Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 38

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 38. DE PASSIONE IMPORTANTE IDEM IN RECTO QUOD SIGNIFICAT SUUM SUBIECTUM ET IN OBLIQUO REM ALIAM: QUOMODO DEMONSTRATUR DE SUO SUBIECTO?.	Chapter 38. Is an important attribute that signifies the same thing directly that its subject signifies in the oblique the same thing?
Sicut dictum est de passione quae importat in recto illud idem quod significat suum subiectum et in obliquo rem inhaerentem illi, quod non potest demonstrari de subiecto suo primo sine omni determinatione addita, et tamen cum determinatione addita potest demonstrari de suo subiecto primo, et absolute, sine omni determinatione, potest demonstrari de inferioribus ad subiectum primum per illud subiectum primum tamquam per medium, ita dicendum est, proportionaliter, de passione importante idem in recto quod significat suum subiectum et in obliquo rem aliam, quae est effectus vel causa, vel aliam attributionem habens ad rem importatam per subiectum suum primum: quia talis passio sine omni determinatione de subiecto suo primo demonstrari non potest.	Just as it was said about an attribute, and yet with an added determination it can be demonstrated from its first subject, and absolutely, without any determination, it can be demonstrated from things inferior to the first subject through that first subject as through a medium, so it must be said, proportionally, about an attribute which implies the same thing in the direct that its subject signifies in the oblique is another thing, which is an effect or cause, or having another attribution to the thing implied by its first subject: because such an attribute cannot be demonstrated from its first subject without any determination.
Sed talis propositio praecise potest evidenter sciri per experientiam, sive experientia accipiatur per notitiam intuitivam sensitivam sive per notitiam intuitivam intellectivam tantum.	But such a proposition can be precisely and clearly known through experience, whether the experience is received through intuitive, sensitive knowledge or through intuitive, intellectual knowledge only.
Unde ista ‘calor est calefactivus’ nullo modo potest per syllogismum demonstrari, sed eius notitia prima per experientiam capietur. Nisi enim aliquis experiretur quod ad praesentiam caloris sequitur calor in alio, numquam plus sciret quod calor est productivus caloris quam quod albedo est productiva albedinis.	Hence, the statement ‘heat is heating’ cannot be demonstrated by any means by syllogism, but its first knowledge must be acquired by experience. For unless someone experienced that the presence of heat results in heat in another, he would never know any more that heat is productive of heat than that whiteness is productive of whiteness.
Et similiter tales ‘anima est susceptibilis disciplinae’, ‘anima est beatificabilis’, ‘anima est peccabilis’ et huiusmodi demonstrari non possunt. Et ita tales passiones de suis subiectis primis demonstrari non possunt sine omni determinatione addita.	And similarly such things as 'the soul is susceptible of discipline', 'the soul is beatificable', 'the soul is sinful' and the like cannot be demonstrated. And so such attributes cannot be shown of their first subjects without any additional determination.
Tamen cum determinatione addita possunt demonstrari, sicut demonstrari potest quod calor approximatus ligno calefacit ipsum si non impediatur.	However, with additional determination they can be shown, as it can be shown that the heat approximated by the wood heats itself if it is not prevented.
Et consimiliter est de aliis. Possunt etiam demonstrari de multis inferioribus, saltem de illis quae non oportet praescire ante cognitionem universalis.	And the same is true of others. They can also be shown about many inferior things, at least about those things that do not need to be foreknown before universal knowledge.
ƿ Quamvis autem non possint demonstrari de subiectis suis primis, tamen quando subiectum primum alicuius passionis talis est nomen formae informantis reliquum, tunc possunt demonstrari de illo de quo primo praedicatur concretum illius subiecti.	Although they cannot be demonstrated of their first subjects, yet when the first subject of an attribute is such a name of the form informing the rest, then they can be demonstrated of that of which the concrete of that subject is first predicated.
Verbi gratia, sit calefactivum prima passio caloris et sit ignis illud de quo primo praedicatur calidum, quod est concretum caloris, ita quod nihil sit nec esse possit calidum nisi ignis. Quo posito dico quod de igne potest demonstrari ‘calefactivum’ per concretum caloris tamquam per medium, sic arguendo ‘omne calidum est calefactivum; omnis ignis est calidus; ergo omnis ignis est calefactivus’.	For example, let heating be the first attribute of heat, and let fire be that of which hot is first predicated, which is the concretion of heat, so that nothing is and cannot be hot except fire. Having said this, I say that fire can be shown to be 'warming' through the concrete of heat as through a medium, thus arguing that 'everything hot is warming; all fire is hot; therefore all fire is heating'.
In isto enim syllogismo maior est prior et notior conclusione, eo quod per medium terminum exprimitur in obliquo illud quod importatur per subiectum primum ‘calefactivum’, non sic per subiectum conclusionis.	For in this syllogism the former is greater and better known than the conclusion, inasmuch as by means of the middle term is expressed obliquely that which is implied by the first 'warming' subject, not so by the subject of the conclusion.
Similiter minor est notior, quia posset esse nota etiam tempore ante conclusionem.	Similarly, the lesser is the more well-known, because it could be known even at the time before the conclusion.
Oportet autem scire quod talis passio, quae primo competit nomini formae, quandoque praedicatur de toto composito ex forma et subiecto et quandoque de subiecto, sicut ‘esse susceptibile disciplinae’ praedicatur de anima intellectiva et de toto composito ex corpore et anima intellectiva, puta de homine; sed ‘calefactivum’ praedicatur de igne qui non componitur ex subiecto caloris et ex calore, et forte quandoque praedicatur de utroque vel de nomine utriusque.	It is necessary to know that such an attribute, which first belongs to the name of form, is sometimes predicated of the whole composed of form and subject and sometimes of the subject, just as 'being susceptible of discipline' is predicated of the intellectual soul and of the whole composed of body and intellectual soul, for example of man; but 'warming' is predicated of fire which is not composed of the subject of heat and of heat, and perhaps sometimes it is predicated of both or of the name of both.
Quando autem talis passio praedicatur de toto sive de nomine totius, tunc debet demonstrari de illo per concretum significans totum in recto et formam in obliquo. Sicut esse susceptibile disciplinae debet demonstrari de homine per ‘animatum’, quod debet significare hominem in recto et animam in obliquo, sic arguendo ‘omne animatum anima rationali est susceptibile disciplinae; omnis homo est huiusmodi; igitur omnis homo est susceptibilis disciplinae’.	But when such an attribute is predicated of the whole, or of the name of the whole, then it must be shown of it by the concrete, signifying the whole directly, and the form in the oblique. Just as man's susceptibility to discipline must be shown by 'animate', which must mean man directly and soul in the oblique, thus arguing that 'every animated soul is susceptible to discipline; every man is of this kind; therefore every man is susceptible of discipline.
Quando autem illa passio non praedicatur de toto sed de subiecto, tunc debet fieri demonstratio per concretum importans subiectum in recto et formam in obliquo, sicut exemplificatum est de calefactivo.	But when that attribute is not predicated of the whole but of the subject, then the demonstration must be made by means of the concrete, importing the subject directly and the form in the oblique, as was exemplified in the heating.
ƿ Et quod dictum est de passione competenti primo nomini formae, idem, proportionaliter, dicendum est de passione competenti primo nomini materiae vel subiecti, quia per concretum illius potest fieri demonstratio de nomine totius tamquam per medium.	And what has been said of the attribute competent to the first name of the form, the same, proportionally, must be said of the attribute competent to the first name of matter or subject, because through its concretion the demonstration of the name of the whole can be made as through a medium.
Et sicut tales passiones possunt demonstrari de illis de quibus praedicantur concreta quae praecise important totum vel subiecta formarum talium, ita possunt tales passiones demonstrative probari de conceptibus compositis vel connotativis, de quibus necessario praedicantur prima subiecta, si possint tales propositiones esse dubiae.	And just as such attributes can be demonstrated about those of which concretes are predicated, which precisely carry the whole or the subjects of such forms, so such attributes can be demonstrated demonstratively about compound or connotative concepts, about which the first subjects are necessarily predicated, if such propositions can be doubtful.
Propter quod de illo subiecto quod nos habemus pro statu isto de Deo possunt demonstrative probari tales passiones ‘creativum’, ‘immortale’, ‘aeternum’ et huiusmodi, et erit medium talium demonstrationum signum simplex et proprium et absolutum Dei, quale medium nos pro statu isto habere non possumus, propter quod nec tales demonstrationes sunt nobis possibiles.	Because of that subject which we have for this state of God, such attributes as 'creative', 'immortal', 'eternal' and the like can be demonstrated demonstratively, and the medium of such demonstrations will be the simple and proper and absolute sign of God, which medium we cannot have for this state, for which reason such demonstrations are not possible for us.
Si tamen beatus, qui primo in via dubitavit istam ‘Deus est creativus’ vel istam ‘Deus est’ vel aliam consimilem, retineat easdem cognitiones et apprehensiones quas prius et formet unam propositionem in qua idem sit praedicatum quod in ista quam nos habemus ‘Deus est creativus’ et subiectum sit aliqua cognitio absoluta, simplex et propria Deo, et illud idem subiectum praedicet de isto subiecto nostrae propositionis ‘Deus est creativus’, dico quod concludet istam conclusionem quam nos habemus ‘Deus est creativus’.	If, however, the saint, who first doubted this 'God is creative' or this 'God is' or something similar, retains the same knowledges and apprehensions as before and forms a proposition in which the predicate is the same as in that which we have 'God is creative' and the subject is some absolute, simple and proper knowledge of God, and that same subject predicts about this subject of our proposition 'God is creative', I say that he concludes the same conclusion that we have God is creative.
Et erit iste syllogismus sibi demonstrativus, quia per praemissas evidenter sibi notas adquiret notitiam conclusionis prius sibi dubiae.	And this syllogism will be demonstrative to him, because through the premisses which are evidently known to him, he will acquire knowledge of the conclusion which he had previously doubted.