be known from the defined.
Et est dicendum quod generaliter definitio exprimens quid nominis non potest demonstrari de definito, sed ista praesupponitur omni demonstrationi et omni syllogismo. Et si talis definitio sit definitio vocalis vel signum ad placitum institutum, tantum scitur per doctrinam, in addiscendo scilicet ab aliis loquentibus significata vocabulorum vel instituendo talia signa ad significandum.	And it must be said that, in general, a definition expressing the meaning of a name cannot be demonstrated about the defined, but this is presupposed to every demonstration and every syllogism. And if such a definition is a vocal definition or a sign established by convention, it is only known through learning, that is, in learning from other speakers the significations of terms or establishing such signs to signify.
Et ideo de tali definitione non est magna difficultas, quamvis propter ignorantiam talium definitionum innumerae difficultates et infinita opinionum contrarietas tam in philosophia quam in theologia consurgant.	And therefore there is no great difficulty about such a definition, although because of ignorance of such definitions innumerable difficulties and infinite contradictions of opinion arise both in philosophy and in theology.
Sed de alia definitione est maior difficultas. Et est sciendum quod tales definitiones possunt esse diversae. Quandoque enim praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis potest ƿ a qualibet causa sumi definitio, si ibi sint quatuor causae, et si sint ibi tantum causa finalis et efficiens, potest ab utraque illarum sumi definitio. Et illae definitiones quae sumuntur a causa finali et formali vocantur definitiones formales, illae autem quae sumuntur a causa efficiente et materiali vocantur definitiones materiales.	But there is a greater difficulty about other definitions. And it must be known that such definitions can be different. For sometimes, in addition to the definition expressing what a name is, a definition can be taken from any cause, if there are four causes, and if there are only a final and efficient cause, the definition can be taken from both types. And those definitions which are taken from a final and formal cause are called formal definitions, and those which are taken from an efficient and material cause are called material definitions.
Et sic se habent quod definitio materialis potest demonstrari quandoque per definitionem formalem. Verbi gratia praesupponatur significatum vocabuli istius termini ‘domus’, et per consequens praesupponatur definitio exprimens quid nominis; qua nota, adquiratur sine demonstratione definitio sumpta a causa finali domus, ut sciatur quod ‘domus est cooperimentum prohibens nos a frigore, ventis, pluvia et caumatibus’.	And so it is that a material definition can sometimes be demonstrated by a formal definition. For example, the meaning of the term 'house' is presupposed, and consequently a definition is presupposed expressing what the name means; by which note, the definition taken from the final cause of the house is acquired without demonstration, so that it is known that 'the house is a covering that prevents us from cold, winds, rain and snow'.
Quo facto potest demonstrari quod domus componitur ex lignis, lapidibus, et sic de aliis, per tale argumentum ‘omne prohibens a frigore, pluvia etc. componitur ex lignis etc.’, --- quae ex hoc scitur quod talia possunt resistere pluviae etc. ---; ‘sed domus est cooperimentum prohibens nos etc.; ergo domus componitur ex talibus’.	By this fact it can be demonstrated that the house is composed of wood, stones, and so on, by such an argument as 'preventing everything from cold, rain, etc.' it is composed of wood, etc.' ---; but the house is a covering that prevents us, etc.; therefore the house is composed of such things.
Ista conclusio ignota fit nota non per experientiam sed per propositiones notas, dispositas in modo et in figura, et ita una definitio demonstratur per aliam de definito. Sed hoc numquam verum est nisi quando definitum est connotativum, cuiusmodi sunt omnia nomina artificialium.	This unknown conclusion becomes known, not through experience, but through known propositions, arranged in manner and form, and thus one definition is demonstrated by another of the defined. But this is never true except when the connotative is defined, which all artificial names are.
Et similiter si ista oratio ‘syllogismus faciens scire’ non esset definitio indicans quid nominis demonstrationis, per istam definitionem sumptam a causa finali demonstrationis posset demonstrari ista definitio ‘ <demonstratio est> ex primis et veris et immediatis’.	And similarly, if this sentence 'making a syllogism to know' was not a definition indicating what the name of demonstration is, by means of this definition taken from the cause of the final demonstration it could be demonstrated that this definition is '<demonstration is> from the first and true and immediate'.
Et ideo quia auctores aliquando utuntur hoc nomine ‘demonstratio’ non tamquam nomine connotativo, dicunt quod Aristoteles per unam definitionem demonstrationis demonstrat aliam de demonstratione.	And therefore, because the authors sometimes use this name 'demonstration' not as a connotative name, they say that Aristotle, through one definition of demonstration, demonstrates another about demonstration.
ƿ Ex praedictis patet quod praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis possunt eiusdem passionis et eiusdem nominis esse plures definitiones, quarum una est indemonstrabilis et alia demonstrabilis.	From the above it is clear that, in addition to the definition expressing what a name can be, there are several definitions of the same passion and the same name, one of which is unprovable and the other demonstrable.
Propter quod ex omni tali demonstratione potest elici definitio et ex omni tali definitione potest haberi demonstratio. Sed praeter istas definitiones est una definitio complectens utramque, quae non differt a demonstratione nisi situ.	Because of this, a definition can be derived from every such demonstration, and a demonstration can be derived from every such definition. But in addition to these definitions there is one definition comprising both, which does not differ from demonstration except in situation.
Verbi gratia sit haec demonstratio ‘omne cooperimentum prohibens nos a pluvia et ventis etc. componitur ex lignis, lapidibus etc.; domus est cooperimentum prohibens etc.; ergo domus componitur ex talibus’.	For example, let this demonstration be 'every covering preventing us from the rain and winds, etc.' it is composed of wood, stones, etc.; the house is a covering preventing etc.; therefore the house is composed of such things.
In ista demonstratione ponuntur duae definitiones, quarum una est medium et alia est praedicatum conclusionis, quae coniungantur ad invicem sic ‘domus est quoddam cooperimentum compositum ex lignis et lapidibus, prohibens nos a pluvia, frigore etc.’.	In this demonstration, two definitions are put forward, one of which is the middle and the other is the predicate of the conclusion, which are connected to each other in this way: 'a house is a kind of covering composed of wood and stones, preventing us from rain, cold, etc.'
Patet quod quidquid ponitur in demonstratione, ponitur in hac definitione, sed diverso ordine. Nam in demonstratione praeponitur definitio sumpta a fine, in ista autem definitione completa praeponitur definitio sumpta a partibus domus.	It is clear that whatever is stated in the demonstration is stated in this definition, but in a different order. For in the demonstration the definition taken from the end is preferred, but in this complete definition the definition taken from the parts of the house is preferred.
Oportet autem scire quod quando duae definitiones coniunguntur ad invicem ut faciant definitionem unam completam, non sunt secundum se totas coniungendae, quia tunc in illa tota definitione esset nugatio; sed posita una definitione, coniungenda est tota alia praeter illud quod iam acceptum est, sicut patere potest in praedicta definitione domus.	But it is necessary to know that when two definitions are joined to one another to make one complete definition, they are not to be joined as wholes in themselves, because then there would be nonsense in that whole definition; but having laid down one definition, a whole other must be joined besides that which has already been accepted, as can be seen in the aforesaid definition of house.
Sciendum est etiam quod in hac parte non tantum vocatur ‘materia’ vel ‘causa materialis’ aliqua pars distincta realiter a forma et componens cum ea ipsam recipiendo, sed causa materialis vocatur hic pars integralis rei, quo modo ligna et lapides vocantur materia domus et duae praemissae et conclusio vocantur materia syllogismi vel demonstrationis.	It must also be known that in this part it is not so much called 'matter' or 'material cause' that any part really distinct from the form and composing it by receiving it, but the material cause is called here an integral part of the thing, in the same way that wood and stones are called the material of a house and the two premises and the conclusion are called the material of a syllogism or demonstration.