Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 35

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 35. QUOMODO TERMINATUR QUAESTIO ‘QUIA EST’ ET QUOMODO PROPOSITIO PER SE SECUNDO MODO, DUBITABILIS TAMEN, POTEST EVIDENTER COGNOSCI?.	Chapter 35. How the question quia est (why is it?) is settled and and how can a proposition per se in the second mode, though doubtful, be obviously known?
Ostenso quomodo terminatur quaestio ‘si est’ et quomodo terminatur quaestio ‘quid est’, videndum est quomodo terminatur quaestio ‘quia est’; et hoc est in sciendo quomodo propositio per se secundo modo, dubitabilis, potest evidenter cognosci.	Having shown how the question ‘if it is’ is settled and how the question ‘what it is’ is settled, we must see how the question ‘why it is’ is settled; and this is in knowing how a proposition per se, in the second mode, although doubtful, can be clearly known.
Et est primo sciendum quod quandoque passio praedicatur de subiecto suo primo sine omni determinatione, specificatione seu modificatione; quandoque praedicatur de subiecto suo primo cum aliqua determinatione seu modificatione; quandoque praedicatur de inferiori ad subiectum suum primum; quandoque de superiori; et quandoque praedicatur de concreto sui primi subiecti; vel de aliquo de quo dicitur illud concretum.	And it must first be known that sometimes an attribute is predicated of its first subject without any determination, specification or modification; sometimes it is predicated of its first subject with some determination or modification; sometimes it is predicated of something inferior to its first subject; sometimes of something superior; and sometimes it is predicated of the concrete of its first subject; or of something of which that concrete is said.
Exemplum primi ‘omnis triangulus habet tres’ etc.; exemplum secundi ‘quandocumque luna est in tali situ, tunc eclipsatur’; exemplum tertii ‘omnis isosceles habet tres angulos’ etc.; exemplum quarti ‘aliqua figura habet tres angulos’ etc.; exemplum quinti ‘omne calidum est calefactivum’, si calor sit primum subiectum calefactivum; exemplum sexti ‘omnis ignis est calefactivus’. Primo autem videndum est quomodo propositio dubitabilis, in qua praedicatur passio de subiecto suo primo sine omni determinatione extremi vel compositionis, potest cognosci evidenter. Et primo supposita definitione huius nominis ‘passio’, quae posita est supra, videndum est quomodo potest evidenter cognosci propositio in qua praedicatur passio importans praecise illud idem in recto quod importat subƿiectum et aliquam formam inhaerentem sibi in obliquo; de qua dico quod nullo modo potest demonstrari de subiecto suo primo sine omni determinatione.	Example of the first: ‘every triangle has three’ etc.; example of the second: ‘whenever the moon is in such and such a position, then it is eclipsed’; example of the third: ‘every isosceles has three angles’ etc.; example of the fourth: ‘some figure has three angles’ etc.; example of the fifth: ‘every hot thing is heating’, if heat is the first subject of heating; example of the sixth: ‘every fire is heating’. First, however, we must see how a doubtful proposition, in which an attribute is predicated of its first subject without any determination of the extreme or composition, can be clearly known. And first, assuming the definition of this name ‘passion’ (attribute), which was given above, we must see how a proposition in which an effect is predicated, implying precisely the same thing in the direct that it implies the subject and some form inherent to it in the oblique, can be clearly known; of which I say that it can in no way be demonstrated of its first subject without any determination.
Sicut si ista propositio sit primo vera ‘omne corpus est colorabile’, ista nullo modo potest demonstrari, quia si posset demonstrari, oporteret quod ‘colorabile’ alicui primo inesset, per cuius notitiam posset intellectus devenire in notitiam istius propositionis.	For example, if the proposition 'every body is colorable' is initially true, it cannot be demonstrated in any way, because if it could be demonstrated, it would be necessary for 'colorable' to be innate in something, through the knowledge of which the intellect could come to the knowledge of that proposition.
Sed hoc non est verum: quia si sic, cum talis propositio non posset esse nisi universalis affirmativa, oporteret quod hoc praedicatum ‘colorabile’ prius et notius competeret alicui alteri subiecto.	But this is not true: because if so, since such a proposition could only be universally affirmative, it would be necessary that this predicate ‘colorable’ should belong first and more well-known to some other subject.
Et tunc vel definitioni subiecti vel alicui alteri. Non alteri a definitione, manifestum est; nec ipsi definitioni, quia numquam potest talis propositio in qua ‘colorabile’ praedicatur de definitione corporis evidenter cognosci nisi per experientiam cognoscatur quod omne corpus est colorabile, et per consequens una non potest dici medium demonstrandi aliam. Dicendum est ergo quod omnes tales propositiones ‘omne corpus est colorabile’, ‘aqua est calefactibilis’ et huiusmodi, si sint primae, non sunt demonstrabiles, sed tantum per experientiam adquiritur evidens earum notitia, sicut inductive patet. Et si dicatur quod omnis effectus potest demonstrari per suam causam, respondendum est quod quamvis omnis passio, importans effectum alicuius causae inhaerentem alteri cum alio cointellecto, sit demonstrabilis per medium importans illam causam, tamen non est demonstrabilis talis passio sine determinatione sumpta de quolibet subiecto, nec est demonstrabilis de aliquo subiecto quocumque modo.	And then either to the definition of the subject or to some other. Not to another from the definition, it is clear; nor to the definition itself, because such a proposition in which ‘colorable’ is predicated of the definition of a body can never be clearly known unless it is known through experience that every body is colorable, and consequently one cannot be called a means of demonstrating another. It must therefore be said that all such propositions ‘every body is colorable’, ‘water is heatable’ and the like, if they are primary, are not demonstrable, but only through experience is their evident knowledge acquired, as is clear inductively. And if it is said that every effect can be demonstrated through its cause, it must be answered that although every effect, implying the effect of some cause inherent in another with another co-understood, is demonstrable through a medium implying that cause, nevertheless such an effect is not demonstrable without a determination taken from any subject, nor is it demonstrable from any subject in any way.
Verbi gratia sit ‘colorabile’ passio ipsius corporis tamquam subiecti primi et sint qualitates primae causae colorum inhaerentium corporibus. Istis positis ista non potest demonstrari ‘omne corpus est colorabile’, sed prima notitia ipsius accipietur per sensum et experientiam.	For example, let the attribute of the body itself as the first subject be ‘colorable’ and let the qualities of the first cause of the colors inherent in bodies be. With these posited, it cannot be demonstrated that ‘every body is colorable’, but the first knowledge of it will be received through sense and experience.
Ex hoc enim quod videmus corpus colorari accipimus quod omne corpus est colorabile; et ultra, ex hoc quod videmus quod tale corpus ad praesentiam ƿ ignis vel solis habet talem colorem et ad praesentiam aliorum corporum habentium alias qualitates habet alium colorem, et sic de aliis, accipimus per experientiam quod tales qualitates sunt causae talium colorum, et ita possunt esse principia rectificantia aliquas demonstrationes, quas tamen non intrant.	For from the fact that we see a body being colored we understand that every body is colorable; and further, from the fact that we see that such a body has such a color in the presence of fire or the sun and has a different color in the presence of other bodies having other qualities, and so on, we understand through experience that such qualities are the causes of such colors, and thus they can be principles rectifying some demonstrations, which however they do not enter into.
Unde arguitur sic ‘omne corpus approximabile in tali distantia igni est colorabile ab illo; lapis est huiusmodi; ergo lapis est colorabilis ab igne’. Et per talem modum contingit demonstrare per omne genus causae.	Hence it is argued thus ‘every body approachable at such a distance to fire is colorable by it; a stone is of this kind; therefore a stone is colorable by fire’. And in such a way it is possible to demonstrate through every kind of cause.
Cum hoc tamen stat quod talis passio, quae praecise importat idem in recto quod importat subiectum et formam inhaerentem sibi in obliquo, non sit demonstrabilis de subiecto suo primo sine omni addito.	However, it stands to reason that such an attribute, which implies precisely the same thing in the direct sense as it implies the subject and the form inherent to it in the oblique sense, cannot be demonstrated from its first subject without anything added.